Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'talk' and 'Letter Seven'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Realism….is the only philosophy science which does not make the success of science a miracle.
     From: Hilary Putnam (works [1980]), quoted by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.4
     A reaction: This was from his earlier work; he became more pragmatist and anti-realist later. Personally I approve of the remark. The philosophy of science must certainly offer an explanation for its success. Truth seems the obvious explanation.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
     Full Idea: Putnam's 'no miracle' argument says that being an anti-realist is akin to believing in miracles (because of the accurate predictons). …It is a plausibility argument - an inference to the best explanation.
     From: report of Hilary Putnam (works [1980]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 4
     A reaction: [not sure of ref] Putnam later backs off from this argument, but my personal realism rests on best explanation. Does anyone want to prefer an inferior explanation? The objection is that successful theories can turn out to be false. Phlogiston, ether.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
To understand morality requires a soul [Plato]
     Full Idea: Good and evil are meaningless to things that have no soul.
     From: Plato (Letter Seven [c.352 BCE], 334)
     A reaction: That is presumably psuché, and hence includes plants. Soulless things can still function well, but obviously that is not 'meaningful' to them.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
God can't have silly perfections, but how do we decide which ones are 'silly'? [Joslin]
     Full Idea: It is clear that God cannot have all conceivable perfections, because otherwise he would have absurd perfections (like being the perfect prawn sandwich), so a line must be drawn, and how are we to decide which perfections are appropriate and essential?
     From: Jack Joslin (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This is an excellent question for curbing the absurdities of those who want to load God with every good thing that can possibly be conceived. Is the God who is also a perfect prawn sandwich more perfect than the one who isn't?