74 ideas
| 421 | Men who love wisdom must be inquirers into very many things indeed [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: Men who love wisdom must be inquirers into very many things indeed. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B035), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.140.5 | |
| A reaction: …which invites the question 'Is there anything that a wisdom-seeker should NOT be interested in?' |
| 1491 | Everyone has the potential for self-knowledge and sound thinking [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: Everyone has the potential for self-knowledge and sound thinking. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B116), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.06 | |
| A reaction: This is true. When people are labelled as incapable of philosophy (e.g. by Plato), it is just that they are slow developers. |
| 5863 | Reason is eternal, but men are foolish [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: Although reason exists forever, men are foolish. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]), quoted by Aristotle - The Art of Rhetoric 1407b | |
| A reaction: The despair of all philosophers (e.g. Plato) who think reason is the easiest thing in the world, and stares everyone in the face, and yet people seem to spurn this supreme gift from the gods. They needed the optimism of the career teacher. |
| 414 | Logos is common to all, but most people live as if they have a private understanding [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: Although the universal law (logos) is common to all, the majority live as if they had understanding peculiar to themselves. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B002), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.133.4- | |
| A reaction: Heraclitus mentions 'logos' in just three fragments - this one, and Idea 15660 and Idea 424. |
| 416 | Beautiful harmony comes from things that are in opposition to one another [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: That which is in opposition is in concert, and from things that differ comes the beautiful harmony. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B008), quoted by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1155b04 |
| 425 | A thing can have opposing tensions but be in harmony, like a lyre [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: They do not understand how that which differs with itself is in agreement: harmony consists of opposing tensions, like that of the bow and the lyre. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B051), quoted by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 9.9.2 | |
| A reaction: Like squabbling couples who resent outside intervention. The remark suggests the virtues of 'dialectic', and may get to the heart of what philosophy is. |
| 15063 | Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: There is a distinction between worldly and unworldly sentences, between sentences that depend for their truth upon the worldly circumstances and those that do not. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Fine is fishing around in the area between the necessary, the a priori, truthmakers, and truth-conditions. He appears to be attempting a singlehanded reconstruction of the concepts of metaphysics. Is he major, or very marginal? |
| 1312 | If everything is and isn't then everything is true, and a midway between true and false makes everything false [Aristotle on Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: The remark of Heraclitus that all things are and are not effectively renders all assertions true, and that of Anaxagoras that there is an intermediary between assertion and negation makes all assertions false. | |
| From: comment on Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1012a | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 416. Heraclitus is discussing truth-value 'gluts', as in paraconsistent logic, and Anaxagoras is discussing truth-value 'gaps', as in three-valued Kleene logic. |
| 15078 | There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Just as we recognise different levels of reality, so we should recognise different levels of existence. Each object will exist at the lowest level at which it can enjoy its characteristic form of life. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 10) | |
| A reaction: I'm struggling with this claim, despite my sympathy for much of Fine's picture. I'm not sure that the so-called 'levels' of reality have different degrees of reality. |
| 458 | Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: From what in no wise exists, it is impossible for anything to come into being; for Being to perish completely is incapable of fulfilment and unthinkable. | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B012), quoted by Anon (Lyc) - On Melissus 975b1-4 |
| 5112 | Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Empedocles claims that things are alternately changing and at rest - that they are changing whenever love is creating a unity out of plurality, or hatred is creating plurality out of unity, and they are at rest in the times in between. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 250b26 | |
| A reaction: I suppose one must say that this an example of Ruskin's 'pathetic fallacy' - reading human emotions into the cosmos. Being constructive little creatures, we think goodness leads to construction. I'm afraid Empedocles is just wrong. |
| 15072 | Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: At the bottom are tensed or temporal facts, subject to the vicissitudes of time and hence of the world. Then come the timeless though worldly facts, subject to the world but not to time. Top are transcendental facts, subject to neither world nor time. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 08) | |
| A reaction: For all of Fine's awesome grasp of logic and semantics, when he divides reality up as boldly as this I start to side a bit with the sceptics about modern metaphysics (like Ladyman and Ross). I daresay Fine acknowledges that it is 'speculative'. |
| 15071 | Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: A tensed fact is stated by a tensed sentence while a tenseless fact is stated by a tenseless sentence, and they belong to two 'realms' of reality. That Socrates drank hemlock is in the temporal realm, while 2+2=4 is presumably in the timeless realm. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 07) | |
| A reaction: Put so strongly, I suddenly find sales resistance to his proposal. All my instincts favour one realm, and I take 2+2=4 to be a highly general truth about that realm. It may be a truth of any possible realm, which would distinguish it. |
