65 ideas
19250 | Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Everything worth notice is worth recording; and those records should be so made that they can readily be arranged, and particularly so that they can be rearranged. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], V) | |
A reaction: Yet another epigraph for my project! Peirce must have had a study piled with labelled notes, and he would have adored this database, at least in its theory. |
19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Philosophy differs from the special sciences in not confining itself to the reality of existence, but also to the reality of potential being. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: One might reply that sciences also concern potential being, if their output is universal generalisations (such as 'laws'). I take disposition and powers to be central to existence, which are hence of interest to sciences. |
19241 | An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce] |
Full Idea: There is no such thing as an absolutely detached idea. It would be no idea at all. For an idea is itself a continuous system. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], III) | |
A reaction: This is the new anti-epigraph for this database. This idea is part of Peirce's idea that relations are the central feature of our grasp of the world. |
19227 | Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Philosophy differs from mathematics in being a search for real truth. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: This is important, coming from the founder of pragmatism, in rejecting the anti-realism which a lot of modern pragmatists seem to like. |
19218 | Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The metaphysician who is not prepared to grapple with the difficulties of modern exact logic had better put up his shutters and go out of the trade. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: This announcement comes before Russell proclaimed mathematical logic to be the heart of metaphysics (though it is contemporary with Frege's work, of which Peirce was unaware). It places Peirce firmly in the analytic tradition. |
19229 | Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics is the science of being, not merely as given in physical experience, but of being in general, its laws and types. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: I agree with this. The question then is whether such a science is possible. Dogmatic empiricists think not. Explanatory empiricists (me) think it is. |
19219 | Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical reasonings, such as they have hitherto been, have been simple enough for the most part. It is the metaphysical concepts which it is difficult to apprehend. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: Peirce is not, of course, saying that it is just conceptual, because for him science comes first. It is the woolly concepts that alienate some people from metaphysics. Metaphysicians should challenge the concepts they use much, much more! |
19231 | Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics is gradually and surely taking on the character of a logic. And finally seems destined to become more and more converted into mathematics. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: Remarkably prescient for 1898. I don't think Peirce knew of Frege (and certainly not when he wrote this). It shows that the revolution of Frege and Russell was in the air. It's there in Dedekind's writings. Peirce doesn't seem to be a logicist. |
6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The acknowledgement that the sphere of knowledge is wider than the sphere of 'science' seems to me to be a cultural necessity if we are to arrive at a sane and human view of ourselves or of science. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro) | |
A reaction: A very nice remark, with which I intuitively agree, but then you are left with the problem of explaining how something can qualify as knowledge when it can't pass the stringent tests of science. How wide to we spread, and why? |
6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Some non-scientific knowledge is presupposed by science; for example, I have been arguing that 'refers' and 'true' cannot be made scientifically precise; yet truth is a fundamental term in logic - a precise science. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec VI) | |
A reaction: We might ask whether we 'know' what 'true' and 'refers' mean, as opposed to being able to use them. If their usage doesn't count as knowledge, then we could still end up with all actual knowledge being somehow 'scientific'. |
6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
Full Idea: 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: The word 'warranted' seems to be ambiguous in modern philosophy. See Idea 6150. There seem to be internalist and externalist versions. It seems clear to say that a belief could be well-justified and yet false. |
19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
Full Idea: To set up a philosophy which barricades the road of further advance toward the truth is the one unpardonable offence in reasoning. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], IV) | |
A reaction: This is Popper's rather dubious objection to essentialism in science. Yet Popper tried to do the same thing with his account of induction. |
6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
Full Idea: A correspondence theory of truth is needed to understand how language works, and how science works. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro) | |
A reaction: Putnam retreated from this position to a more pragmatic one later on, but all my sympathies are with the present view, despite being repeatedly told by modern philosophers that I am wrong. See McGinn (Idea 6085) and Searle (Idea 3508). |
6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The great nineteenth century argument against the correspondence theory of truth was that one cannot think of truth as correspondence to facts (or 'reality') because one would need to compare concepts directly with unconceptualised reality. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: Presumably the criticism was offered by idealists, who preferred a coherence theory. The defence is to say that there is a confusion here between a concept and the contents of a concept. The contents of a concept are designed to be facts. |
