Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'A Rsum of Metaphysics' and 'Mathematical Physics'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Realism….is the only philosophy science which does not make the success of science a miracle.
     From: Hilary Putnam (works [1980]), quoted by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.4
     A reaction: This was from his earlier work; he became more pragmatist and anti-realist later. Personally I approve of the remark. The philosophy of science must certainly offer an explanation for its success. Truth seems the obvious explanation.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
     Full Idea: Putnam's 'no miracle' argument says that being an anti-realist is akin to believing in miracles (because of the accurate predictons). …It is a plausibility argument - an inference to the best explanation.
     From: report of Hilary Putnam (works [1980]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 4
     A reaction: [not sure of ref] Putnam later backs off from this argument, but my personal realism rests on best explanation. Does anyone want to prefer an inferior explanation? The objection is that successful theories can turn out to be false. Phlogiston, ether.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Maths deals with quantities of physical significance, ignoring irrelevant features [Geroch]
     Full Idea: Mathematics can serve to provide a framework within which one deals only with quantities of physical significance, ignoring other, irrelevant things.
     From: Robert Geroch (Mathematical Physics [1985], p.1), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 9.8
     A reaction: This is a modern physicist espousing abstractionism, as derided and dismissed by Frege and Geach. It's common sense, really.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: An intelligent being's pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §18)
     A reaction: Leibniz seems to have inherited this from the Greeks, especially Pythagoras and Plato. Buried in Leibniz's remark I see the Christian fear of physical pleasure. He should have got out more. Must an intelligent being always be intelligent?
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Perfection is simply quantity of reality.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §11)
     A reaction: An interesting claim, but totally beyond my personal comprehension. I presume he inherited 'quantity of reality' from Plato, e.g. as you move up the Line from shadows to Forms you increase the degree of reality. I see 'real' as all-or-nothing.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Evils themselves serve a greater good, and the fact that pains are found in minds is necessary if they are to reach greater pleasures.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §23)
     A reaction: How much pain is needed to qualify for the 'greater pleasures'? Some people receive an awful lot. I am not sure exactly how an evil can 'serve' a greater good. Is he recommending evil?