9110
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The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham]
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Full Idea:
The words 'thing' and 'to be' (esse) signify one and the same thing, but the one in the manner of a noun and the other in the manner of a verb.
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From:
William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323], III,II,c,xxvii)
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A reaction:
Well said - as you would expect from a thoroughgoing nominalist. I would have thought that this was the last word on the subject of Being, thus rendering any need for me to read Heidegger quite superfluous. Or am I missing something?
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13169
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I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Forms establish the true general principles of nature. Aristotle calls them 'first entelechies'; I call them, perhaps more intelligibly, 'primitive forces', which contain not only act or the completion of possibility, but also an original activity.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
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A reaction:
As in Idea 13168, I take Leibniz to be unifying Aristotle with modern science, and offering an active view of nature in tune with modern scientific essentialism. Laws arise from primitive force, and are not imposed from without.
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13170
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The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
There are only atoms of substance, that is, real unities absolutely destitute of parts, which are the source of actions, the first absolute principles of the composition of things, and, as it were, the final elements in the analysis of substantial things.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.142)
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A reaction:
I like this because it addresses the pure issue of the identity of an individuated object, but also links it with an active view of nature, and not some mere inventory of objects.
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9109
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If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham]
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Full Idea:
If essence and existence were two things, then no contradiction would be involved if God preserved the essence of a thing in the world without its existence, or vice versa, its existence without its essence; both of which are impossible.
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From:
William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323], III,II,c,xxvii)
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A reaction:
Not that William is using the concept of a supreme mind as a tool in argument. His denial of essence as something separable is presumably his denial of the Aristotelian view of universals, as well as of the Platonic view.
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9105
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Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham]
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Full Idea:
Conceptual terms and the propositions formed by them are those mental words which do not belong to any language; they remain only in the mind and cannot be uttered exteriorly, though signs subordinated to these can be exteriorly uttered.
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From:
William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323], I.c.i)
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A reaction:
[He cites Augustine] A glimmer of the idea of Mentalese, and is probably an integral part of any commitment to propositions. Quine would hate it, but I like it. Logicians seem to dislike anything that cannot be articulated, but brains are like that.
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15877
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The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]
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Full Idea:
In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose.
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From:
report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
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A reaction:
I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts.
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13167
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We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Considering 'extended mass' alone was not sufficient to explain the principles of mechanics and the laws of nature, but it is necessary to make use of the notion of 'force', which is very intelligible, despite belonging in the domain of metaphysics.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
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A reaction:
We may find it surprising that force is a metaphysical concept, but that is worth pondering. It is a mysterious notion within physics. Notice the emphasis on what explains, and what is intelligible. He sees Descartes's system as too passive.
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