Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Space and Time', 'Introduction to 'Personal Identity'' and 'The Second Sex'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

6 ideas

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity

5504	Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: Some recent philosophers have argued that we should replace the three-dimensional view of persons with a four-dimensional view according to which only time-slices, or 'stages', of persons exist at short intervals of time.
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
	A reaction: At first glance this seems to neatly eliminate lots of traditional worries. But why would I want to retain my identity, if someone threatened to brainwash me. I also want to disown my inadequate earlier selves. Interesting, though. Lewis.

5503	Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: A modern question is whether personal identity is primarily what matters in survival; that is, people might cease and be continued by others whose continuation the original people would value as much.
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
	A reaction: When put like this, the proposal seems hard to grasp. It only makes sense if you don't really believe in a thing called 'personal identity'. I don't see how you can believe in it without also believing that for you it has central importance.

16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct

5502	Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: In modern times the Lockean intrinsic relations view of personal identity has been superseded by an extrinsic relations view (also called the 'closest-continuer' or 'externalist' view).
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.1)
	A reaction: Sounds sweeping. My suspicion is that there is a raging fashion for externalist views of everything (justification, content etc.), but this will pass. I take Parfit to be the source of the modern views.

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism

20746	One is not born, but rather becomes a woman [Beauvoir]
	Full Idea: One is not born, but rather becomes a woman.
	From: Simone de Beauvoir (The Second Sex [1952], p.301 (or 267)), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 2 'Phenomenology'
	A reaction: This has become the principle idea in modern discussions of gender. It divides gender from sex, rather as Locke divided person from human being. It is an abstraction. It is part of the Hegelian-Marxist idea that persons are moulded by culture.

27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time

14014	Space alone, and time alone, will fade away, and only their union has an independent reality [Minkowski]
	Full Idea: Henceforth, space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality.
	From: Hermann Minkowski (Space and Time [1908], Intro)
	A reaction: Notice the qualification that it is a 'kind of' union. Deep confusion arises from exaggerating the analogy between space and time. Craig Bourne remarks (2006:157) that this shows independence of measurement, not of reality

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality

5505	For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: In Aristotle's view, with the possible exception of 'nous' the psyche and all its parts come into being at the same time as its associated body; it is inseparable from the body, and perishes along with it.
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.8)
	A reaction: It is suggested that he thought there was only one 'nous', which all humans share (p.9). If he wants to claim that one part is immortal, he doesn't have much evidence. If psyche is the form of the body, it is bound to perish.