Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Knowledge' and 'fragments/reports'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science

6782	Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam]
	Full Idea: Realism….is the only philosophy science which does not make the success of science a miracle.
	From: Hilary Putnam (works [1980]), quoted by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.4
	A reaction: This was from his earlier work; he became more pragmatist and anti-realist later. Personally I approve of the remark. The philosophy of science must certainly offer an explanation for its success. Truth seems the obvious explanation.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism

22181	Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
	Full Idea: Putnam's 'no miracle' argument says that being an anti-realist is akin to believing in miracles (because of the accurate predictons). …It is a plausibility argument - an inference to the best explanation.
	From: report of Hilary Putnam (works [1980]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 4
	A reaction: [not sure of ref] Putnam later backs off from this argument, but my personal realism rests on best explanation. Does anyone want to prefer an inferior explanation? The objection is that successful theories can turn out to be false. Phlogiston, ether.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure

20769	Sphaerus he was not assenting to the presence of pomegranates, but that it was 'reasonable' [Sphaerus, by Diog. Laertius]
	Full Idea: When Sphaerus accepted pomegranates from the king, he was accused of assenting to a false presentation, to which Sphaerus replied that what he had assented to was not that they were pomegranates, but that it was reasonable that they were pomegranates.
	From: report of Sphaerus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.177
	A reaction: He then cited the stoic distinction between a 'graspable' presentation and a 'reasonable' one. This seems a rather helpful response to Dretske's zebra problem. I like the word 'sensible' in epistemology, because animals can be sensible.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge

19724	Belief is knowledge if it is true, certain, and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey]
	Full Idea: I have always said that a belief was knowledge if it was (i) true, (ii) certain, (iii) obtained by a reliable process.
	From: Frank P. Ramsey (Knowledge [1929]), quoted by Juan Comesaña - Reliabilism 2
	A reaction: Remarkable to be addressing the Gettier problem at that date, but Russell had flirted with the problem. Ramsey says the production of the belief must be reliable, rather than the justification for the belief. Note that he wants certainty.