19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Whether or not 'truth' has two meanings, I think 'holding for true' has two kinds. One is practical holding for true which alone is entitled to the name of Belief; the other is the acceptance of a proposition, which in pure science is always provisional. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], IV) | |
A reaction: The problem here seems to be that we can act on a proposition without wholly believing it, like walking across thin ice. |
6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Anyone who accepts the notions of whatever object language is in question - and this can be chosen arbitrarily - can also understand 'true' as defined by Tarski for that object language. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro) | |
A reaction: Thus if we say "'snow is white' is true iff snow is white", then if you 'accept the notion' that snow is white in English, you understand what 'true' means. This seems to leave you with the meaning of 'snow is white' being its truth conditions. |
6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
Full Idea: What Tarski has done is to give us a perfectly correct account of the formal logic of the concept 'true', but the formal logic of the concept is not all there is to the notion of truth. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro) | |
A reaction: I find this refreshing. A lot of modern philosophers seem to think that truth is no longer an interesting philosophical topic, because deflationary accounts have sidelined it, but I take the concept to be at the heart of metaphysics. |
6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
Full Idea: There is only one way anyone knows how to define 'true' and that is Tarski's way. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec II.5) | |
A reaction: However, Davidson wrote a paper called 'On the Folly of Trying to Define Truth', which seems to reject even Tarski. Also bear in mind Putnam's earlier remark (Idea 6265) that there is more to truth than Tarski's definition. Just take 'true' as primitive. |
19237 | Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The question of whether a deductive argument is true or not is simply the question whether or not the facts stated in the premises could be true in any sort of universe no matter what be true without the fact stated in the conclusion being true likewise. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], III) | |
A reaction: A remarkably modern account, fitting the normal modern view of semantic consequence, and expressing the necessity in the validity in terms of something close to possible worlds. |
19256 | Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Every attempt to understand anything at least hopes that the very objects of study themselves are subject to a logic more or less identical with that which we employ. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], VIII) | |
A reaction: The idea that external objects might be subject to a logic has become very unfashionable since Frege, but I love the idea. I'm inclined to think that we derive our logic from the world, so I'm a bit more confident that Peirce. |
19238 | The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce] |
Full Idea: In the place of the class ...the logic of relatives considers the system, which is composed of objects brought together by any kind of relations whatsoever. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], III) | |
A reaction: Peirce's logic of relations might support the purely structural view of reality defended by Ladyman and Ross. Modern logic standardly expresses its semantics in terms of set theory. Peirce pioneered relations in logic. |
9224 | Proceduralism offers a version of logicism with no axioms, or objects, or ontological commitment [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: My Proceduralism offers axiom-free foundations for mathematics. Axioms give way to the stipulation of procedures. We obtain a form of logicism, but with a procedural twist, and with a logic which is ontologically neutral, and no assumption of objects. | |
From: Kit Fine (Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: [See Ideas 9222 and 9223 for his Proceduralism] Sounds like philosophical heaven. We get to take charge of mathematics, without the embarrassment of declaring ourselves to be platonists. Someone, not me, should evaluate this. |
9222 | The objects and truths of mathematics are imperative procedures for their construction [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: I call my new approach to mathematics 'proceduralism'. It agrees with Hilbert and Poincaré that the objects and truths are postulations, but takes them to be imperatival rather than indicative in form; not propositions, but procedures for construction. | |
From: Kit Fine (Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how an object or a truth can be a procedure, any more than a house can be a procedure. If a procedure doesn't have a product then it is an idle way to pass the time. The view seems to be related to fictionalism. |
9223 | My Proceduralism has one simple rule, and four complex rules [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: My Proceduralism has one simple rule (introduce an object), and four complex rules: Composition (combining two procedures), Conditionality (if A, do B), Universality (do a procedure for every x), and Iteration (rule to keep doing B). | |
From: Kit Fine (Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: It sounds like a highly artificial and private game which Fine has invented, but he claims that this is the sort of thing that practising mathematicians have always done. |
19226 | We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It did not become clear to mathematicians before modern times that they study nothing but hypotheses without as pure mathematicians caring at all how the actual facts may be. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: 'Modern' here is 1898. As a logical principle this would seem to qualify as 'if-thenism' (see alphabetical themes). It's modern descendant might be modal structuralism (see Geoffrey Hellman). It take maths to be hypotheses abstracted from experience. |
19240 | Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce] |
Full Idea: If there is any reality, then it consists of this: that there is in the being of things something which corresponds to the process of reasoning. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], III) | |
