67 ideas
6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The acknowledgement that the sphere of knowledge is wider than the sphere of 'science' seems to me to be a cultural necessity if we are to arrive at a sane and human view of ourselves or of science. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro) | |
A reaction: A very nice remark, with which I intuitively agree, but then you are left with the problem of explaining how something can qualify as knowledge when it can't pass the stringent tests of science. How wide to we spread, and why? |
6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Some non-scientific knowledge is presupposed by science; for example, I have been arguing that 'refers' and 'true' cannot be made scientifically precise; yet truth is a fundamental term in logic - a precise science. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec VI) | |
A reaction: We might ask whether we 'know' what 'true' and 'refers' mean, as opposed to being able to use them. If their usage doesn't count as knowledge, then we could still end up with all actual knowledge being somehow 'scientific'. |
6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
Full Idea: 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: The word 'warranted' seems to be ambiguous in modern philosophy. See Idea 6150. There seem to be internalist and externalist versions. It seems clear to say that a belief could be well-justified and yet false. |
6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
Full Idea: A correspondence theory of truth is needed to understand how language works, and how science works. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro) | |
A reaction: Putnam retreated from this position to a more pragmatic one later on, but all my sympathies are with the present view, despite being repeatedly told by modern philosophers that I am wrong. See McGinn (Idea 6085) and Searle (Idea 3508). |
6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The great nineteenth century argument against the correspondence theory of truth was that one cannot think of truth as correspondence to facts (or 'reality') because one would need to compare concepts directly with unconceptualised reality. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: Presumably the criticism was offered by idealists, who preferred a coherence theory. The defence is to say that there is a confusion here between a concept and the contents of a concept. The contents of a concept are designed to be facts. |
6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Anyone who accepts the notions of whatever object language is in question - and this can be chosen arbitrarily - can also understand 'true' as defined by Tarski for that object language. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro) | |
A reaction: Thus if we say "'snow is white' is true iff snow is white", then if you 'accept the notion' that snow is white in English, you understand what 'true' means. This seems to leave you with the meaning of 'snow is white' being its truth conditions. |
6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
Full Idea: What Tarski has done is to give us a perfectly correct account of the formal logic of the concept 'true', but the formal logic of the concept is not all there is to the notion of truth. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro) | |
A reaction: I find this refreshing. A lot of modern philosophers seem to think that truth is no longer an interesting philosophical topic, because deflationary accounts have sidelined it, but I take the concept to be at the heart of metaphysics. |
6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
Full Idea: There is only one way anyone knows how to define 'true' and that is Tarski's way. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec II.5) | |
A reaction: However, Davidson wrote a paper called 'On the Folly of Trying to Define Truth', which seems to reject even Tarski. Also bear in mind Putnam's earlier remark (Idea 6265) that there is more to truth than Tarski's definition. Just take 'true' as primitive. |
9738 | Each line of a truth table is a model [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Each line of a truth table is, in effect, a model. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) | |
A reaction: I find this comment illuminating. It is being connected with the more complex models of modal logic. Each line of a truth table is a picture of how the world might be. |
9727 | Modal logic adds □ (necessarily) and ◊ (possibly) to classical logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: For modal logic we add to the syntax of classical logic two new unary operators □ (necessarily) and ◊ (possibly). | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.3) |
9726 | We let 'R' be the accessibility relation: xRy is read 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: We let 'R' be the accessibility relation: xRy is read 'y is accessible from x'. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.5) |
9737 | The symbol ||- is the 'forcing' relation; 'Γ ||- P' means that P is true in world Γ [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The symbol ||- is used for the 'forcing' relation, as in 'Γ ||- P', which means that P is true in world Γ. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) |
13136 | The prefix σ names a possible world, and σ.n names a world accessible from that one [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: A 'prefix' is a finite sequence of positive integers. A 'prefixed formula' is an expression of the form σ X, where σ is a prefix and X is a formula. A prefix names a possible world, and σ.n names a world accessible from that one. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
13727 | A 'constant' domain is the same for all worlds; 'varying' domains can be entirely separate [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: In 'constant domain' semantics, the domain of each possible world is the same as every other; in 'varying domain' semantics, the domains need not coincide, or even overlap. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 4.5) |