| 15658 | The hidden harmony is stronger than the visible [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: The hidden harmony is stronger (or 'better') than the visible. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B055), quoted by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 9.9.5 | |
| A reaction: 'An unapparent connection [harmonia] is stronger than an apparent one' is Curd's translation. I'm taking this for essentialism. It is the basic idea of the essentialising child (see Gelman). The hidden explains the apparent. |
| 13782 | Everything gives way, and nothing stands fast [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: Everything gives way, and nothing stands fast. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Cratylus 402a | |
| A reaction: This is as good a summary of the Heraclitus view of things as any, and Plato appears to present it as a verbatim quotation. |
| 13209 | There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Empedocles says there is no coming-to-be of anything, but only a mingling and a divorce of what has been mingled. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314b08 | |
| A reaction: Aristotle comments that this prevents Empedocleans from distinguishing between superficial alteration and fundamental change of identity. Presumably, though, that wouldn't bother them. |
| 15075 | Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: It is natural to suggest that to be a man is to have certain kind of temporal-modal profile. ...but it seems natural that being a man accounts for the profile, ...so one should not appeal to an object's modal features in stating what the object is. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 09) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a correct and very helpful point, as I am tempted to think that the modal dispositions of a thing are intrinsic to its identity. If we accept 'powers', must they be modal in character? Fine backs a sortal approach. That's ideology. |
| 11853 | A mixed drink separates if it is not stirred [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: The mixed drink, of wine, cheese and barley, separates if it is not stirred. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B125) | |
| A reaction: Wiggins quotes this, because it seems to be Heraclitus struggling to decide what sortal his drink falls under. I take it to be a problem of vagueness, since separation and mixing occur along a continuum, like a sorites. |
| 15065 | What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The identity of an object - what it is - is not a worldly matter; essence will precede existence in that the identity of an object may be fixed by its unworldly features even before any question of its existence or other worldly features is considered. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I'm not clear how this cashes out. If I remove the 'worldly features' of an object, what is there left which establishes identity? Fine carefully avoids talk of 'a priori' knowledge of identity. |
| 15076 | Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: It is the core essential features of the object that will be independent of how things turn out, and they will be independent in the sense of holding regardless of circumstances, not whatever the circumstances. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 09) | |
| A reaction: The distinction at the end seems to be that 'regardless' pays no attention to circumstances, whereas 'whatever' pays attention to all circumstances. In other words, essence has no relationship to how things are. Plausible. Nice to see 'core'. |
| 11091 | You can bathe in the same river twice, but not in the same river stage [Quine on Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: You can bathe in the same river twice, but not in the same river stage. | |
| From: comment on Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis 1 | |
| A reaction: This seems to make Quine a 'perdurantist', committed to time-slices of objects, rather than whole objects enduring through change. |
| 427 | It is not possible to step twice into the same river [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: It is not possible to step twice into the same river. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B091), quoted by Plutarch - 24: The E at Delphi 392b10- |
| 457 | Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: There is no creation of substance in any one of mortal existence, nor any end in execrable death, but only mixing and exchange of what has been mixed. | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B008), quoted by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1111f | |
| A reaction: also Aristotle 314b08 |
| 2064 | If flux is continuous, then lack of change can't be a property, so everything changes in every possible way [Plato on Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: According to Heracliteans, since things must be changing, and since lack of change can't be a property of anything, then everything is always undergoing change of every kind. | |
| From: comment on Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B030) by Plato - Theaetetus 182a |
| 15073 | Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The existential identity of an object with itself needs analysis into two components, one the neutral identity of the object with itself, and the other its existence. The existence of the object appears to be merely a gratuitous addition to its identity. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 08) | |
| A reaction: This is at least a step towards clarification of the notion, which might be seen as just a way of asserting that something 'has an identity'. Fine likes the modern Fregean way of expressing this, as an equality relation. |
| 15074 | We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: If there were impossible objects, ones that do not possibly exist, we would have no difficulty in understanding what it is for such objects to be identical or distinct than in the case of possible objects. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 08) | |
| A reaction: Thus, a 'circular square' seems to be the same as a 'square circle'. Fine is arguing for identity to be independent of any questions of existence. |
| 15064 | Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: We distinguish between the necessary truths proper, those that hold whatever the circumstances, and the transcendent truths, those that hold regardless of the circumstances. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Fine's project seems to be dividing the necessities which derive from essence from the necessities which tended to be branded in essentialist discussions as 'trivial'. |
