141 ideas
| 2845 | Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: To be constantly asking 'what is the use of it?' is unbecoming to those of great soul, and unworthy of free men. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1338b01) | |
| A reaction: Love this one! It is not just philosophers who keep hearing this question. Pure mathematics, history, literature, even carpentry if you are not going to be a carpenter. |
| 12027 | There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: No metaphysical account which renders it impossible to give a plausible epistemological theory is to be countenanced. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 9.1) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to object to this principle, though we certainly don't want to go verificationist, and thus rule out speculations about metaphysics which are beyond any possible knowledge. Some have tried to prove that something must exist (e.g. Jacquette). |
| 22521 | Our method of inquiry is to examine the smallest parts that make up the whole [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The method of inquiry that has guided us elsewhere is … that a composite must be analyzed until we reach things that are incomposite, since these are the smallest parts of the whole. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a18) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle studies things, and aims to reveal their essential natures, so this is part of his method. You still have to grasp the essential natures of the atoms that compose the whole, however. To understand a city, understand people. |
| 1570 | Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a09) | |
| A reaction: This may be a grand claim that we are the only animals that can think rationally, or a more obvious observation that we are the only ones that talk. Aristotle was well aware that logos is a very resonant word. |
| 1574 | Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Logos is for the purpose of clarifying the beneficial and the harmful and as a result the right and the wrong. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a12) | |
| A reaction: I don't think this is asserting that reason can perceive values. Logos perceives the essential nature (and hence purpose) of each thing (including people), which indicates which are its good and bad states. |
| 2801 | Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The element that can use its intelligence to look ahead is by nature ruler and master, while that which has the bodily strength to do the actual work is by nature a slave. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a30) | |
| A reaction: I claim that the two distinguishing features of humanity are prescience and meta-thought, so I can't really disagree with this. |
| 22529 | Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A male, unless he is somehow formed contrary to nature, is by nature more capable of leading than a female. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1259b01) | |
| A reaction: Beautiful! The greatest of all philosophers offers us a perfect perpetration of the No True Scotsman Fallacy! If the question is 'are men natural leaders?', this seems to beg it. |
| 22571 | 'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The sophistical argument 'if each is small, so too are all' is in one way true and in another false. For the whole composed of all the parts is not small, but it is composed of small parts. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1307b36) | |
| A reaction: If neurons can't think, then brains can't think. |
| 12005 | The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: We use the symbol 'ι' (Greek 'iota') to form definite descriptions, reading (ιx)F(x) as 'the x which is such that F(x)', or simply as 'the F'. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: Compare the lambda operator in modal logic, which picks out predicates from similar formulae. |
| 12010 | Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: The typical semantic account of validity for propositional connectives like 'and' presupposes that meaning is given by truth-tables. On the natural deduction view, the meaning of 'and' is given by its introduction and elimination rules. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.4) |
| 12023 | Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: It is very plausible that the sorites paradoxes arose from the application of a semantic apparatus appropriate only for sharp predicates to languages containing vague predicates (rather than from deficiency of meaning, or from incoherence). | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.3) | |
| A reaction: Sounds wrong. Of course, logic has been designed for sharp predicates, and natural languages are awash with vagueness. But the problems of vagueness bothered lawyers long before logicians like Russell began to worry about it. |
| 12017 | In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: For each instance of identity or failure of identity, there must be facts in virtue of which that instance obtains. ..Enough has been said to lend this doctrine some plausibility. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.5) | |
| A reaction: Penelope Mackie picks this out from Forbes as a key principle. It sounds to be in danger of circularity, unless the 'facts' can be cited without referring to, or implicitly making use of, identities - which seems unlikely. |
| 12024 | If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: If we imagine a possible world in which two clocks in a room make one clock from half the parts of each, the judgement 'these two actual clocks could have been a single clock' does not seem wholly false. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.4) | |
| A reaction: You would, of course, have sufficient parts left over to make a second clock, so they look like a destroyed clock, so I don't think I find Forbes's intuition on this one very persuasive. |
| 22525 | The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary for the whole to be prior to the part. For if the whole body is put to death, there will no longer be a foot or a hand. For everything is defined by its function and by its capacity (so the hands and feet would no longer be the same). | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a20) | |
| A reaction: It may be a mistake to ask which of these is 'prior'. If bricks make a wall, the whole depends on the parts, but the parts can exist without the whole. They continue to be possible parts of a wall (unlike severed feet). |
| 11885 | Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
| Full Idea: Forbes argues that, unless we posit individual essences, we cannot guarantee that identities across possible worlds will be appropriately grounded in other properties. | |
| From: report of Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 2.4 | |
| A reaction: There is a confrontation between Wiggins, who says identity is primitive, and Forbes, who says identity must be grounded in other properties. I think I side with Forbes. |
| 12014 | An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: An individual essence of an object x is a set of properties I which satisfies the following conditions: i. every property P in I is an essential property of x; ii. it is not possible that some object y distinct from x has every member of I. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: I am coming to the view that stable natural kinds (like electrons or gold) do not have individual essences, but complex kinds (like tigers or tables) do. The view is based on the idea that explanatory power is what individuates an essence. |
| 12015 | Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: A non-trivial individual essence is properties other than a) those following from a de dicto truth, b) properties of existence and self-identity (or their cognates), c) properties derived from necessities in some other category. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: [I have compressed Forbes] Rather than adding all these qualificational clauses to our concept, we could just tighten up on the notion of a property, saying it is something which is causally efficacious, and hence explanatory. |
| 12013 | Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: The essential properties of a thing will typically depend upon what category of thing it is, and perhaps also on some more particular facts about the thing itself. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: I see no way of dispensing with the second requirement, in the cases of complex entities like animals. If all samples are the same, then of course we can define a sample's essence through its kind, but not if samples differ in any way. |
