Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Methods of Ethics (7th edn)', 'Animal Rights talk' and 'works'

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7 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5

7791	The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
	Full Idea: C.I.Lewis constructed five axiomatic systems of modal logic, and named them S1 to S5. It turns out that the simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is the same as Lewis's S5.
	From: report of C.I. Lewis (works [1935]) by Rod Girle - Modal Logics and Philosophy 2.1
	A reaction: Nathan Salmon ('Reference and Essence' 2nd ed) claims (on p.xvii) that "the correct modal logic is weaker than S5 and weaker even than S4". Which is the greater virtue, simplicity or weakness?

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity

11002	Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read]
	Full Idea: C.I.Lewis's S4 system develops a sense of necessity as 'provability' in some fairly informal sense.
	From: report of C.I. Lewis (works [1935]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch. 4

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will

23111	If we say that freedom depends on rationality, the irrational actions are not free [Sidgwick]
	Full Idea: If we say that a man is a free agent in proportion as he acts rationally, we cannot also say that it is by free choice that he acts irrationally.
	From: Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874], p.511), quoted by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 7.4
	A reaction: A very nice riposte. Clearly people can rationally choose to act irrationally, e.g. at a wild party.

23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism

23059	Self-interest is not rational, if the self is just a succession of memories and behaviour [Sidgwick, by Gray]
	Full Idea: Sidgwick said self-interest is not self-evidently rational. Unless we invoke a religious idea of the soul, human personality is no more than a succession of continuities in memory and behaviour. In that case, why should anyone favour their future self?
	From: report of Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874]) by John Gray - Seven Types of Atheism 2
	A reaction: This sounds like Locke's account of the self, as psychological continuity. We can say that our continuous self is a fiction, the hero of our own narrative. Personally I think of the self as a sustained set of brains structures which change very little.

23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism

4129	It is self-evident (from the point of view of the Universe) that no individual has more importance than another [Sidgwick]
	Full Idea: It is a self-evident principle that the good of one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view of the Universe, than the good of any other, ..and as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally, not merely at a particular part.
	From: Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874], III.XIII.3)
	A reaction: Showing that even a very empirical theory like utilitarianism has an a priori basis. Of course, the principle is false. What about animals, the senile, criminals, androids? What bestows 'importance'?

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism

20588	Sidwick argues for utilitarian institutions, rather than actions [Sidgwick, by Tuckness/Wolf]
	Full Idea: Sidgwick's complex version of utilitarianism urges that institutions should be set in place to maximise utility, but that individual actions people undertake might not appear to be justifiable on utilitarian terms.
	From: report of Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874]) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 1 Refs
	A reaction: This seems to be a specifically political version of utilitarianism, but isn't cited much by political philosophers who discuss utilitarianism.

25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights

5064	Rights are moral significance, or liberty, or right not to be restrained, or entitlement [Mawson]
	Full Idea: A 'right' can mean 'x counts morally', or 'x is permitted to do this' (liberty), or 'x can't be stopped from doing this' (negative right), or 'someone should provide this for x'.
	From: Tim Mawson (Animal Rights talk [2003]), quoted by PG - lecture notes
	A reaction: A useful analysis. It is a useful preliminary to considering whether any of these are natural rights. Personally I am sympathetic to that concept. You cannot deny a person's right to self-defence, even when you are sitting on them. Persons have rights.