7 ideas
18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If a proposition is 'made' true, it has to be true 'in virtue of' something, meaning a relationship of metaphysical explanation. Thus a true proposition must have truth conferred on it in some way that explains how it gets to be true. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.202) | |
A reaction: It is good to ask what we mean by 'makes'. I like essentialist explanations, but this may be misplaced. Observing that y makes x true seems to be rather less than actually explaining how it does it. What would such explanations look like? |
18353 | Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Modes are real beings that stand in non-contingent formal ontological relations both to individual substances and to immanent universals. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.212) | |
A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I pass it on. 'Modes' seem to invite the Razor, if we already have substances and universals. I am no clear about 'instantiation' because I now have the word 'mode' to play with. |
18352 | Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Pure trope theorists must apparently hold that each trope has its identity underivatively, not that it depends for it on or owes it to other entities of any sort. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.207) | |
A reaction: Lowe defends dependent 'modes' of things, against independent 'tropes'. Good, but he then has to say what the thing is (a modeless 'substance'?), because it can't just be a bundle of modes or tropes. |
335 | Do the gods also hold different opinions about what is right and honourable? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Do the gods too hold different opinions about what is right, and similarly about what is honourable and dishonourable, good and bad? | |
From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 07e) |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |
336 | Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? (the 'Euthyphro Question') [Plato] |
Full Idea: Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? | |
From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 10a) | |
A reaction: The famous Euthyphro Question, the key question about the supposed religious basis of morality. The answer of Socrates is Idea 337. |
337 | It seems that the gods love things because they are pious, rather than making them pious by loving them [Plato] |
Full Idea: So things are loved by the gods because they are pious, and not pious because they are loved? It seems so. | |
From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 10e) | |
A reaction: Socrates' answer to the Euthyphro Question (see Idea 336). The form of piety precedes the gods. |