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All the ideas for 'works', 'Mind in a Physical World' and 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver)'

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34 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the domain where different languages, theories, explanations, and conceptual systems come together and have their mutual ontological relationships sorted out and clarified.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §3 p.066)
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Realism….is the only philosophy science which does not make the success of science a miracle.
     From: Hilary Putnam (works [1980]), quoted by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.4
     A reaction: This was from his earlier work; he became more pragmatist and anti-realist later. Personally I approve of the remark. The philosophy of science must certainly offer an explanation for its success. Truth seems the obvious explanation.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
     Full Idea: If truth can be explicitly defined, it can be eliminated.
     From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.3)
     A reaction: That we could just say p corresponds to the facts, or p coheres with our accepted beliefs, or p is the aim of our enquiries, and never mention the word 'true'. Definition is a strategy for reduction or elimination.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
     Full Idea: If axioms are formulated for a language (such as set theory) that lacks names for all objects, then they require the use of a satisfaction relation rather than a unary truth predicate.
     From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 3.3)
     A reaction: I take it this is an important idea for understanding why Tarski developed his account of truth based on satisfaction.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
     Full Idea: Semantic approaches to truth usually necessitate the use of a metalanguage that is more powerful than the object-language for which it provides a semantics. It is usually taken to include set theory.
     From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1)
     A reaction: This is a motivation for developing an axiomatic account of truth, that moves it into the object language.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
     Full Idea: Although the theory is materially adequate, Tarski thought that the T-sentences are deductively too weak. …Also it seems that the T-sentences are not conservative, because they prove in PA that 0=0 and ¬0=0 are different, so at least two objects exist.
     From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 3.2)
     A reaction: They are weak because they can't prove completeness. This idea give two reasons for looking for a better theory of truth.
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
     Full Idea: If a natural theory of truth is added to Peano Arithmetic, it is not necessary to add explicity global reflection principles to assert soundness, as the truth theory proves them. Truth theories thus prove soundess, and allows its expression.
     From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.2)
     A reaction: This seems like a big attraction of axiomatic theories of truth for students of metamathematics.
If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
     Full Idea: If truth does not have any explanatory force, as some deflationists claim, the axioms of truth should not allow us to prove any new theorems that do not involve the truth predicate. That is, a deflationary axiomatisation of truth should be 'conservative'.
     From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.3)
     A reaction: So does truth have 'explanatory force'? These guys are interested in explaining theorems of arithmetic, but I'm more interested in real life. People do daft things because they have daft beliefs. Logic should be neutral, but truth has values?
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
     Full Idea: It is a virtue of the Friedman-Sheard axiomatisation that it is thoroughly classical in its logic. Its drawback is that it is ω-inconsistent. That is, it proves &exists;x¬φ(x), but proves also φ(0), φ(1), φ(2), …
     From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 4.3)
     A reaction: It seems the theory is complete (and presumably sound), yet not fully consistent. FS also proves the finite levels of Tarski's hierarchy, but not the transfinite levels.
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
     Full Idea: KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes a non-classical notion of truth. It allow truth-value gluts, making some sentences (such as the Liar) both true and not-true. Some authors add an axiom ruling out such gluts.
     From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 4.4)
     A reaction: [summary, which I hope is correct! Stanford is not wholly clear]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG]
     Full Idea: Examples where reductionism seems to give a good account of things are light, genes, temperature and transparency.
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.025) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This a fairly simple examples, thoroughly confirmed by science a long time ago. Life is a nicer example, because it is more complex and less obvious, but pretty much beyond dispute these days.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim]
     Full Idea: It is customary to associate supervenience with the idea of dependence or determination.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.011)
     A reaction: It is only 'customary' because, in principle, the supervenience might just be a coincidence. I might follow someone everywhere because I love them (dependence) or because they force me to (determination). There's always a reason.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim]
     Full Idea: Mereological supervenience is the doctrine that wholes are fixed by the properties and relations that characterise their parts.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.018)
     A reaction: Presumably this would be the opposite of 'holism'. Personally I would take mereological supervenience to be not merely correct, but to be metaphysically necessary. Don't ask me to prove it, of course.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim]
     Full Idea: A plausible criterion for distinguishing what is real from what is not real is the possession of causal power.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.119)
     A reaction: This is, of course, a physicalist view, but for physicalists it is probably the best criterion of what is real. A standard objection to platonism in mathematics is that it denies mathematics causal powers.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
     Full Idea: Putnam's 'no miracle' argument says that being an anti-realist is akin to believing in miracles (because of the accurate predictons). …It is a plausibility argument - an inference to the best explanation.
     From: report of Hilary Putnam (works [1980]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 4
     A reaction: [not sure of ref] Putnam later backs off from this argument, but my personal realism rests on best explanation. Does anyone want to prefer an inferior explanation? The objection is that successful theories can turn out to be false. Phlogiston, ether.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim]
     Full Idea: Macroproperties can, and in general do, have their own causal powers, powers that go beyond the causal powers of their microconstituents.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §3 p.085)
     A reaction: I don't see why the macro-powers 'go beyond' the sum of the micro-powers. Admittedly one molecule can't be slippery, but slipperiness can be totally reduced to molecule behaviour.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]
     Full Idea: One might say that 'x is a poor philosopher' is true of Tom instead of saying that Tom has the property of being a poor philosopher. We quantify over formulas instead of over definable properties, and thus reduce properties to truth.
