Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Neutral Relations' and 'Formal and Transcendental Logic'

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9 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: Husserl maintained that because most logicians have not studied the connection between logic and the world, logic did not achieve its status of purity. Even more, their logic implicitly presupposed a world.
     From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1
     A reaction: The point here is that the bracketing of phenomenology, to reach an understanding with no presuppositions, is impossible if you don't realise what your are presupposing. I think the logic/world relationship is badly neglected, thanks to Frege.
Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: The phenomenological logic grounds logical notions in subjective acts of experience.
     From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929], p.183) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1
     A reaction: I'll approach this with great caution, but this is a line of thought that appeals to me. The core assumptions of logic do not arise ex nihilo.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: Pure mathematics is the science of the relations between any object whatever (relation of whole to part, relation of equality, property, unity etc.). In this sense, pure mathematics is seen by Husserl as formal ontology.
     From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.2
     A reaction: I would expect most modern analytic philosophers to agree with this. Modern mathematics (e.g. category theory) seems to have moved beyond this stage, but I still like this idea.
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The 'standard' view of relations, held by philosophers and logicians alike, is that we may meaningfully talk of a relation holding of several objects in a given order (which works for examples like 'loves' and 'between').
     From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], Intro)
     A reaction: The point of Fine's paper is that there are many relations for which this model seems to fail.
The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The 'positionalist' view of relations is that each relation is taken to be endowed with a given number of argument places, or positions, in no specified order. [...The argument-places are specific entities, such as 'lover' and 'beloved']
     From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], Intro)
     A reaction: Fine offers this as an alternative to the 'standard' view of relations, in which the order of the objects matters. He then adds, and favours, the 'anti-positionalist' view, where there are not even a fixed number of places.
A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: If block a is on block b, it is hard to see how this state of affairs might consist of both 'on top of' and 'beneath'. Surely if the state is a genuine relational complex, there must be a single relation for these relata?
     From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], 1)
     A reaction: He has already shown that if such relations imply their converses, then that gives you two separate relations. He goes on to observe that you cannot pick one of the two as correct, because of symmetry. He later offers the 'vertical placement' relation.
Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Roads in the directional sense (A-to-B or B-to-A) are merely roads in the adirectional sense up which a direction has been imposed.
     From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], 1)
     A reaction: This is Fine's linguistic objection to the standard view of relations. It is undeniable that language imposes an order where it may not exist ('Bob and Jane play tennis'), and this fact is very significant in discussing relations.
Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: A 'biased' relation can be taken to be the result of imposing ordering on the argument-places of an unbiased relation, ..or we can take an unbiased relation to be a 'permutation class' of biased relations. This is a familiar metaphysic predicament.
     From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], 3)
     A reaction: 'Biased' relations such as 'on top of' have an ordering to their places, but 'unbiased' relations such as 'vertical placement' do not. This is a nice question in the metaphysics of grounding relations between key concepts.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Hesiod reckons envy among the effects of the good and benevolent Eris, and there was nothing offensive in according envy to the gods. ...Likewise the Greeks were different from us in their evaluation of hope: one felt it to be blind and malicious.
     From: report of Hesiod (works [c.700 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Dawn (Daybreak) 038
     A reaction: Presumably this would be understandable envy, and unreasonable hope. Ridiculous envy can't possibly be good, and modest and sensible hope can't possibly be bad. I suspect he wants to exaggerate the relativism.