Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'Reply to Hellman' and 'Noneism or Allism?'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
15533 We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Substitutionalists simulate quantification over fictional characters by quantifying for real over fictional names.
     From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.159)
     A reaction: I would say that a fiction is a file of conceptual information, identified by a label. The label brings baggage with it, and there is no existence in the label.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15534 We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis]
     Full Idea: We can quantify over Meinongian objects by quantifying for real over property bundles (such as the bundle of roundness and squareness).
     From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.159)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
10245 One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
     Full Idea: One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient.
     From: Henri Poincaré (Science and Method [1908], p.65), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics
     A reaction: This is the culminating view after new geometries were developed by tinkering with Euclid's parallels postulate.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
15532 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis]
     Full Idea: An expansive friend of the controversial entities who says they all exist may be called an 'allist'; a tough desert-dweller who says that none of them exist may be called a 'noneist'.
     From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.152)
     A reaction: Lewis gives examples of the obvious and the controversial entities. Lewis implies that he himself is in between. The word 'desert' is a reference to Quine.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
15535 We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis]
     Full Idea: If 'existence' is understood so that it can be a substantive thesis that only some of the things there are exist, we will have none of it.
     From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.163)
     A reaction: Lewis is a strong advocate, following Quine, of the univocal sense of the word 'exist', and I agree with them.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9379 A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it [Quine]
     Full Idea: A sentence is obvious if (a) it is true and (b) any speaker of the language is prepared, for any reason or none, to assent to it without hesitation, unless put off by being asked so obvious a question.
     From: Willard Quine (Reply to Hellman [1975], p.206), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
     A reaction: This comes from someone who is keen to deny a priori knowledge, but what are we to make of the expostulations "It's obvious, you idiot!", and "Now I see it, it's obvious!", and "It seemed obvious, but I was wrong!"?