10415
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Properties make round squares and round triangles distinct, unlike exemplification [Zalta, by Swoyer]
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Full Idea:
On Zalta's view, properties with the same encoding extensions are identical, but may be distinct with the same exemplification extension. So the properties of being a round square and a round triangle are distinct, but with the same exemplification.
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From:
report of Edward N. Zalta (Abstract Objects:intro to Axiomatic Metaphysics [1983]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties
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A reaction:
(For Zalta's view, see Idea 10414) I'm not sure about 'encoding' (cf. Hodes's use of the word), but the idea that an abstract object is just a bunch of possible properties (assuming properties have prior availability) seems promising.
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9379
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A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it [Quine]
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Full Idea:
A sentence is obvious if (a) it is true and (b) any speaker of the language is prepared, for any reason or none, to assent to it without hesitation, unless put off by being asked so obvious a question.
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From:
Willard Quine (Reply to Hellman [1975], p.206), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
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A reaction:
This comes from someone who is keen to deny a priori knowledge, but what are we to make of the expostulations "It's obvious, you idiot!", and "Now I see it, it's obvious!", and "It seemed obvious, but I was wrong!"?
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