Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Mental Life of Some Machines', 'works' and 'Putnam's Paradox'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


16 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A consistent theory is, by definition, one satisfied by some model; an isomorphic image of a model satisfies the same theories as the original model; to provide the making of an isomorphic image of any given model, a domain need only be large enough.
     From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Model')
     A reaction: This is laying out the ground for Putnam's model theory argument in favour of anti-realism. If you are chasing the one true model of reality, then formal model theory doesn't seem to offer much encouragement.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Anti-realists say the only world is imaginary, or only has the parts or classes or relations we divide it into, or doubt that reference to the world is possible, or doubt that our interpretations can achieve truth.
     From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Anti-R')
     A reaction: [compression of a paragraph on anti-realism] Lewis is a thoroughgoing realist. A nice example of the rhetorical device of ridiculing an opponent by suggesting that they don't even know what they themselves believe.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The mereological sum of the coffee in my cup, the ink in this sentence, a nearby sparrow, and my left shoe is a miscellaneous mess of an object, yet its boundaries are by no means unrelated to the joints of nature.
     From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Might')
     A reaction: In that case they do, but if there are no atoms at the root of physics then presumably their could also be thoroughly jointless assemblages, involving probability distributions etc. Even random scattered atoms seem rather short of joints.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Special relativity, unlike general relativity, was operationalist in spirit [Putnam on Einstein]
     Full Idea: Einstein's interpretation of special relativity was operationalist in spirit (in marked contrast to the interpretation he gave to general relativity).
     From: comment on Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History Ch.5
     A reaction: The late twentieth century was polluted with daft relativism, and I hold Einstein partly responsible, suspecting that he was a bad philosopher. The later development of Einstein's view noted here is interesting.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan]
     Full Idea: In machine functionalism, pain tokens (individual instances of pain) are identical with particular neurophysiological states, but pain itself, the kind, universal, or 'type', can be identified only with something more abstract.
     From: report of Hilary Putnam (The Mental Life of Some Machines [1967]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.6
     A reaction: This is where the "what is it like?" question seems important. Pain doesn't seem like a physical object, or an abstract idea. Personally I think the former is more likely to be correct than the latter. Causation by pain is not like causation by gravity.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Whatever happens in special cases, causal theories usually make it easy to be wrong about the thing we refer to.
     From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Is')
     A reaction: I suppose the point of this is that there are no checks and balances to keep reference in focus, but just a requirement to keep connected to an increasingly attenuated causal chain.
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Description theories of reference are supposed to have been well and truly refuted. I think not: ..it is still tenable with my seven points, and part of the truth of reference [7: rigidity, egocentric, tokens, causal, imperfect, indeterminate, families].
     From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Glob Desc')
     A reaction: (The bit at the end refers to his seven points, on p.59). He calls his basic proposal 'causal descriptivism', incorporating his seven slight modifications of traditional descriptivism about reference.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Einstein took causation to be the bedrock of physics [Einstein, by Coveney/Highfield]
     Full Idea: It is difficult to overplay Einstein's commitment to the concept of causality as the bedrock of physics.
     From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by P Coveney / R Highfield - The Arrow of Time 3 'problem'
     A reaction: I normally avoid arguments from authority, but this carries a bit of weight (e.g. when Russell tries to oppose it). What happens to Einstein's theories if you remove causation from them?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
General relativity assumes laws of nature are the same in all frames of reference [Einstein, by Close]
     Full Idea: Einstein came to general relativity from the principles that the laws of nature are the same in all frames of reference.
     From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Frank Close - Theories of Everything 5 'Cosmological'
     A reaction: I wish physicists would tell us a bit more about the ontological status of the 'laws of nature'. Presumably they are not supernatural, so there is an aspect of nature which is constant in all frames of reference. Explanation please.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Newton is a special case of Einstein's general theory, with an infinite speed of light [Einstein, by Close]
     Full Idea: Einstein's general relativity included Newton's theory as a special case: Newton's theory corresponds to the speed of light being infinite relative to the speed of the interacting bodies.
     From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Frank Close - Theories of Everything 5 'Gravity'
     A reaction: So Newton's theory was NOT wrong, but he made the false assumption that the speed of light was infinite.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
The theory is 'special' because it sticks to observers moving straight, at constant speeds [Einstein, by Farmelo]
     Full Idea: Einstein's first theory is 'special' because it only deals with observers who move in a straight line at constant speeds with respect to one another.
     From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Graham Farmelo - The Strangest Man 03
     A reaction: Most theories of this period seem to have focused on the simplest cases, for obvious reasons.
Assume the speed of light is constant for all observers, and the laws of physics are the same [Einstein, by Farmelo]
     Full Idea: Einstein assumed that when each observer measures the speed of light in a vacuum, they find the same value, regardless of their speed; and that measurements will lead to agreement on the laws of physics.
     From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Graham Farmelo - The Strangest Man 03
     A reaction: So are the laws of physics constant for all observers, irrespective of their speed?
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
General Relativity says there is no absolute force or acceleration [Einstein, by Close]
     Full Idea: Einstein's General Theory arose from the idea that there is no absolute measure of force and acceleration.
     From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Frank Close - Theories of Everything 5 'Gravity'
     A reaction: If absolutely everything is only true relative to something else you wonder what the point of measuring anything is. How big can a 'frame of reference' or 'inertial frame' be. Is the multiverse a frame of reference?
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / d. Mass
Mass is a measure of energy content [Einstein]
     Full Idea: The mass of a body is the measure of its energy content.
     From: Albert Einstein (works [1915]), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence 04 'Intro'
     A reaction: If I knew what energy was, this would be very illuminating. This idea is e=mc^2 in words. We now have the Higgs field to consider when trying to understand mass.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Space-time arises from the connection between measurements of space and of time [Einstein, by Farmelo]
     Full Idea: Einstein noted that the measurements of space and time are not independent but inextricably linked, leading to the idea of unified space-time (introduced by his former teacher Minkowski).
     From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Graham Farmelo - The Strangest Man 03
     A reaction: Notice the instrumentalist assumptions behind this.
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
I do not believe in a personal God [Einstein]
     Full Idea: I do not believe in a personal God and I have never denied this but have expressed it clearly.
     From: Albert Einstein (works [1915]), quoted by Richard Dawkins - The God Delusion Ch.1.15
     A reaction: This is an important corrective to those who claim Einstein as religious, on the basis of remarks about God not playing dice etc. See the whole of Dawkins's chapter on Einstein for full discussion.