| 12012 | Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: An essential property of an object x is a property without possessing which x could not exist. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: This is certainly open to question. See Joan Kung's account of Aristotle on essence. I am necessarily more than eight years old (now), and couldn't exist without that property, but is the property part of my essence? |
| 12022 | Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: Sameness of parts is not sufficient for identity of artefacts at a world, since the very same parts may turn up at different times as the parts of artefacts with different designs and functions. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.2) | |
| A reaction: Thus the Ship of Theseus could be dismantled and turned into a barn (as happened with the 'Mayflower'). They could then be reconstituted as the ship, which would then have two beginnings (as Chris Hughes has pointed out). |
| 12025 | Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: Artefacts can be ascribed fuzzy essences. ...We might say that it is essential to an artefact to have 'most' of its parts. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.6) | |
| A reaction: I think I prefer to accept the idea that essences are unstable things, in all cases. For all we know, electrons might subtly change their general character, or cease to be uniform, tomorrow. Essences explain, and what needs explaining changes. |
| 12020 | An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: In the time of a single world, the same individual can undergo a change of sex, but it is less clear that an individual of one sex could have been, from the outset, an individual of another. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 6.5) | |
| A reaction: I don't find this support for essentiality of origin very persuasive. I struggle with these ideas. Given my sex yesterday, then presumably I couldn't have had a different sex yesterday. Given that pigs can fly, pigs can fly. What am I missing? |
| 11888 | Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
| Full Idea: Forbes has two principles of identity, which we can call the No Bare Identities Principle (identities hold in virtue of other facts), and the No Extrinsic Determination Principle (that only intrinsic facts of a thing establish identity). | |
| From: report of Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 127-8) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 2.7 | |
| A reaction: The job of the philosopher is to prise apart the real identities of things from the way in which we conceive of identities. I take these principles to apply to real identities, not conceptual identities. |
| 12003 | De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: The difference between de re and de dicto formulae is a difference between formulae which are, and formulae which are not, sensitive to the identities of objects at various worlds. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 3.1) |
| 12028 | De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: De re necessity does not differ from de dicto necessity in respect of how it arises: it is still a form of conceptual necessity. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 9.4) | |
| A reaction: [Forbes proceeds to argue for this claim] Forbes defends a form of essentialism, but takes the necessity to arise from a posteriori truths because of the a priori involvement of other concepts (rather as Kripke argues). |
| 12008 | Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: There is no means by which we might distinguish a possible world from what is true at it. ...Whereas our ability to separate a place, or a time, from its occupier is crucial to realism about places and times, as is a distance relation. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.2) | |
| A reaction: He is objecting to Lewis's modal realism. I'm not fully convinced. It depends whether we are discussing real ontology or conceptual space. In the latter I see no difference between times and possible worlds. In ontology, a 'time' is weird. |
| 12009 | The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: The main objection to realism about worlds is from epistemology. Knowledge of properties of objects requires experience of these objects, which must be within the range of our sensory faculties, but only concrete actual objects achieve that. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.2) | |
| A reaction: This pinpoints my dislike of the whole possible worlds framework, ontologically speaking. I seem to be an actualist. I take possibilities to be inferences to the best explanation from the powers we know of in the actual world. We experience potentiality. |
| 12007 | Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: Someone impressed by the parallel between tense and modal operators ...might suggest that just as we can speak of places and times forming their own manifolds or spaces, so we can say that worlds are the points of logical space. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.2) | |
| A reaction: I particularly like the notion of worlds being "points of logical space", and am inclined to remove it from this context and embrace it as the correct way to understand possible worlds. We must understand logical or conceptual space. |
| 12011 | Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: An elucidation of transworld identity can be regarded as an elucidation of the boundaries of possibility for ordinary things. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: I presume that if we don't search for some such criterion, we just have to face the possibility that Aristotle could have been a poached egg in some possible world. To know the bounds of possibility, study the powers of actual objects. |
| 12016 | The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: The motivation for investigating individual essences should be obvious, since if every object has such an essence, the problem of elucidating transworld identity can be solved. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: It is important that, if necessary, the identities be 'individual', and not just generic, by sortal, or natural kind. We want to reason about (and explain) truths at the fine-grained level of the individual, not just at the broad level of generalisation. |
| 12004 | Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: The outstanding technical objection to counterpart-theoretic semantics concerns its handling of the logic of identity. In quantified S5 (the orthodox semantics) a = b → □(a = b) is valid, but 'a' must not attach to two objects. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 3.5) |
| 12021 | Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness, as opposed to the sort of essentialism that gives non-trivial conditions sufficient for transworld identity. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 6.6) | |
| A reaction: 'Haecceitism' is the doctrine that things have primitive identity. A 'haecceity' is a postulated property which actually does the job. The key point of the view is that whatever it is is 'primitive', and not complex, or analysable. I don't believe it. |
| 12029 | We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: The natural response to an unreasonable hypothesis of possibility for an object x, that in such a state of affairs it would not be x which satisfies the conditions, is evidence that we do possess concepts of thisness for individuals. | |
| From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 9.4) | |
| A reaction: We may have a 'concept' of thisness, but we needn't be committed to the 'existence' of a thisness. There is a fairly universal intuition that cessation of existence of an entity when it starts to change can be a very vague matter. |
| 22587 | Understanding is the aim of our nature [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Reason and understanding are our nature's end. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1334b16) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be purpose of philosophy, and we should distinguish understanding from the mere accumulation of knowledge. |