A reaction: A nice definition of realism, a little different from usual. I belief that the normal logic of daily thought corresponds (in its rules and connectives) to the way the world is. We evaluate success in logic by truth-preservation. |
19239 | There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce] |
Full Idea: What is reality? Perhaps there isn't any such thing at all. It is but a working hypothesis which we try, our one desperate forlorn hope of knowing anything. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], III) | |
A reaction: I'm not quite sure why the hope is 'forlorn'. We have no current reason to doubt that the hypothesis is working out extremely well. Lovely idea, though. |
6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Realism is an empirical theory; it explains the convergence of scientific theories, where earlier theories are often limiting cases of later theories (which is why theoretical terms preserve their reference); and it explains the success of language. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: I agree. Personally, I think of Plato's Theory of Forms and all religions as empirical theories. The response from anti-realists is generally to undermine confidence in the evidence which these 'empirical theories' are said to explain. |
19252 | Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Chance, as an objective phenomenon, is a property of a distribution. ...In order to have any meaning, it must refer to some definite arrangement of all the things. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], VI) |
19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
Full Idea: In our ordinary use of language we always understand the range of possibility in such a sense that in some possible case the antecedent shall be true. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], II) | |
A reaction: Peirce is discussing Diodorus, and proposes the view nowadays defended by Edgington, though in the end Peirce defends the standard material conditional as simpler. I suspect that this discussion by Peirce is not well known. |
19223 | We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce] |
Full Idea: 'Full belief' is willingness to upon a proposition in vital crises, 'opinion' is willingness to act on it in relatively insignificant affairs. But pure science has nothing at all to do with action. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of the pragmatic view of beliefs. It is not much help in distinguishing full belief about the solar system from mere opinion about remote galaxies. Ditto for historical events. |
6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
Full Idea: If we held, say, 'All unmarried men are unmarried' as absolutely immune from revision, why would this make it true? | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: A very nice question. Like most American philosophers, Putnam accepts Quine's attack on the unrevisability of analytic truths. His point here is that defenders of analytic truths are probably desperate to preserve basic truths, but it won't work. |
19253 | We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Allying certain ideas like 'crimson' and 'scarlet' is called 'association by resemblance'. The name is not a good one, since it implies that resemblance causes association, while in point of fact it is the association which constitutes the resemblance. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], VII) | |
A reaction: I take it that Hume would have agreed with this. It is an answer to Russell's claim that 'resemblance' must itself be a universal. |
19224 | Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The scientific man is not in the least wedded to his conclusions. He risks nothing upon them. He stands ready to abandon one or all as experience opposes them. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: In the age of massive speculative research grants, the idea that 'he risks nothing upon them' is no longer true. Ditto for building aircraft and bridges, which are full of theoretical science. Notoriously, many scientists don't live up to Peirce's idea. |
6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Our ability to picture how people are likely to respond may well be innate; indeed, our disposition to believe what other people tell us (which is fundamental to knowledge) could hardly be an inference, as that isn’t good enough for knowledge. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec VI) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim. There could be an intermediate situation, which is a hard-wired non-conscious inference. When dismantled, the 'innate' brain circuits for assessing testimony could turn out to work on logic and evidence. |
6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Empathy with others may give less than 'Knowledge', but it gives more than mere logical or physical possibility; it gives plausibility, or (to revive Platonic terminology) it provides 'right opinion'. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec VI) | |
A reaction: See Ideas 174 and 2140 for Plato. Putnam is exploring areas of knowledge outside the limits of strict science. Behind this claim seems to lie the Principle of Charity (3971), but a gang of systematic liars (e.g. evil students) would be a problem case. |
19243 | If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Were every probable inference less certain than its premises, science, which piles inference upon inference, often quite deeply, would soon be in a bad way. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], IV) | |
A reaction: This seems to endorse Aristotle's picture of demonstration about scientific and practical things as being a form of precise logic, rather than progressive probabilities. Our generalisations may be more certain than the particulars they rely on. |
19225 | I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce] |
Full Idea: I classify the sciences on Comte's general principles, in order of the abstractness of their objects, so that each science may largely rest for its principles upon those above it in the scale, while drawing its data in part from those below it. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: He places mathematics at the peak of abstraction. I assume physics is more abstract than biology. So chemistry draws principles from physics and data from biology. Not sure about this. Probably need to read Comte on it. |