9734 | Modern modal logic introduces 'accessibility', saying xRy means 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Modern modal logic takes into consideration the way the modal relates the possible worlds, called the 'accessibility' relation. .. We let R be the accessibility relation, and xRy reads as 'y is accessible from x. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.5) | |
A reaction: There are various types of accessibility, and these define the various modal logics. |
9736 | A 'model' is a frame plus specification of propositions true at worlds, written < G,R,||- > [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea:
A 'model' is a frame plus a specification of which propositional letters are true at which worlds. It is written as |
|
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) |
9735 | A 'frame' is a set G of possible worlds, with an accessibility relation R, written < G,R > [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea:
A 'frame' consists of a non-empty set G, whose members are generally called possible worlds, and a binary relation R, on G, generally called the accessibility relation. We say the frame is the pair |
|
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) |
9741 | Accessibility relations can be 'reflexive' (self-referring), 'transitive' (carries over), or 'symmetric' (mutual) [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: A relation R is 'reflexive' if every world is accessible from itself; 'transitive' if the first world is related to the third world (ΓRΔ and ΔRΩ → ΓRΩ); and 'symmetric' if the accessibility relation is mutual. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.7) | |
A reaction: The different systems of modal logic largely depend on how these accessibility relations are specified. There is also the 'serial' relation, which just says that any world has another world accessible to it. |
13137 | Conj: a) if σ X∧Y then σ X and σ Y b) if σ ¬(X∧Y) then σ ¬X or σ ¬Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: General tableau rules for conjunctions: a) if σ X ∧ Y then σ X and σ Y b) if σ ¬(X ∧ Y) then σ ¬X or σ ¬Y | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
13140 | Bicon: a)if σ(X↔Y) then σ(X→Y) and σ(Y→X) b) [not biconditional, one or other fails] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: General tableau rules for biconditionals: a) if σ (X ↔ Y) then σ (X → Y) and σ (Y → X) b) if σ ¬(X ↔ Y) then σ ¬(X → Y) or σ ¬(Y → X) | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
13143 | Universal: a) if σ ¬◊X then σ.m ¬X b) if σ □X then σ.m X [m exists] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: General tableau rules for universal modality: a) if σ ¬◊ X then σ.m ¬X b) if σ □ X then σ.m X , where m refers to a world that can be seen (rather than introducing a new world). | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Note that the universal rule of □, usually read as 'necessary', only refers to worlds which can already be seen, whereas possibility (◊) asserts some thing about a new as yet unseen world. |
13139 | Implic: a) if σ ¬(X→Y) then σ X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X→Y then σ ¬X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: General tableau rules for implications: a) if σ ¬(X → Y) then σ X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X → Y then σ ¬X or σ Y | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
13148 | 4r rev-trans: a) if σ.n □X then σ □X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: System 4r reversed-transitive rules (also for S5): a) if σ.n □X then σ □X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬◊X [where n is a world which already occurs] | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
13141 | Negation: if σ ¬¬X then σ X [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: General tableau rule for negation: if σ ¬¬X then σ X | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
13138 | Disj: a) if σ ¬(X∨Y) then σ ¬X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X∨Y then σ X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: General tableau rules for disjunctions: a) if σ ¬(X ∨ Y) then σ ¬X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X ∨ Y then σ X or σ Y | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
13142 | Existential: a) if σ ◊X then σ.n X b) if σ ¬□X then σ.n ¬X [n is new] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: General tableau rules for existential modality: a) if σ ◊ X then σ.n X b) if σ ¬□ X then σ.n ¬X , where n introduces some new world (rather than referring to a world that can be seen). | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Note that the existential rule of ◊, usually read as 'possibly', asserts something about a new as yet unseen world, whereas □ only refers to worlds which can already be seen, |
13144 | T reflexive: a) if σ □X then σ X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: System T reflexive rules (also for B, S4, S5): a) if σ □X then σ X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬X | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
13145 | D serial: a) if σ □X then σ ◊X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬□X [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: System D serial rules (also for T, B, S4, S5): a) if σ □X then σ ◊X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬□X | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
13146 | B symmetric: a) if σ.n □X then σ X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: System B symmetric rules (also for S5): a) if σ.n □X then σ X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬X [where n is a world which already occurs] | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
13147 | 4 transitive: a) if σ □X then σ.n □X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ.n ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: System 4 transitive rules (also for K4, S4, S5): a) if σ □X then σ.n □X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ.n ¬◊X [where n is a world which already occurs] | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