| 22522 | To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If we see how things grow naturally from the start, we would in this way, as in other cases, get the best theoretical grasp of them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a24) | |
| A reaction: Observing the natural origins of a tulip doesn't help much (without microbiology), but he is discussing the nature of cities, and his suggestion seems good. |
| 22524 | The nature of each thing is its mature state [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What each thing is when its coming to be has been complete, this we say is the nature of each - for example, of a human, or of a horse, or of a household. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b32) | |
| A reaction: This works better for animate than for inanimate things. Aristotle is much clearer when we talk of the 'nature' of each thing, rather than its 'essence', because the latter has been blurred. I like 'essential nature'. |
| 22528 | The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whatever is composed of a number of things, and becomes one communal thing, a ruler and a ruled are always seen, and this is present in animate things on the basis of their entire nature. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1254a28) | |
| A reaction: I'm assuming he is referring to animals, rather than plants. I'm not sure if this is a universal truth (e.g. in the case of slime moulds), but it is how I see human beings. The organism could not possibly function (esp. navigate) without central control. |
| 22570 | Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Now, with the development of rhetoric, those who are able public speakers become popular leaders. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1305a12) | |
| A reaction: Demosthenes was an exact contemporary of Aristotle. Nowadays we are conscious of the 'dumbing down' by popular speakers, which is not the same as rhetoric. |
| 22574 | A community can lack self-control [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If lack of self-control exists at the level of a single individual, it also exists at the level of a city. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1310a17) | |
| A reaction: A nice extension of the problem of akrasia. Was Britain declaring war in 1914 an act of akrasia? With hindsight it looks that way. Strong emotions about Belgium overcame sensible concern for the young men of Britain. |
| 2837 | Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Nothing that is contrary to nature is fine. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1325b09) | |
| A reaction: This seems a rather conservative view, since it rules out submarines, mountaineering and heart transplants.. It depends what we count as 'natural'. |
| 2824 | The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The many are the best judges of poetry and music; some judge some parts, some judge others, but their collective judgement is a verdict on all the parts. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b08) | |
| A reaction: No one seems to believe this in modern times, but it was a lot easier to spot good art before the invention of the camera, and Duchamp's wretched Fountain. |
| 2846 | Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We must regard music as a stimulus to virtue, capable of making a certain kind of character (just as gymnastic training produces a body of a certain type). | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1339a20) | |
| A reaction: He makes a sustained claim for this, but without explicit justification. I am totally convinced that the music of Bach improves us, but I have no idea why. |
| 2807 | Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Some say the distinction between slave and free is one of convention only, and in nature there is no difference, so that this form of rule is based on force and is therefore not just. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253b20) | |
| A reaction: Note that Aristotle gives good expression to the main view opposed to his own. History has clearly proved Aristotle wrong, and the present idea to be correct. Ditto the subjugation of women. |
| 22582 | Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Spirit [thumos] is what produces friendliness [philetikon], since it is the capacity of the soul by which we love [philoumen]. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1327b39) | |
| A reaction: This is the same 'spirit' which Plato adds to reason and emotion for this three-part soul. There it seems more to denote fighting ability. Aristotle says it produces both fierceness and love. 'For the man de sword, for the woman de kiss'. |
| 2810 | Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Selfishness is condemned, and justly, but selfishness is not simply to be fond of oneself, but to be excessively fond. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b03) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is one of the main defendents of the idea that self-concern is an important part of morality. Stay fit! Improve your character! The mean between self-hatred and narcissism. |
| 22555 | The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Conferring benefits is just what it is the function of good men to do. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286b10) | |
| A reaction: Kant cannot ignore consequences (when assessing the maxim), and the great virtue theorist can't ignore them when judging virtuous behaviour. |
| 2841 | People become good because of nature, habit and reason [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Men become sound and good because of three things: these are nature, habit and reason. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332a38) | |
| A reaction: 'Habit' is the distinctively Aristotelian idea, but the most attractive part of his account is that habit and reason should combine. |
| 22557 | Virtuous people are like the citizens of the best city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The virtue of a man must be identical to that of a citizen of the best city. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1288a38) | |
| A reaction: Earlier he separated virtuous people from the best citizens, but here he reverses it. The interesting part is the role of the city in moulding the virtuous person. |
| 2829 | The law is the mean [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The law is the mean. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287b04) | |
| A reaction: He probably intends to say that the law should be the mean. Since virtue is always the mean (i.e. what is appropriate), then it is almost tautological (for him) that the law is the mean. |
| 22590 | Virtue is concerned with correct feelings [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is concerned with enjoying, loving, and hating in the correct way. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1340a14) | |
| A reaction: The context is a defence of music as a training of right feelings. |
| 2813 | It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1265a32) | |
| A reaction: That's a relief. Presumably this would achieve the correct mean in terms of indulgence, but all ruined by excesses in other areas. |
| 22553 | Justice is a virtue of communities [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Justice is a virtue relating to communities. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1283a38) | |
| A reaction: Interesting, given that we can also think of justice as between two individuals - in a contract, for example. Betrayal is an injustice. But for Aristotle the focus is on the constitution. |
| 22561 | The rich are seen as noble, because they don't need to commit crimes [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The rich seem to possess already the things for the sake of which unjust people do injustice, which is why the rich are called both noble and good and notable. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1293b38) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem (at least in popular lore) to apply to those who acquired their wealth by unjust means, because by then injustice has become a habit. |
| 2808 | Master and slave can have friendship through common interests [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There is an interest in common and a feeling of friendship between master and slave, wherever they are fitted for this relationship. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1255b12) | |
