Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'On the Pragmatics of Communications' and 'works'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Realism….is the only philosophy science which does not make the success of science a miracle.
     From: Hilary Putnam (works [1980]), quoted by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.4
     A reaction: This was from his earlier work; he became more pragmatist and anti-realist later. Personally I approve of the remark. The philosophy of science must certainly offer an explanation for its success. Truth seems the obvious explanation.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
     Full Idea: Putnam's 'no miracle' argument says that being an anti-realist is akin to believing in miracles (because of the accurate predictons). …It is a plausibility argument - an inference to the best explanation.
     From: report of Hilary Putnam (works [1980]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 4
     A reaction: [not sure of ref] Putnam later backs off from this argument, but my personal realism rests on best explanation. Does anyone want to prefer an inferior explanation? The objection is that successful theories can turn out to be false. Phlogiston, ether.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Belief is no more rational than is tasting and smelling [Hamann]
     Full Idea: Belief happens as little in terms of reasons as tasting and smelling.
     From: J.G. Hamann (works [1770], v2:74), quoted by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy
     A reaction: That is one idea definitively expressed! I take it as only a partial truth. Beliefs happen as a result of observation and experience. But someone can draw our attention to something (and we can hunt it out ourselves), which is giving a reason for belief.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
To understand language is to know how to use it to reach shared understandings [Habermas]
     Full Idea: One simply would not know what it is to understand the meaning of a linguistic expression if one did not know how one could make use of it in order to reach understanding with someone about something.
     From: Jürgen Habermas (On the Pragmatics of Communications [1998], p.228), quoted by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.3:34
     A reaction: Not offered as a 'theory of meaning', and certainly plausible. Compare a hammer, though: a proper understanding is that it is used to exert a sharp force, but you can take in its structure and nature before you spot its usage.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is not a mathematician, but a poet [Hamann, by Berlin]
     Full Idea: Hamann's fundamental doctrine was that God was not a geometer, not a mathematician, but a poet.
     From: report of J.G. Hamann (works [1770]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.3
     A reaction: [This idea is wonderfully expressed by D.H.Lawrence in his poem 'Red Geranium and Godly Mignonette]. The idea becomes attractive when you ask whether God would need to do mathematics.