|
15784
|
The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
|
|
Full Idea:
A Meinongian has already posited everything that could, or even could not, be; how, then, can any subsequent brandishing of Ockham's Razor be to the point?
|
|
From:
William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 02)
|
|
A reaction:
See the ideas of Alexius Meinong. Presumably these crazy Meinongians must make some distinction between what actually exists in front of your nose, and the rest. So the Razor can use that distinction too.
|
|
12185
|
Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge]
|
|
Full Idea:
Edgington's position is that logical necessity is an epistemic notion: epistemic necessity which, she claims, is the old notion of the a priori. Like Kripke, she thinks this is two-way independent of metaphysical necessity.
|
|
From:
report of Dorothy Edgington (Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility [1985]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §1
|
|
A reaction:
[her paper was unpublished] She hence thinks an argument can be logically valid, while metaphysically its conclusion may not follow. Dubious, though I think I favour the view that logical necessity is underwritten by metaphysical necessity.
|
|
15794
|
If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
|
|
Full Idea:
If a 'world' is understood as a set of sentences, then possibility may be understood as consistency, ...but this seems circular, in that 'consistency' of sentences cannot adequately be defined save in terms of possibility.
|
|
From:
William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)
|
|
A reaction:
[Carnap and Hintikka propose the view, Lewis 'Counterfactuals' p.85 objects] Worlds as sentences is not, of course, the same as worlds as propositions. There is a lot of circularity around in 'possible' worlds.
|
|
15877
|
The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]
|
|
Full Idea:
In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose.
|
|
From:
report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
|
|
A reaction:
I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts.
|