| A reaction: Very striking. His view that there are natural slaves, who are incapable of the good life, seems to count against this, but I suspect that he is forced to confront the facts in his own city. |
| 2803 | Man is by nature a political animal [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Man is by nature a political animal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a01) | |
| A reaction: It might be clearer if we said 'social animal'. We are certainly gregarious. Anyone who fails to be social is dismissed by Aristotle as not truly human. |
| 2820 | People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Men have a desire for live together, even when they have no need to seek each other's help. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1278b20) | |
| A reaction: He says that someone who doesn't want to live in community because they are wholly self-sufficient doesn't count as a normal human. |
| 22586 | Only humans have reason [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The human being alone has reason. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332b04) | |
| A reaction: Only in the last fifty years have we begun to grasp how clever larger animals are, and I would say that they consistently make rational choices, even if they can't articulate them. |
| 22523 | The community (of villages) becomes a city when it is totally self-sufficient [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The community, coming from several villages, when it is complete, is the city, once it has already reached (one might almost say) the limit of total self-sufficiency. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b27) | |
| A reaction: I suppose a group of villages might be self-sufficient, provided water supply and defences were secure. In a city it is all within easy reach. Each village can't have a full set of specialists. |
| 2805 | A community must share a common view of good and justice [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is sharing a common view in good and evil, justice and injustice, that makes a household and a state. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a17) | |
| A reaction: This idea comes up against the modern idea of pluralism (e.g. in Isaiah Berlin), which is inevitable in huge states with a lot of migration. |
| 22526 | People who are anti-social or wholly self-sufficient are no part of a city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Anyone who cannot live in a community with others, or who does not need to because of his self-sufficiency, is no part of a city, so that he is either a wild beast or a god. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a27) | |
| A reaction: Civil people should try hard to accommodate those who are anti-social. I'm not convinced that there is anyone who is wholly self-sufficient. |
| 22535 | Friendship is the best good for cities, because it reduces factions [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We think friendship is the greatest good for cities, since this way people are least likely to engage in faction. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1262b07) | |
| A reaction: Earlier philosophers were deeply worried about 'faction', but we now accept the gangs of secretive hoodlums called political parties. I suspect the old view was right, but it's a bit late now. You can't engineer friendships (can you?). |
| 22532 | A city can't become entirely one, because its very nature is to be a multitude [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Socrates adopts the hypothesis that it is best for a city to be as far as possible entirely one. …But it is evident that the more a city becomes one the less of a city it will be. For a city is in its nature a sort of multitude. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261a14) | |
| A reaction: [He is referring to Plato's Republic] He says if a city wholly unifies it becomes like a household, and then a human being, rather than a city. A very interesting commitment to diversity in a city, based on its essential nature. Athens was very diverse. |
| 22584 | A community should all share to some extent in something like land or food [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Communities should have some one thing that is common and the same for all the members, whether they share in it equally or unequally - for example, food, a quantity of territory, or something else of this sort. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1328a27) | |
| A reaction: In modern societies vast numbers of people own no land at all, and common land has dwindled. Maybe it is roads, buses and trains? |
| 22581 | The size of a city is decided by the maximum self-sufficient community that can be surveyed [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The best defining mark of a city is the greatest excess of multitude with a view to self-sufficiency in living that can easily be surveyed as a whole. Let the size of the city, then, be determined in this way. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1326b23) | |
| A reaction: Modern states have presumably far exceeded to self-sufficiency test. The requirement to be 'surveyed' presumably implies that the state can be controlled. Modern technology means almost no limit to such a size. |
| 22548 | A city aims at living well [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The end of the city is living well. …It is for the sake of noble actions, not for the sake of living together. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1280b38) | |
| A reaction: So the aim is not glory, conquest, colonisation, great buildings or other works. It is all of the citizens living well in their own way. This is the liberal ideal, from a long time ago. Spinoza is in tune with this. Fulfilling capabilities? |
| 22577 | What is the best life for everyone, and is that a communal or an individual problem? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There should first be agreement about what the most choiceworthy life is for (one might almost say) everyone, and then determine whether it is the same or distinct for all communally as for each separately. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323a19) | |
| A reaction: Presumably 'almost' because slaves don't make the cut. But the inclusiveness is hugely important, and I take his second question to be the debate between communitarians and liberals. Communists and libertarians might get a look in. |
| 22579 | The same four cardinal virtues which apply to individuals also apply to a city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The courage, justice, practical wisdom, and temperance of a city have the same capacity and form [morphé] as those in which each human being who is said to be courageous, just, practically-wise, and temperate would share. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b33) | |
| A reaction: These are the four traditional Cardinal Virtues of ancient Greek culture. Aristotle defers to them, even though his account of the virtues is much broader. |
| 2431 | Every state is an association formed for some good purpose [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Observation tells us that every state is an association; and that every state is formed with a view to some good purpose. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a01) | |
| A reaction: Not so much a historical speculation, I think, as an assertion that it should be obvious what binds a state together, and hence has allowed it to endure. |
| 22578 | The happiest city is the one that acts most nobly [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The happy city is the one that is best and acts nobly. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b29) | |
| A reaction: He applies almost identical criteria to the eudaimon individual and the eudaimon city. It is not the possession of virtuous qualities but the performing of fine deeds which matters. I want to be proud of what my country does. |
| 2832 | The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b25) | |
| A reaction: He knows that this cannot be fully achieved. It gets worrying when misfits are pressured into conformity. This sounds like Aristotle's less liberal side - though he accepts diversity. |
| 2821 | The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The names for right constitutions (with their deviations) are monarchy (tyranny), aristocracy (oligarchy), and polity (democracy). | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1279b04) | |
