Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Space and Time', 'Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics' and 'Principle of Life and Plastic Natures'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

14 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
7920 Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: Descriptive metaphysics (e.g. Aristotle and Kant) is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world; revisionary metaphysics (e.g. Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley) is concerned to produce a better structure.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
     A reaction: This distinction by Strawson was incredibly helpful in reinstating metaphysics as a feasible activity. I don't want to abandon the revisionary version. We can hammer the current metaphysics into a more efficient shape, or even create new concepts.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
7922 Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: Descriptive metaphysics is primarily concerned with categories and concepts which, in their fundamental character, change not at all. They are the commonplaces of the least refined thinking, and the indispensable core for the most sophisticated humans.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
     A reaction: This seems to be the basic premise for a modern metaphysician such as E.J.Lowe, though such thinkers are not averse to suggesting clarifications of our conceptual scheme. The aim must be good foundations for a successful edifice of knowledge.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
7921 Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in philosophy.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
     A reaction: Probably the last bold assertion of ordinary language philosophy, though Strawson goes on the defend his 'deeper' version of the activity, which he says is 'descriptive metaphysics', rather than mere 'analysis'. Mere verbal analysis now looks hopeless.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
19419 Not all of perception is accompanied by consciousness [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I do not think that the Cartesians have ever proved or can prove that every perception is accompanied by consciousness.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.195)
     A reaction: This idea is very important in Leibniz, because non-conscious or barely conscious thoughts and perceptions explain a huge amount about behaviour, reality and morality.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
9282 I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: One can ascribed states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of experience, and they cannot be identified only as subjects of experience.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4)
     A reaction: A neat linguistic twist on the analogy argument, but rather dubious, if it is actually meant to prove that other minds exist. It is based on his view of predicates - see Idea 9281. If the rest of humanity are zombies, why would I not apply them?
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
9263 A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4)
     A reaction: As Frankfurt points out, merely requiring the entity to be 'conscious' is a grossly inadequate definition of what we mean by a person, which is typically a being that is self-aware and capable of rational decisions between alternatives.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
19421 Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Everything takes place in souls as if there were no body, and everything takes place in bodies as if there were no souls.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.198)
     A reaction: I don't think I have ever encountered a modern thinker who accepts this view. Leibniz rejected Occasionalism, but his account depends entirely on the role of God, to set up the pre-established harmony. Why would God do that?
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
9281 The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: The idea of a predicate is correlative with a range of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be significantly, though not necessarily truly, affirmed.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4 n1)
     A reaction: Said to be one of Strawson's most important ideas. The idea is that you understand a predicate if you understand its range, not just a one-off application. So you must understand the implied universal, whatever that is.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
19420 Death and generation are just transformations of an animal, augmented or diminished [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Death, like generation, is only the transformation of the same animal, which is sometimes augmented and sometimes diminished.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.195)
     A reaction: Leibniz has a very unusual view of death, since neither minds nor their bodies can ever be wholly destroyed. Death is a kind of shrinking. I suspect that he was wrong about that.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
19416 Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: It must not be said that each portion of matter is animated, just as we do not say that a pond full of fishes is an animated body, although a fish is.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.190)
     A reaction: This is a particularly clear picture of the role of monads in matter. Monads are attached to bodies, which are entirely inanimate, but monads suffuse matter and give it its properties, like particularly bubbly champagne. Cf Idea 19422.
19422 Every particle of matter contains organic bodies [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There is no particle of matter which does not contain organic bodies.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.198)
     A reaction: Cf Idea 19416. There seems to be an interaction problem here (solved, presumably, by pre-established harmony). The organic bodies are there to explain the active behaviour of matter, but the related matter seems intrinsically inert.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
14014 Space alone, and time alone, will fade away, and only their union has an independent reality [Minkowski]
     Full Idea: Henceforth, space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality.
     From: Hermann Minkowski (Space and Time [1908], Intro)
     A reaction: Notice the qualification that it is a 'kind of' union. Deep confusion arises from exaggerating the analogy between space and time. Craig Bourne remarks (2006:157) that this shows independence of measurement, not of reality
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
19418 Mechanics shows that all motion originates in other motion, so there is a Prime Mover [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The maxim that there is no motion which has not its origin in another motion, according to the laws of mechanics, leads us again to the Prime Mover.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.194)
     A reaction: This is Leibniz's endorsement (uncredited) to Aquinas's First Way. It is hard to see how the laws of mechanics could have anything to say about the origin of movement. And doesn't the law say that the motions of God need a mover?
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
19417 All substances are in harmony, even though separate, so they must have one divine cause [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: My system of Pre-established Harmony furnishes a new proof of God's existence, since it is manifest that the agreement of so many substances, of which the one has no influence upon the other, could only come from a general cause on which they all depend.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.192)
     A reaction: Adjacent harmony seems self-explanatory, but remote harmony is interesting evidence for God. Hence modern quantum non-locality should make us all wonder whether there is a deeper explanation.