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16541
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All the intrinsic properties of a thing should be deducible from its definition [Spinoza]
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Full Idea:
The definition of a thing should be such that all the properties of that thing, in so far as it is considered by itself, and not in conjunction with other things, can be deduced from it.
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From:
Baruch de Spinoza (Improvement of Understanding [1675], p.35), quoted by E.J. Lowe - What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? 6
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A reaction:
This is exactly what Locke requires of a real essence (though he is pessimistic about ever achieving it). Spinoza is talking of an Aristotelian real definition, which may be complex, and not a lexicographer's short verbal explication.
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13073
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To understand the properties we must know the essence, as with a circle [Spinoza]
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Full Idea:
If a circle is defined as a figure in which lines from centre to circumference are equal, such definitions do not explain the essence of a circle, but only a property. The properties of a thing are not understood as long as their essences are not known.
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From:
Baruch de Spinoza (Improvement of Understanding [1675], §95), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.2.1
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A reaction:
This is the traditional Aristotelian view of essence, and the example of a circle is nice, though I am not sure what the essence of a circle might be. Presumably ALL the properties of a circle must flow from it.
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14014
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Space alone, and time alone, will fade away, and only their union has an independent reality [Minkowski]
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Full Idea:
Henceforth, space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality.
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From:
Hermann Minkowski (Space and Time [1908], Intro)
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A reaction:
Notice the qualification that it is a 'kind of' union. Deep confusion arises from exaggerating the analogy between space and time. Craig Bourne remarks (2006:157) that this shows independence of measurement, not of reality
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