| A reaction: I found it hard to pin down the meaning of 'polity', even though he makes it sound like the best constitution. Something like 'teamwork'. |
| 22546 | A city is a community of free people, and the constitution should aim at the common advantage [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those constitutions that aim at the common advantage are correct, whereas those that aim only at the advantage of the rulers are erroneous ones. For they are like the rule of a master, whereas a city is a community of free people. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1279a17) | |
| A reaction: He is very keen on the full equality of all citizens (even if his concept of a citizen is narrow). This must be connected to his eudaimonist account of ethics. Everyone must flourish. I'm struck by his liberal values. |
| 22558 | Constitutions specify distribution of offices, the authorities, and the community's aim [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A constitution is the way that cities order their offices, how they are distributed, what element is in control in the constitution, and what the end of each community is. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1289a15) | |
| A reaction: Liberal constitutions tend to avoid stating what the end of the city is, because that is for the free citizens to decide. Nothing is said, it seems, about the territory or the population. |
| 22566 | The greed of the rich is more destructive than the greed of the people [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What the rich do to get more does more to destroy the constitution than what the people do. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1297a10) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is because the wealthy have more power. In our society they have more control over the media and public opinions. The law should maintain the constitution, and the poor have no influence on the law. |
| 2973 | We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If we wish to investigate the best constitution appropriately, we must first decide what is the most desirable life. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323a14) | |
| A reaction: He takes this for granted, and it sounds right, but it is firmly contradicted by modern liberals (e.g. Rawls), who say the good life is for individuals to decide. |
| 2835 | Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1319b35) | |
| A reaction: An important issue for Aristotle, which we no longer seem to worry about. A constitution should aim, when it is created, to be acceptable enough to be durable. |
| 22580 | The best constitution enables everyone to live the best life [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is evident that the best constitution is necessarily that order in accord with which anyone might be able to do best and live blessedly. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1324a23) | |
| A reaction: So what would Aristotle make of the modern welfare state, or the idea of a safety net for those who struggle? Should the state help the best life, and not just facilitate it? Education, infrastructure, health, communal activity…. |
| 2818 | The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The virtue of the citizen must be in relation to the constitution; and as there are many constitutions, there cannot be just one single and perfect virtue of the sound citizen. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1276b28) | |
| A reaction: This is very striking support for the view that Aristotle's account of the virtues in 'Ethics' is merely a description of conventions (Athenian, presumably), rather than an appeal to nature. However, see his account of the soul, and human function. |
| 22545 | A person can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent man [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is possible for someone to be an excellent citizen without having acquired the virtue in accord with which someone is an excellent man. …[1278b02] In one sort of city the good man and the excellent citizen are the same. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1276b33) | |
| A reaction: Thus confutes my simple summary of Aristotelian ethics as 'be a good citizen!'. He thinks leaders of communities must be excellent men. You can fulfil a role in the city (soldier, doctor, cleaner) without all-round excellence (see 1276b39). |
| 22563 | The middle classes are neither ambitious nor anarchic, which is good [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those in the middle [in wealth] are least inclined either to avoid rule or to be eager to rule, both of which things are harmful to cities. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b12) | |
| A reaction: How nice to hear something good about the poor old middle classes - the hated bourgeoisie of the marxists, looked down on by the snobbish elite. They avoid the black market, and bribery for offices. |
| 22544 | A citizen is someone who is allowed to hold official posts in a city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whoever is authorised to share in deliberative or judicial office …is a citizen of the relevant city. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1275b18) | |
| A reaction: Interesting, and perhaps a bit surprising for us. We tend to assume that in a democracy the citizens are those allowed to vote, but he says what matters is being allowed to hold an office. Log cabin to White House. He's right. |
| 22541 | Kings should be selected according to character [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is surely better to choose each new king not as now but rather in accord with his own life. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1271a20) | |
| A reaction: When the British monarch was very powerful, the hereditary system was fairly disastrous. I get a thrill when a highly esteemed citizen is voted president of a country, such as Vaclav Havel in Czechia. British monarchs could be elected. |
| 2819 | The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1277b27) | |
| A reaction: If a person with wide social powers is to have practical wisdom, that will require extensive knowledge, in a way that local practical wisdom does not. |
| 22542 | People who buy public office will probably expect to profit from it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is reasonable to expect that those who have bought office, that is, when they rule by having spent money, will become habituated to making a profit from it. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1273b01) | |
| A reaction: Probably true, though money-grubbers are even happier if they can achieve office without expenditure. |
| 22552 | The rich can claim to rule, because of land ownership, and being more trustworthy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The rich have a claim because they own a larger share of the land, and the land is something communal, and furthermore because they are for the most part more trustworthy when it comes to treaties. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1283a32) | |
| A reaction: It seems right that the rich give a stability and hence reliability to a society, which the more mobile poor cannot offer. But it is a minor point. |
| 22583 | The guardians should not be harsh to strangers, as no one should behave like that [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is not correct to claim that guardians are to be harsh to those they do not know, since one should not treat anyone in this way. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1328a07) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a criticism of Plato. Aristotle thinks people should be nice to one another! The ancient tradition of hospitality to strangers. |
| 22543 | In large communities it is better if more people participate in the offices [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Where the city is not small, it is more political and more democratic, if more people participate in the offices. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1273b11) | |
| A reaction: Not sure what 'more political' means. This is not to avoid corruption, but because it is best to have specialists in everything. All of the state functions should be of the highest standard. |