     From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.1)
     A reaction: [compressed] This stuff is difficult (because the axioms are complex and hard to compare), but I am excited (yes!) about this idea. Their point is that you need a truth predicate within the object language for this, which disquotational truth forbids.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh]
     Full Idea: The reduction of second-order theories (of properties or sets) to axiomatic theories of truth is a form of reductive nominalism, replacing existence assumptions (e.g. comprehension axioms) by innocuous assumptions about the truth predicate.
     From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.1)
     A reaction: I'm currently thinking that axiomatic theories of truth are the most exciting development in contemporary philosophy. See Halbach and Horsten.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim]
     Full Idea: There are two contradictory arguments about everything.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], B06a), quoted by (who?) - where?
Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca]
     Full Idea: Protagoras declares that it is possible to argue either side of any question with equal force, even the question whether or not one can equally argue either side of any question!
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998]) by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 088
     A reaction: This is perhaps the most famous sceptical argument in the ancient world (though, note, Protagoras is most famous for his relativism rather than his scepticism). It is, of course, wrong. The arguments are sometimes equal, but often they are not.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim]
     Full Idea: We do not agree that every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people.
     From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], B01) by Plato - Theaetetus 183c
     A reaction: I fully agree with this, but only because I have an optimistic view that rational people converge on the truth.
Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim]
     Full Idea: Why didn't he start 'Truth' off by saying "A pig is the measure of all things", or "a baboon",…or " tadpole"? That would have been a magnificently haughty beginning.
     From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], B01) by Plato - Theaetetus 161d1
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG]
     Full Idea: The following all require a belief in mental causation: agency (mind causes events), knowledge (perception causes beliefs), reasoning (one belief causes another), memory (events cause ideas), psychology (science of mental causes).
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §2 p.031) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: A very good list, which I cannot fault, and to which I cannot add. The question is: is there any mental activity left over which does NOT require causation? Candidates are free will, and the contingent character of qualia. I say the answer is, no.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim]
     Full Idea: It seems to me inconceivable that a possible world exists that is an exact physical duplicate of this world but lacking wholly in intentionality.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101)
     A reaction: Personally I can't conceive of such a world lacking qualia either. The physical entails the mental, say I.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
     Full Idea: There has been much scepticism about a functionalist account of intentionality, particularly from Putnam (recently) and Searle, but, like many others, I don't see any principled objections to such an account.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101)
     A reaction: I agree. I don't believe that intentionality is a candidate for being one of those many 'magic' qualities which are supposed to make the reduction of mind to brain impossible.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim]
     Full Idea: It is possible to hold that phenomenal properties (qualia) are irreducible, while holding intentional properties, including propositional attitudes, to be reducible (functionally, or biologically).
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.017)
     A reaction: This is the position which Kim has settled for, but I find it baffling. If the universe is full of irreducibles that is one thing, but if everything in the universe is reducible except for one tiny item, that is implausible.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim]
     Full Idea: The emergentism (of Searle), like ethical intuitionism, views mind-body supervenience as something that admits no explanation - it is a brute fact.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.013)
     A reaction: This is why 'emergence' is no sort of theory, and is really old-fashioned dualism in a dubious naturalistic disguise. If mind 'emerges', there is presumably a causal mechanism for that.
The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim]
     Full Idea: If emergentism is correct about anything, it is more likely to be correct about qualia than about anything else.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.103)
     A reaction: I'm puzzled by a view that says that nearly all of the mind is reducible, but one tiny aspect of it is 'emergent'. What sort of ontology is envisaged by that?
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
     Full Idea: Many philosophers saw in mind-body supervenience a satisfying metaphysical statement of physicalism without reductionism. This widely influential position is now known as "nonreductive physicalism".
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.008)
     A reaction: If two things supervene on one another, then we should be asking why. Occasionalism and Parallelism are presumably not the answer. Coldness supervenes on ice.
Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
     Full Idea: Maybe strong supervenience is inconsistent with the irreducibility of the supervenient properties to their subvenient bases.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.012)
     A reaction: If two things are really very very supervenient on one another (superdupervenient?), then you have to ask WHY? If there isn't identity, then there is surely a highly lawlike connection?
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
     Full Idea: The two principle arguments which overthrew the mind-brain identity theory were the multiple realization argument of Hilary Putnam, and the anomalist argument of Davidson, which contained the seeds of functionalism and anomalous monism.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.002)
     A reaction: The first argument strikes me as significant and interesting, but Davidson seems weak. It makes the unsubstantiated claim that mind is outside the laws of physics, and irreducible.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
     Full Idea: Multiple realization goes deeper and wider than biological species, and even in the same individual the neural realizer, or correlate, of a given mental state or function may change over time through maturation and brain injuries.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.095)
     A reaction: The tricky question here is what you mean by 'change'. How different must a pattern of neurons be before you say it is of a different type? How do you individuate a type?
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
     Full Idea: My doubts about functionalist accounts of qualia are based on the much discussed arguments from qualia inversions, and from epistemic considerations.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.102)
     A reaction: With a colour inversion experience changes but function doesn't. But maybe function does change if you ask the right questions. 'Is this a warm colour?' It certainly strikes me that qualia contain useful (epistemic) information.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim]
     Full Idea: It has been customary to distinguish between two broad categories of mental phenomena, the intentional and the phenomenal, without excluding those that have both (e.g. emotions).
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101)
     A reaction: This has become the conventional modern account of the mind. It seems a little too simple to say that the mind is characterised by two clearcut phenomena like this. I suspect that his picture will be modified in time.