| 15070 | It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: It is of the nature of Socrates to be a man; and from this it appears to follow that necessarily he is a man. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 04) | |
| A reaction: I'm always puzzled by this line of thought, because it is only the intrinsic nature of beings like Socrates which decides in the first place what a 'man' is. How can something help to create a category, and then necessarily belong to that category? |
| 15069 | Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: An alternative conception of a possible world says it is constituted, not by the totality of facts, or of how things might be, but by the totality of circumstances, or how things might turn out. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 02) | |
| A reaction: The general idea is to make a possible world more limited than in Idea 15068. It only contains properties arising from 'engagement with the world', and won't include timeless sentences. It is a bunch of possibilities, not of actualities? |
| 15068 | The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: We are accustomed think of the actual world as the totality of facts, and so we think of any possible world as being like the actual world in settling the truth-value of every single proposition. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 02) | |
| A reaction: Hence it is normal to refer to a possible world as a 'maximal' set of of propositions (sentences, etc). See Idea 15069 for his proposed alternative view. |
| 430 | Senses are no use if the soul is corrupt [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: The eyes and ears are bad witnesses for men if they have barbarian souls. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B107), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Mathematicians 7.126 |
| 1500 | When we sleep, reason closes down as the senses do [Heraclitus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Since when we sleep the senses are closed, mind is separated from its surroundings and loses the power of memory. When we wake the mind re-contacts the world, and regains the power of reason. | |
| From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], A16) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.130 |
| 417 | Donkeys prefer chaff to gold [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: Donkeys prefer chaff to gold. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B009), quoted by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1176a07 |
| 426 | Sea water is life-giving for fish, but not for people [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: Sea-water is the purest and the most polluted: for fish it is drinkable and life-giving; for men, not drinkable and destructive. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B061), quoted by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 9.10.5 |
| 431 | Health, feeding and rest are only made good by disease, hunger and weariness [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: Disease makes health pleasant and good, hunger makes satisfaction good, weariness makes rest good. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B111), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.1.178 |
| 462 | One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: One vision is produced by both eyes | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B088), quoted by Strabo - works 8.364.3 |
| 22765 | Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: Wisdom and power of thought, know thou, are shared in by all things. | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) II.286 | |
| A reaction: Sextus quotes this, saying that it is 'still more paradoxical', and that it explicitly includes plants. This may mean that Empedocles was not including inanimate matter. |
| 1524 | For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus] |
| Full Idea: Empedocles assumes that thinking is either identical to or very similar to sense-perception. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], A86) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 9 | |
| A reaction: Not to be sniffed at. We can, of course, control our thinking (though we can't control the controller) and we contemplate abstractions, but that might be seen as a sort of perception. Vision is not as visual as we think. |
| 429 | To God (though not to humans) all things are beautiful and good and just [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: To God, all things are beautiful, good and just; but men have assumed some things to be unjust, others just. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B102), quoted by Porphyry - Notes on Homer Il.4.4 | |
| A reaction: The idea that all things are actually 'just' strikes me as nonsense. I also don't think I can get my head round the idea that everything is actually good and beautiful. Must try harder. |
| 12294 | Good and evil are the same thing [Heraclitus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Heraclitus said that good and evil are the same thing. | |
| From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], 58/102) by Aristotle - Topics 159b32 | |
| A reaction: Heaven knows what he meant by this, though it sounds suspiciously like moral nihilism. Maybe Heraclitus was not a very nice man. Or is the thought a more sophisticated one, in line with Nietzsche's remarks about cultural morality? |
| 419 | If one does not hope, one will not find the unhoped-for, since nothing leads to it [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: If one does not hope, one will not find the unhoped-for, since there is no trail leading to it and no path. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B018), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 2.17.4 | |
| A reaction: The best remark about hope I have ever encountered. Usually they are empty platitudes. |
| 552 | Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Empedocles was the first to give evil and good as principles. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 985a | |
| A reaction: Once you start to think that good and evil will only matter if they have causal powers, it is an easy step to the idea of a benevolent god, and a satanic anti-god. Otherwise the 'principles' could be ignored. |
| 415 | If happiness is bodily pleasure, then oxen are happy when they have vetch to eat [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: If happiness lay in bodily pleasures, we would call oxen happy when they find vetch to eat. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B004), quoted by Albertus Magnus - On Vegetables 6.401 | |