| 22539 | Election of officials by the elected is dangerous, because factions can control it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Where the election of officials is concerned, electing from the elected is dangerous. For if some are willing to combine, even if they are a relatively small number, the election will always turn out according to their wish. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266a25) | |
| A reaction: The British Prime Minister is elected by the elected members of parliament of the majority party. (Boris Johnson is the current PM…). This idea reflects the great concern that earlier thinkers had about factions in politics. |
| 22572 | Officers should like the constitution, be capable, and have appropriate virtues and justice [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those holding the controlling offices should possess friendship towards the constitution, great capacity for that office, and the virtue and justice required by that constitution. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a33) | |
| A reaction: We need to remember that all officers in our democracy need to be fully committed to that system of government (which does not always seem to me to be the case). |
| 2826 | Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: As a larger amount of water is less easily polluted, so the multitude is less easily corrupted than the few. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286a30) | |
| A reaction: This was before the arrival of modern mass media, starting with tabloid newspapers. When many people are corrupted, it is much harder for society to recover its sanity. |
| 22567 | Democracy arises when people who are given equal freedom assume unconditional equality [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democracy arose from those who are equal in some respect thinking themselves to be unconditionally equal, since, because they are equally free, they think they are unconditionally equal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1301a28) | |
| A reaction: An interesting speculation. In Britain the origins of democracy seem tied to the granting of religious equality and freedom. |
| 22560 | Popular leaders only arise in democracies that are not in accord with the law [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In cities under democracies that are in accord with law, popular leaders do not arise, but rather it is the best citizens who take the front seats. Where the laws are not in control, however, there popular leaders arise. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1292a07) | |
| A reaction: This remark is, unfortunately, highly relevant to western politics in 2020. He says that flatterers rise to the top in these regimes. |
| 22562 | Choosing officials by lot is democratic [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It seems to be democratic for officials to be chosen by lot. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1294b07) | |
| A reaction: This idea has dropped out of modern politics, but is not ridiculous if the official is offered thorough civil service support. Presumably the term of office is fairly short. |
| 2823 | The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is possible that the many, not one of whom taken singly is a sound man, may yet, taken all together, be better than the few, not individually but collectively. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b01) | |
| A reaction: They may also crush everything that is good, if the many are gripped by absurd ideas (which they often are). Computer programmers are a good advert for this idea. |
| 22533 | If the people are equal in nature, then they should all share in ruling [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Where it is not possible for the same people always to rule, because all are in nature equal, it is also just for all to share in ruling. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261a38) | |
| A reaction: This derives from his principle that the naturally superior should always rule the naturally inferior - though it sometimes looks as if ruling is the distinguishing mark of who is 'superior'. Democracy needs to equalise its citizens, where possible. |
| 2817 | It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is all wrong that a person who is going to be deemed worthy of an office should solicit it. …One worthy of the office should hold it whether he wishes to or does not wish to. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1271a10) | |
| A reaction: I love this idea, and think it should be immediately implemented in the modern world, at every level of society. All leaders should be pushed to the front. The ambitious should be pulled to the back. |
| 22576 | No office is permanent in a democracy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is democratic to have no office be permanent. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1317b42) | |
| A reaction: Modern exceptions seem to be judges and civil servants. |
| 22549 | In many cases, the claim that the majority is superior would apply equally to wild beasts [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whether in every people this superiority of the majority to the few excellent people can exist is not clear. In some of them this cannot possibly be so, since the same argument would apply to wild beasts. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b18) | |
| A reaction: He also gives reasons why it is plausible to think that the judgement of the majority is superior. It seems crucial that the majority have some education. Education is pointless if it is always overruled by the uneducated. |
| 22575 | Ultimate democracy is tyranny [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The ultimate democracy is a tyranny. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1312b05) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is rule by a majority which has been corrupted by a populist leader, resulting in things like witch hunts. |
| 22531 | We aim to understand the best possible community for free people [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Our project is to get a theoretical grasp on which political community is superior to all others for people who are able to live as far as possible in the way they would pray to live. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1260b28) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a manifesto for liberalism. Presumably a community of free people starts from a superior position, and so the ideal community is the best that can be achieved from that starting point. A utopia of slaves is of no interest. |
| 22564 | Community is based on friends, who are equal and similar, and share things [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Community is fitted to friendship, since enemies do not wish to share even a road in common. But a city tends to consist as much as possible of people who are equal and similar, which especially holds of those in the middle. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b24) | |
| A reaction: The surprising emphasis on friendship in 'Ethics' turns out to have great importance in 'Politics'. Friendship is the cement of a community, and the constitution must maximise good conditions for friendships. |
| 22585 | Look at all of the citizens before judging a city to be happy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A city must not be called happy by looking at just a part of it, but by looking at all of the citizens. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1329a22) | |
| A reaction: For example, it is wrong for a state to exult for being on the winning side in a major war, if it has meant misery for much of their own population. The Field of the Cloth of Gold (1520) does not excuse the misery of vagrants. |
| 22565 | The best communities rely on a large and strong middle class [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The political community that is due to those in the middle class is best, and cities can be well governed where the middle class is numerous and strong. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b34) | |
| A reaction: He specifically connects this to the doctrine of the mean in 'Ethics'. It seems easier for rulers from the middle classes to command universal respect, as the extremes tend to despise one another. What does he mean by 'strong'? |
| 22589 | Citizens do not just own themselves, but are also parts of the city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One should in no way think that any citizen belongs to himself alone, but that all of them belong to the city, each being part of the city. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1337a27) | |
