Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'fragments/reports' and 'The Handbook [Encheiridion]'

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6 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature

23366	We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: The will of nature may be learned from those things in which we do not differ from one another.
	From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 26)
	A reaction: There you go! This is the rule for anthropologists on field trips. And it guides us towards a core of essential human nature. But it neglects the way that nature is expressed in different cultures, which is also important.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia

5996	Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]
	Full Idea: Critolaus reformulated Aristotelian theory by defining happiness as a 'fulfilment' (sumplêrôma) of psychic, physical, and external goods, where virtue vastly outweighs the rest.
	From: report of Critolaus (fragments/reports [c.170 BCE]) by Stephen A. White - Critolaus
	A reaction: The sounds more like an attempt at clarification than a real change of Peripatetic doctrine. Occasionally 'fulfilment' is offered as a translation for eudaimonia. Maybe we should just take up Critolaus' suggestion when we are discussing Aristotle.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

20239	Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche]
	Full Idea: Hesiod reckons envy among the effects of the good and benevolent Eris, and there was nothing offensive in according envy to the gods. ...Likewise the Greeks were different from us in their evaluation of hope: one felt it to be blind and malicious.
	From: report of Hesiod (works [c.700 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Dawn (Daybreak) 038
	A reaction: Presumably this would be understandable envy, and unreasonable hope. Ridiculous envy can't possibly be good, and modest and sensible hope can't possibly be bad. I suspect he wants to exaggerate the relativism.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion

4022	Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C]
	Full Idea: The injunction of Epictetus is well known, that in commiserating with another for his misfortune, we ought to talk consolingly, but not be moved by pity.
	From: report of Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], §16) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §15.1
	A reaction: This goes strongly against the grain of the Christian tradition, but strikes me as an appealing attitude (even if I am the sufferer).

23365	If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: When you see someone weeping is sorrow …do not shrink from sympathising with him, and even groaning with him, but be careful not to groan inwardly too.
	From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 16)
	A reaction: The point is that the person's suffering is an 'indifferent' because nothing can be done about it, and we should only really care about what we are able to choose. He is not opposed to the man's suffering, or his need for support.

25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish

23368	Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: The governor Agrippinus would try to persuade those whom he sentenced that it was proper for them to be sentenced, …just as the physician persuades a patient to accept their treatment.
	From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 22)
	A reaction: This resembles the Contractualism of T.H. Scanlon (that actions are good if you can justify them to those involved). It may be possible to persuade people by the use of sophistry and lies. Nevertheless, a fairly civilise proposal.