Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Primary Truths' and 'Moral Relativism'

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5 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities

9155	An a priori proof is independent of experience [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: An a priori proof is a proof independent of experience.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Primary Truths [1686])
	A reaction: Burge says Leibniz gave the first modern account of a priori knowledge. There may be no explicit reference to experience involved, but it would beg many questions to deny that implicit experience may be at the root of the proof.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation

22449	When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
	Full Idea: One might think that 'is red' means the same as 'seems red to most people', forgetting that when asked if an object is red we look at it to see if it is red, and not in order to estimate the reaction that others will have to it.
	From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.23)
	A reaction: True, but we are conscious of our own reliability as observers (e.g. if colourblind, or with poor hearing or eyesight). I don't take my glasses off, have a look, and pronounce that the object is blurred. Ordinary language philosophy in action.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism

22451	All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
	Full Idea: There is a great deal that all men have in common; all need affection, the cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble.
	From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.33)
	A reaction: There seem to be some people who don't need affection or a place in a community, though it is hard to imagine them being happy. These kind of facts are the basis for any sensible cognitivist view of ethics. They are basic to Foot's view.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value

22452	Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
	Full Idea: Do we know what we mean by saying that anything has value, or even that we value it, as opposed to wanting it or being prepared to go to trouble to get it?
	From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.35)
	A reaction: Well, I value Rembrandt paintings, but have no aspiration to own one (and would refuse it if offered, because I couldn't look after it properly). And 'we' don't want to move the Taj Mahal to London. She has not expressed this good point very well.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

20239	Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche]
	Full Idea: Hesiod reckons envy among the effects of the good and benevolent Eris, and there was nothing offensive in according envy to the gods. ...Likewise the Greeks were different from us in their evaluation of hope: one felt it to be blind and malicious.
	From: report of Hesiod (works [c.700 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Dawn (Daybreak) 038
	A reaction: Presumably this would be understandable envy, and unreasonable hope. Ridiculous envy can't possibly be good, and modest and sensible hope can't possibly be bad. I suspect he wants to exaggerate the relativism.