| A reaction: Note that they do not belong entirely to the city. I take this as an expression of his liberalism, which reminds liberals that we are also parts of a community, with a common good, and can't just go our own way. |
| 22534 | People care less about what is communal, and more about what is their own [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What is held communally by the most people gets the least care. For people give most thought to what is their own, less to what is communal, or only as much as falls to each of them to give. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261b33) | |
| A reaction: That is, they care about the bit they contributed (I think). On a train, would people with feet on the seats do the same in their own home? Yes, probably! Caring about what is communal must be a cultural consensus. Pride in the NHS. |
| 22538 | Owning and sharing property communally increases disagreements [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those who own and share property communally have far more disagreements than those who own their property separately. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b23) | |
| A reaction: The reduction of disagreements is not a trivial matter, when designing a constitution for a happy community. 'Good fences make good neighbours'. |
| 22536 | There could be private land and public crops, or public land and private crops, or both public [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The land might be held separately, while the crops grown on it are brought into a communal store, …or the land might he held and farmed communally, while the crops are divided for private use, …or they could both be held communally. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263a02) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle says that examples exist of both of the first two cases. I would go for public land and privately divided crops. Capitalists end up with private land and private crops. |
| 22530 | Both women and children should be educated, as this contributes to a city's excellence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary to look to the constitution in educating both women and children, if indeed it makes any difference to the excellence of a city that its children be excellent, and its women too. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1260b14) | |
| A reaction: He consistently classes women as inferior, so it is a bit surprising to find that women need to be educated. They are not full citizens, but are part of the community, of which all parts need to be excellent. |
| 21358 | Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A human being who belongs, by nature, not to himself but to another is, by nature, a slave. ...Those whose function happens to be the use of their bodies (when this is the best that can be achieved) are slaves by nature. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1254a09-), quoted by Armand Marie LeRoi - The Lagoon: how Aristotle invented science 099 | |
| A reaction: A nice example of Aristotle trying to derive what ought to be from the 'nature' of each thing. Clearly, though, this was not the best that can be achieved. And why are labourers slaves, but not computer programmers or economists? |
| 20092 | One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One sort of freedom is ruling and being ruled in turn. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1317b1) | |
| A reaction: This is a lovely challenge to our modern idea of liberty, which largely consists of being left alone. |
| 2833 | Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In an oligarchy or a democracy it pays to give equality, or even preference, to those who participate in the constitution less, to the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an oligarchy. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a27) | |
| A reaction: A very nice idea. Every constitution will give priority to some group, even if it is all of the adults. So it should therefore have clauses supporting the others (e.g. children). |
| 2834 | It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is always the weaker who go in search of justice and equality; the strong reck nothing of them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1318b05) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be merely an observation of the facts. He certainly doesn't want to deny them justice and equality, merely because that motivates them. |
| 2830 | We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is the definitive principle of aristocracy, as wealth is of oligarchy, and freedom of democracy. …each of these is grounds for claiming equality. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1294a11) | |
| A reaction: By 'aristocratic' Aristotle means living at a high level of virtue (unlike oligarchs, who are just rich). Hence we can all aspire to be aristocrats. |
| 22569 | The Heraeans replaced election with lot, to thwart campaigning [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The people of Heraea replaced election with selection by lot because those who electioneered were getting elected. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1303a14) | |
| A reaction: Maybe electioneering can distort sensible choices, but good choices need good knowledge of the candidates. It is much harder in large communities. |
| 22550 | It is dreadful to neither give a share nor receive a share [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Neither to give a share nor to receive a share is a fearful thing. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b28) | |
| A reaction: It is striking that he includes equality in giving, as well as in receiving. Paying taxes is a privilege, because it shows your equality as a citizen. |
| 22568 | Faction is for inferiors to be equal, and equals to become superior [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Inferiors engage in faction in order to be equal, while equals do so in order to be superior. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1302a30) | |
| A reaction: In Britain that seems to trade unions in the first case, and the Conservative Party in the second case. Aristotle dislikes faction, but he's stuck with it because he insists on freedom. |
| 2814 | Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Phaleas of Chalcedon was the first to propose that the property of the citizens should be equal. … but there should also be equality of education. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266a38) | |
| A reaction: Not sure how you achieve full equality in education, if some of the blighters work harder. A useful reminder that achieving 'equality' is far from a simple matter. |
| 22540 | Wealth could be quickly leveled by only the rich giving marriage dowries [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A leveling could be very quickly achieved by the rich giving but not receiving dowries, and the poor receiving but not giving them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266b02) | |
| A reaction: Consequence: the daughters of the rich are never again allowed to marry (or even speak to) poor people. The modern approach is graduated income tax, presumably because there are reasonably accurate records of income. |
| 2828 | Law is intelligence without appetite [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Law is intelligence without appetite. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287a31) | |
| A reaction: Neat, but no laws would be needed if there were no appetites. The idea has a nice Kantian feeling to it, though - of rising into the space of pure reason. |
| 22537 | Property should be owned privately, but used communally [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is better for property to be private, but for its use to be made communal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263a38) | |
| A reaction: This is because people take more care of what is private. Modern large land owners usually allow hikers, but not gardeners. |
| 22573 | The virtue of justice may be relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If what is just is not the same in all constitutions, there must be differences in the virtue of justice as well. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a37) | |
| A reaction: This problem has recently arisen when the state of China took full control of the westernised colony of Hong Kong. Liberals look for a more absolute concept of justice. What is justice in a slave colony? |
