9 ideas
6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Realism….is the only philosophy science which does not make the success of science a miracle. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (works [1980]), quoted by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.4 | |
A reaction: This was from his earlier work; he became more pragmatist and anti-realist later. Personally I approve of the remark. The philosophy of science must certainly offer an explanation for its success. Truth seems the obvious explanation. |
9944 | We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam] |
Full Idea: We seem to understand some statements about all sets (e.g. 'for every set x and every set y, there is a set z which is the union of x and y'). | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Mathematics without Foundations [1967], p.308) | |
A reaction: His example is the Axiom of Choice. Presumably this is why the collection of all sets must be referred to as a 'class', since we can talk about it, but cannot define it. |
9937 | I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam] |
Full Idea: I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations'. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Mathematics without Foundations [1967]) | |
A reaction: Agreed that mathematics can function well without foundations (given that the enterprise got started with no thought for such things), the ontology of the subject still strikes me as a major question, though maybe not for mathematicians. |
9939 | It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam] |
Full Idea: I believe that under certain circumstances revisions in the axioms of arithmetic, or even of the propositional calculus (e.g. the adoption of a modular logic as a way out of the difficulties in quantum mechanics), is fully conceivable. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Mathematics without Foundations [1967], p.303) | |
A reaction: One can change the axioms of a system without necessarily changing the system (by swapping an axiom and a theorem). Especially if platonism is true, since the eternal objects reside calmly above our attempts to axiomatise them! |
9940 | Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Mathematics might be 'empirical' in the sense that one is allowed to try to put alternatives into the field. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Mathematics without Foundations [1967], p.303) | |
A reaction: He admits that change is highly unlikely. It take hardcore Millian arithmetic to be only changeable if pebbles start behaving very differently with regard to their quantities, which appears to be almost inconceivable. |
9941 | Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Science demands much more of a mathematical theory than that it should merely be consistent, as the example of the various alternative systems of geometry dramatizes. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Mathematics without Foundations [1967]) | |
A reaction: Well said. I don't agree with Putnam's Indispensability claims, but if an apparent system of numbers or lines has no application to the world then I don't consider it to be mathematics. It is a new game, like chess. |
9943 | You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Surely the mere fact that we may never know whether the continuum hypothesis is true or false is by itself just no reason to think that it doesn't have a truth value! | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Mathematics without Foundations [1967]) | |
A reaction: This is Putnam in 1967. Things changed later. Personally I am with the younger man all they way, but I reserve the right to totally change my mind. |
22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
Full Idea: Putnam's 'no miracle' argument says that being an anti-realist is akin to believing in miracles (because of the accurate predictons). …It is a plausibility argument - an inference to the best explanation. | |
From: report of Hilary Putnam (works [1980]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 4 | |
A reaction: [not sure of ref] Putnam later backs off from this argument, but my personal realism rests on best explanation. Does anyone want to prefer an inferior explanation? The objection is that successful theories can turn out to be false. Phlogiston, ether. |
16654 | Our words and concepts don't always correspond to what is out there [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: It should not be said that as distinct words and intentions or concepts are distinct from one another, so too the corresponding things are distinct. Those distinctions do not always line up with distinctions among things that are signified. | |
From: William of Ockham (Predest.,God's foreknowledge and contingents [1320], 7.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.2 | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is the great nominalist opponent of the idea that Aristotle's ten categories give an accurate map of reality. He proposed just substance and accidents, and based categorisation on the questions we ask. |