19234 | 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The word 'inductio' is Cicero's imitation of Aristotle's term 'epagoge'. It fails to convey the full significance of the Greek word, which implies the examples are arrayed and brought forward in a mass. 'The assault upon the generals by the singulars'. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], II) | |
A reaction: Interesting, thought I don't think there is enough evidence in Aristotle to get the Greek idea fully clear. |
19236 | Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Induction can never afford the slightest reason to think that a law is without an exception. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], II) | |
A reaction: Part of the general Humean doubts about induction, but very precisely stated, and undeniable. You can then give up on universal laws, or look for deeper reasons to justify your conviction that there are no exceptions. E.g. observe mass, or Higgs Boson. |
19251 | The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The most dangerous fallacy of inductive reasoning consists in examining a sample, finding some recondite property in it, and concluding at once that it belongs to the whole collection. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], V) | |
A reaction: The point, I take it, is not that you infer that the whole collection has all the properties of the sample, but that some 'recondite' or unusual property is sufficiently unusual to be treated as general. |
19235 | How does induction get started? [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Induction can never make a first suggestion. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], II) | |
A reaction: This seems to lead to the general modern problem of the 'theory-laden' nature of observation. You don't see anything at all without some idea of what you are looking for. How do you spot the 'next instance'. Instance of what? Nice. |
17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Explanation is an interest-relative notion …explanation has to be partly a pragmatic concept. To regard the 'pragmatics' of explanation as no part of the concept is to abdicate the job of figuring out what makes an explanation good. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], p. 41-2), quoted by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 1 | |
A reaction: I suppose this is just obvious, depending on how far you want to take the 'interest-relative' bit. If a fool is fobbed off with a trivial explanation, there must be some non-relative criterion for assessing that. |
19222 | Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Men many times fancy that they act from reason, when the reasons they attribute to themselves are nothing but excuses which unconscious instinct invents to satisfy the teasing 'whys' of the ego. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: A strikely modern thought, supported by a lot of modern neuro-science and psychology. It is crucial to realise that we don't have to accept the best explanation we can think of. |
19220 | We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Those whom we are so fond of referring to as the 'lower animals' reason very little. Now I beg you to observe that those beings very rarely commit a mistake, while we ---- ! | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: We might take this as pessimism about reason, but I would take it as inviting a much broader view of rationality. I think nearly all animal behaviour is highly rational. Are animals 'sensible' in what they do? Their rationality is unadventurous. |
19255 | Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The generalising tendency is the great law of mind. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], VII) | |
A reaction: How else could a small and compact mind get a grip on a vast and diverse reality? This must even apply to inarticulate higher animals. |
19242 | Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Generalization, the spelling out of continuous systems, in thought, in sentiment, in deed, is the true end of life. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], III) | |
A reaction: I take understanding to be the true aim of life, and full grasp of particulars (e.g. of particular people) is as necessary as generalisation. This is still a very nice bold idea. |
19249 | 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce] |
Full Idea: 'Know thyself' does not mean instrospect your soul. It means see yourself as others would see you if they were intimate enough with you. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], V) | |
A reaction: When it comes to anger management, I would have thought that introspection had some use. You can see a tantrum coming before even your intimates can. Nice disagreement with Sartre! (Idea 7123) |
19257 | Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce] |
Full Idea: I think that what is First is ipso facto sentient. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], VIII) | |
A reaction: He doesn't mention Leibniz's monads, but that looks like the ancestor of Peirce's idea. He doesn't make clear (here) how far he would take the idea. I would just say that whatever is 'First' must be active rather than passive. |
19248 | Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The mental operations concerning in reasoning are three. The first is Observation; the second is Experimentation; and the third is Habituation. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], V) | |
A reaction: I like the breadth of this. Even those who think scientific reasoning has priority over logic (as I do, thinking of it as the evaluation of evidence, with Sherlock Holmes as its role model) will be surprised to finding observation and habituation there. |
19221 | Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The very fact that everybody so ridiculously overrates his own reasoning, is sufficient to show how superficial the faculty is. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: A nice remark. The obvious counter-thought is that the collective reasoning of mankind really has been rather impressive, even though people haven't yet figured out how to live at peace with one another. |
6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: How can you have a theory of understanding without a meaning that requires to be understood? Personally I think about the minds of small animals when pondering this, and that seems to put reference and truth at the front of the queue. |
6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