| A reaction: But surely oxen are happy when they find some good vetch? Presumably, though, they are not 'eudaimon'. What is the complete fulfilment of life for an ox? |
| 5155 | It is hard to fight against emotion, but harder still to fight against pleasure [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: It is hard to fight against emotion, but harder still to fight against pleasure. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B085), quoted by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1105a08 | |
| A reaction: 'Emotion' is the Greek word 'thumos'. "The only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it", said Oscar Wilde. Heraclitus underestimates how very good many modern people are at dieting. |
| 433 | For man character is destiny [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: For man character is destiny. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B119), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.40.23 | |
| A reaction: This is the extreme opposite of Sartre's existentialist claim that we can entirely change ourselves. Personally I am with Heraclitus, though I don't see why our destined character shouldn't be modified (e.g. by education). |
| 422 | The people should fight for the law as if for their city-wall [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: The people should fight for the law as if for their city-wall. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B044), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.2 | |
| A reaction: This may be the first recorded assertion of the rule of law, and hence of the separation of powers. We still have plenty of people who reject this principle. |
| 589 | 'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: Nature is but a word of human framing. | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B008), quoted by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1015a |
| 614 | Heraclitus said sometimes everything becomes fire [Heraclitus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Heraclitus claimed that from time to time everything becomes fire. | |
| From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1067a |
| 424 | Reason tells us that all things are one [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: When you have listened, not to me but to the law (logos), it is wise to agree that all things are one. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B050), quoted by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 9.9.1 |
| 21823 | The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: In Empedocles we have a dividing principle, 'Strife', set against 'Friendship' - which is the One and is to him bodiless, while the elements represent matter. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.09 | |
| A reaction: The first time I've seen the principle of Love in Empedocles identified with the One of Parmenides. Plotinus is a trustworthy reporter, I think, because he was well read, and had access to lost texts. |
| 2680 | Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Empedocles holds that the corporeal elements are four, but that all the elements, including those which create motion, are six in number. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a16 |
| 5096 | Heraclitus says that at some time everything becomes fire [Heraclitus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Heraclitus says that at some time everything becomes fire. | |
| From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 204b37 | |
| A reaction: Modern cosmology says that Heraclitus was right (pretty much). If we say 'energy' instead of 'fire' (which may be what he meant), then he is absolutely spot-on. |
| 17539 | The sayings of Heraclitus are still correct, if we replace 'fire' with 'energy' [Heraclitus, by Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: If we replace Heraclitus's word 'fire' by the word 'energy' we can almost repeat his statements word for word from our modern point of view. | |
| From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Werner Heisenberg - Physics and Philosophy 04 | |
| A reaction: My problem has always been that I have no idea what 'energy' is, so I'm none the wiser. |
| 3054 | Heraclitus said fire could be transformed to create the other lower elements [Heraclitus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Heraclitus taught that fire when densified becomes liquid, and becoming concrete, becomes also water; again, that the water when concrete is turned to earth, and this is the road down. | |
| From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.1.6 |
| 6002 | Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood] |
| Full Idea: Empedocles used numerical ratios to explain different kinds of matter; for example, bone is two parts water, four parts fire, two parts earth; and blood is an equal blend of all four elements. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Brad Inwood - Empedocles | |
| A reaction: Why isn't the ration 1:2:1? This presumably shows the influence of Pythagoras (who had also been based in Italy, like Empedocles), as well as that of the earlier naturalistic philosophers. It was a very good theory, though wrong. |
| 13207 | Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Empedocles says that Fire, Water, Air and Earth are four elements, and are thus 'simple' rather than flesh, bone and bodies which, like these, are 'homoeomeries'. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a26 | |
| A reaction: The translation is not quite clear. I take it that flesh and bone may look simple, because they are homoeomerous, but they are not really - but what is his evidence for that? Compare Idea 13208. |
| 13218 | The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: Empedocles says it is evident that all the other bodies down to the 'elements' have their coming-to-be and their passing-away: but it is not clear how the 'elements' themselves, severally in their aggregated masses, come-to-be and pass-away. | |
| From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 325b20 | |
| A reaction: Presumably the elements are like axioms - and are just given. How do electrons and quarks come-to-be? |
| 459 | All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: These elements never cease their continuous exchange, sometimes uniting under the influence of Love, so that all become One, at other times again moving apart through the hostile force of Hate. | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B017), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 158.1- |