| 22527 | Justice is the order in a political community [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Justice is a political community's order. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a36) | |
| A reaction: This seems to agree with Plato, who identifies justice with harmony (in individuals as well as in communities). Fascism, however, tries to impose order without justice. Maybe justice is the health of the community. |
| 22547 | Justice is equality for equals, and inequality for unequals [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Justice seems to be equality - not for everyone, but for equals. Justice also seems to be inequality - not for everyone, but for unequals. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1280a11) | |
| A reaction: He is specific that slaves, women and children are unequals, but I'm not sure how much inequality there is among the free men. In virtue theory, some men are clearly greatly superior to others. Is there a cut off point for equality? |
| 2825 | The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In a state the good aimed at is justice; and that means what is for the benefit of the whole community; and all men believe that justice means equality in some sense. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1282b17) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle's idea of justice seems closer to finding what is appropriate than it does to mere equality of treatment. |
| 2816 | If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Easy change from established laws to new laws means weakening the power of the law. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1269a23) | |
| A reaction: This is a reasonable justification for sometimes insisting on the letter of the law, even though some degree of injustice results. |
| 2806 | Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a31) | |
| A reaction: Sounds true, but it is extraordinary that the virtues of mankind only emerge when we are artificially contrained. Rousseau disagreed with this. |
| 22556 | Laws that match people's habits are more effective than mere written rules [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Laws that are in accord with habits have more control and deal with things that have more control than do written laws. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287b05) | |
| A reaction: This is the problem of bringing the law into disrepute, by insisting on behaviour that goes against the grain. But there are laws, such as those against racism, which are designed to break bad habits. |
| 2827 | It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287a19) | |
| A reaction: This assumes that the law is sensible. An exception would be when a wise ruler takes over a very corrupted state, which has passed evil laws. Nelson Mandela. |
| 22551 | Correct law should be in control, with rulers only deciding uncertain issues [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The laws, when correctly laid down, should be in control, and the ruler, whether one or many, should have control only of those matters on which the laws cannot pronounce with exactness. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1282b01) | |
| A reaction: It is obvious that general laws cannot cover each individual cases. Aristotle doesn't yet have the concept of an independent judiciary to handle this problem, so this is not true separation of powers. |
| 22554 | It is said that we should not stick strictly to written law, as it is too vague [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is said that laws speak only of the universal, and do not prescribe with a view to particular circumstances, so that it is foolish to rule in any craft in accord with what is written down. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286a10) | |
| A reaction: To say we shouldn't follow laws because they are all vague would be crazy. A vague border is still a border. Laws need interpretation, and judgement of appropriate application. |
| 2840 | The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Another thing that should be a common charge on the whole state is the worship of the gods. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1330a08) | |
| A reaction: If religion ceases to be a priority, is there some equivalent which should replace it? National sports teams? National theatre, or orchestras? National parks? |
| 2811 | A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A state is a plurality which must depend on education to bring about its common unity. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b33) | |
| A reaction: He also says that diversity is an essential aspect of a city, so I don't think he expects education to achieve perfect unity. |
| 22588 | A city has a single end, so education must focus on that, and be communal, not private [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Since the end of the whole city is a single end, it is evident that education too must be one and the same for all, and that its supervision must be communal, not private as it is at present. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1337a21) | |
| A reaction: But the end of the city is for all individual citizens to flourish, not for the group to flourish. So presumably education must be tuned to individual capacities and needs, and not just focus on some communal good. |
| 2847 | The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One might perhaps suppose that serious activity in childhood may have for its aim the amusement of the complete and adult man. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1339a30) | |
| A reaction: It is very Aristotelian to have a concept of 'serious' childhood play. I doubt whether Nichomachus had much fun. Aristotle thinks the good amusement of adults is very important. |
| 2842 | Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Men learn partly by habituation and partly by listening. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332b10) | |
| A reaction: Habit is almost an education of the body rather than of the mind, like a pianist making their fingers learn to play a piece. |
| 2844 | Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If an unwanted child is conceived, abortion should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1335b24) | |
| A reaction: A salient reminder that ancient people also had to think about the question of abortion. Some cultures seem unbothered by concerns, but not Arfistotle. |
| 6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
| Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
| From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
| A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |
| 2809 | If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If nature makes nothing without some end in view, nothing to no purpose, it must be that nature has made plants and animals for the sake of man. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1256b20) | |
| A reaction: That was a rather fast move! If a tiger eats a man, how do we explain that? Why are some plants poisonous? Pebbles on a beach seem to have no purpose. |
| 2800 | The best instruments have one purpose, not many [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Every instrument will be made best if it serves not many purposes but one. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b03) | |
| A reaction: Sound like a good general truth, but not a universal truth. Swiss army knife. Ship in a bottle. Pins. Wrapping paper. |
| 2836 | God is not blessed and happy because of external goods, but because of his own nature [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: God himself is not blessed and happy on account of any of the external goods but because of himself and what he is by his own nature. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b24) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle was famous for saying that external goods are important for the virtuous human life, so this idea is his corrective, which shows that they are of limited importance. |
| 2802 | Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Just as men imagine gods in human shape, so they imagine their way of life to be like that of men. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b26) | |
| A reaction: A common Greek observation. It is more significant that we anthropomorphise the thinking of the gods, as well as their physiques and banquets. |