Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'The Nature of Thought' and 'How to Russell a Frege-Church'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science

6782	Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam]
	Full Idea: Realism….is the only philosophy science which does not make the success of science a miracle.
	From: Hilary Putnam (works [1980]), quoted by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.4
	A reaction: This was from his earlier work; he became more pragmatist and anti-realist later. Personally I approve of the remark. The philosophy of science must certainly offer an explanation for its success. Truth seems the obvious explanation.

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence

2764	Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J]
	Full Idea: Blanshard says that in a fully coherent system there would not only be consistency, but every proposition would be entailed by the others, and no proposition would stand outside the system.
	From: report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], 2:265) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 8.1
	A reaction: Hm. If a proposition is entailed by the others, then it is a necessary truth (given the others) which sounds deterministic. You could predict all the truths you had never encountered. See 1578:178 for quote.

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth

19080	Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO]
	Full Idea: Blanshard said that coherent justification leads to coherence truth. It might be said that coherence is a test for truth, but truth is correspondence. But coherence doesn't guarantee correspondence, and coherence is a test, so truth is not correspondence.
	From: report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], Ch.26) by James O. Young - The Coherence Theory of Truth §2.2
	A reaction: [compression of Young's summary] Rescher (1973) says that Blanshard's argument depends on coherence being an infallible test for truth, which it isn't.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions

11989	For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan]
	Full Idea: It is a tenet of Russell's theory that all expressions, and especially definite descriptions, whose denotation is dependent upon contingent circumstances must be eliminated.
	From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], II)

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism

22181	Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
	Full Idea: Putnam's 'no miracle' argument says that being an anti-realist is akin to believing in miracles (because of the accurate predictons). …It is a plausibility argument - an inference to the best explanation.
	From: report of Hilary Putnam (works [1980]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 4
	A reaction: [not sure of ref] Putnam later backs off from this argument, but my personal realism rests on best explanation. Does anyone want to prefer an inferior explanation? The objection is that successful theories can turn out to be false. Phlogiston, ether.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism

11990	'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan]
	Full Idea: The doctrine that we can ask whether this is the same individual in another possible world, and that a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance, I call 'Haecceitism'.
	From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
	A reaction: Penelope Mackie emphasises that this doctrine, that each thing is somehow individuated, is not the same as believing in actual haecceities, specific properties which achieve the individuating.

9668	'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan]
	Full Idea: That a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity or distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance I call 'haecceitism'. (I prefer the pronunciation Hex'-ee-i-tis-m).
	From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
	A reaction: [odd pronunciation, if 'haec' is pronounced haeek] The view seems to be very unpopular (e.g. with Lewis, Bird and Mumford). But there is an intuitive sense of whether or not two things are identical when they seem dissimilar.

11991	If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan]
	Full Idea: If one regards the usual form of quantification into modal and other intensional contexts - modality de re - as legitimate (without special explanations), then one seems committed to some form of haecceitism.
	From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
	A reaction: That is, modal reference requires fixed identities, irrespective of possible changes in properties. Why could one not refer to objects just as bundles of properties, with some sort of rules about when it ceased to be that particular bundle (keep 60%?)?