| 13225 | Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: It is not an adequate explanation to say that 'Love and Strife set things moving', unless the very nature of Love is a movement of this kind and the very nature of Strife a movement of that kind. | |
| From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 333b23 | |
| A reaction: I take this to be of interest for showing Aristotle's quest for explanations, and his unwillingness to be fobbed off with anything superficial. I take a task of philosophy to be to push explanations further than others wish to go. |
| 460 | If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: Besides these elements, nothing else comes into being, nor does anything cease. For if they had been perishing continuously, they would Be no more; and what could increase the Whole? And whence could it have come? | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B017), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 158.1- |
| 15660 | Logos is the source of everything, and my theories separate and explain each nature [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: All things come into being according to this Law ('logos'), ...and I expound theories (words) and processes (actions) separating each thing according to its nature and explaining how it is made. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B001), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Mathematicians 7.133 | |
| A reaction: I like the fact that things are separated according to their natures (particulars!), and not that natures are somehow bestowed on individuals. |
| 12269 | All things are in a state of motion [Heraclitus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: All things are in a state of motion. | |
| From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE]) by Aristotle - Topics 104b22 | |
| A reaction: This seems right, I would say. It seems to make a 'process' the fundamental category of ontology, rather than an 'object'. |
| 15077 | It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: It is said that there is no room in the A-theorists' ontology for a realm of timeless existents. Just as there is a tendency to think that every sentence is tensed, so there is a tendency to think that every object must enjoy a tensed form of existence. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 10) | |
| A reaction: Fine is arguing for certain things to exist or be true independently of time (such as arithmetic, or essential identities). I struggle with the notion of timeless existence. |
| 15067 | A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Most A-theorists have been inclined to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 01) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is because they reject the notion of 'tenseless' truths. But sentences like 'two and two make four' seem not to be very tensy. |
| 15066 | B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: B-theorists regard tensed sentences as incomplete expressions, implicitly containing an unfilled argument-place for the time at which they are to be evaluated. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 01) | |
| A reaction: To distinguish past from future it looks as if you would need two argument-places, not one. Then there are 'used to be' and 'had been' to evaluate. |
| 420 | The cosmos is eternal not created, and is an ever-living and changing fire [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: This cosmos, which is the same for all, was not created by any one of the gods or of mankind, but it was ever and is and shall be ever-living fire, kindled and quenched in measure. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B030), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.1.103 |
| 5090 | Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Is it just an accident that teeth and other parts of the body seem to have some purpose, and creatures survive because they happen to be put together in a useful way? Everything else has been destroyed, as Empedocles says of his 'cow with human head'. | |
| From: report of Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], 61) by Aristotle - Physics 198b29 | |
| A reaction: Good grief! Has no one ever noticed that Empedocles proposed the theory of evolution? It isn't quite natural selection, because we aren't told what does the 'destroying', but it is a little flash of genius that was quietly forgotten. |
| 461 | God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: God is equal in all directions to himself and altogether eternal, a rounded Sphere enjoying a circular solitude. | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B028), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.15.2 |
| 466 | God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: God is mind, holy and ineffable, and only mind, which darts through the whole cosmos with its swift thought. | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B134), quoted by Ammonius - On 'De Interpretatione' 4.5.249.6 |
| 1719 | In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: It is a consequence of Empedocles' view that God is the most unintelligent thing, for he alone is ignorant of one of the elements, namely strife, whereas mortal creatures are familiar with them all. | |
| From: comment on Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE]) by Aristotle - De Anima 410b08 |
| 1499 | Heraclitus says intelligence draws on divine reason [Heraclitus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: According to Heraclitus we become intelligent by drawing on divine reason. | |
| From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], A16) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.129 |
| 1522 | It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles] |
| Full Idea: Wretched is he who cares not for clear thinking about the gods. | |
| From: Empedocles (fragments/reports [c.453 BCE], B132), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.140.5.1 |
| 15659 | Purifying yourself with blood is as crazy as using mud to wash off mud [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: They purify themselves by staining themselves with other blood, as if one were to step into mud to wash off mud. But a man would be thought mad if any of his fellow-men should perceive him acting thus. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B005), quoted by Origen - Against Celsus 7.62 |
| 1501 | In their ignorance people pray to statues, which is like talking to a house [Heraclitus] |
| Full Idea: In their ignorance of the true nature of gods and heroes people pray to these statues, which is like someone holding a conversation with a house. | |
| From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B005), quoted by Anon (Pyth) - Theosophia Tubigensis 68 |