Full Idea: You can't treat understanding a sentence as knowing its truth conditions, because it then becomes unintelligible what that knowledge in turn consists in. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: The implication, I take it, is circularity; how can you specify truth conditions if you don't understand sentences? Putnam here agrees with Dummett that verification must be involved. Something has to be taken as axiomatic in all this. |
6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
Full Idea: I am suggesting that we reject the view that truth (based on the semantic theory) is prior to meaning. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: It is a nice question which of truth or meaning has logical priority. One might start by speculating about how and why animals think. A moth attracted to flame is probably working on truth without much that could be called 'meaning'. |
6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
Full Idea: A theory of how reference is specified isn't a theory of what reference is. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec V) | |
A reaction: A simple and important point. We may achieve reference by naming, describing, grunting or pointing, but the question is, what have we achieved when we get there? |
6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The line of reasoning of Kuhn and Feyerabend can be blocked by arguing (as I have in various places, and as Saul Kripke has) that scientific terms are not synonymous with descriptions. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec II.2) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of the motivation for creating the causal theory of reference. See Idea 6162. We could still go back and ask whether we could block scientific relativism by rethinking how descriptions work, instead of abandoning them. |
19233 | Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Words like 'this', 'that', 'I', 'you', enable us to convey meanings which words alone are incompetent to express; they stimulate the hearer to look about him. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], II) | |
A reaction: Peirce was once of the first to notice the interest of indexicals, and this is a very nice comment on them. A word like 'Look!' isn't like the normal flow of verbiage, and may be the key to indexicals. |
6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
Full Idea: A language made up and used by a being who belonged to no community would have no need for such a concept as the 'meaning' of a term. To state the reference of each term and what the language speaker believes is to tell the whole story. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: A subtle response to Wittgenstein's claim (e.g. Ideas 4152,4158), but I am not sure what Putnam means. I would have thought that beliefs had to be embodied in propositions. They may not need 'meaning' quite as urgently as sentences, but still… |
6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
Full Idea: What it is to be a correct translation is to be the translation that best explains the behaviour of the speaker. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec III) | |
A reaction: This seems fairly close to Quine, but rather puzzlingly uses the word 'correct'. If our criteria of translation are purely behavioural, there is no way we can be correct after one word ('gavagai'), so at what point does it become 'correct'? |
6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
Full Idea: We could say that the language has more than one correct way of being mapped onto the world (it must, since it has more than one way of being correctly mapped onto a language which is itself correctly mapped onto the world). | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: This spells out nicely the significance of Quine's 'indeterminacy of translation'. Others have pointed out that the fact that language maps onto world in many ways need not be anti-realist; the world is endless, and language is limited. |
6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The maxim that 'most of a speaker's beliefs are true' as an a priori principle governing radical translation seems to me to go too far; first, I don't know how to count beliefs; second, most people's beliefs on some topics (philosophy) are probably false. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: Putnam prefers a pragmatic view, where charity is applicable if behaviour is involved. Philosophy is too purely theoretical. The extent to which Charity should apply in philosophy seminars is a nice question, which all students should test in practice. |
19230 | People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Each person ought to select some definite duty that clearly lies before him and is well within his power as the special task of his life. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
A reaction: I like that. Note especially that it should be 'well' within his power. Note also that this is a 'duty', and not just a friendly suggestion. Not sure what the basis of the duty is. |
19245 | We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is not the man who thinks he knows it all, that can bring other men to feel their need for learning, and it is only a deep sense that one is miserably ignorant that can spur one on in the toilsome path of learning. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], IV) |
19244 | Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The chemist contents himself with a single experiment to establish any qualitative fact, because he knows there is such a uniformity in the behavior of chemical bodies that another experiment would be a mere repetition of the first in every respect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], IV) | |
A reaction: I take it this endorses my 'Upanishads' view of natural kinds - that for each strict natural kind, if you've seen one you've them all. This seems to fit atoms and molecules, but only roughly fits tigers. |
19254 | Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce] |
Full Idea: We may suppose that the laws of nature are results of an evolutionary process. ...But this evolution must proceed according to some principle: and this principle will itself be of the nature of a law. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], VII) | |
A reaction: Maybe I've missed something, but this seems a rather startling idea that doesn't figure much in modern discussions of laws of nature. Lee Smolin's account of evolving universes comes to mind. |