13149 | S5: a) if n ◊X then kX b) if n ¬□X then k ¬X c) if n □X then k X d) if n ¬◊X then k ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Simplified S5 rules: a) if n ◊X then kX b) if n ¬□X then k ¬X c) if n □X then k X d) if n ¬◊X then k ¬X. 'n' picks any world; in a) and b) 'k' asserts a new world; in c) and d) 'k' refers to a known world | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
9739 | If a proposition is necessarily true in a world, it is true in all worlds accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: If a proposition is necessarily true in a world, then it is also true in all worlds which are accessible from that world. That is: Γ ||- □X ↔ for every Δ ∈ G, if ΓRΔ then Δ ||- X. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) |
9740 | If a proposition is possibly true in a world, it is true in some world accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: If a proposition is possibly true in a world, then it is also true in some world which is accessible from that world. That is: Γ ||- ◊X ↔ for some Δ ∈ G, ΓRΔ then Δ ||- X. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) |
9742 | The system K has no accessibility conditions [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The system K has no frame conditions imposed on its accessibility relation. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) | |
A reaction: The system is named K in honour of Saul Kripke. |
13114 | □P → P is not valid in D (Deontic Logic), since an obligatory action may be not performed [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: System D is usually thought of as Deontic Logic, concerning obligations and permissions. □P → P is not valid in D, since just because an action is obligatory, it does not follow that it is performed. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.12.2 Ex) |
9743 | The system D has the 'serial' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The system D has the 'serial' condition imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world must have some world which is accessible to it. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) |
9744 | The system T has the 'reflexive' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The system T has the 'reflexive' condition imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world must be accessible to itself. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) |
9746 | The system K4 has the 'transitive' condition on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The system K4 has the 'transitive' condition imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, if a relation holds between worlds 1 and 2 and worlds 2 and 3, it must hold between worlds 1 and 3. The relation carries over. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) |
9745 | The system B has the 'reflexive' and 'symmetric' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The system B has the 'reflexive' and 'symmetric' conditions imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world must be accessible to itself, and any relation between worlds must be mutual. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) |
9747 | The system S4 has the 'reflexive' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The system S4 has the 'reflexive' and 'transitive' conditions imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world is accessible to itself, and accessibility carries over a series of worlds. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) |
9748 | System S5 has the 'reflexive', 'symmetric' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The system S5 has the 'reflexive', 'symmetric' and 'transitive' conditions imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world is self-accessible, and accessibility is mutual, and it carries over a series of worlds. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) | |
A reaction: S5 has total accessibility, and hence is the most powerful system (though it might be too powerful). |
9404 | Modality affects content, because P→◊P is valid, but ◊P→P isn't [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: P→◊P is usually considered to be valid, but its converse, ◊P→P is not, so (by Frege's own criterion) P and possibly-P differ in conceptual content, and there is no reason why logic should not be widened to accommodate this. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Frege had denied that modality affected the content of a proposition (1879:p.4). The observation here is the foundation for the need for a modal logic. |
13112 | In epistemic logic knowers are logically omniscient, so they know that they know [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: In epistemic logic the knower is treated as logically omniscient. This is puzzling because one then cannot know something and yet fail to know that one knows it (the Principle of Positive Introspection). | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.11) | |
A reaction: This is nowadays known as the K-K Problem - to know, must you know that you know. Broadly, we find that externalists say you don't need to know that you know (so animals know things), but internalists say you do need to know that you know. |
13111 | Read epistemic box as 'a knows/believes P' and diamond as 'for all a knows/believes, P' [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: In epistemic logic we read Υ as 'KaP: a knows that P', and ◊ as 'PaP: it is possible, for all a knows, that P' (a is an individual). For belief we read them as 'BaP: a believes that P' and 'CaP: compatible with everything a believes that P'. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.11) | |
A reaction: [scripted capitals and subscripts are involved] Hintikka 1962 is the source of this. Fitting and Mendelsohn prefer □ to read 'a is entitled to know P', rather than 'a knows that P'. |
13113 | F: will sometime, P: was sometime, G: will always, H: was always [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: We introduce four future and past tense operators: FP: it will sometime be the case that P. PP: it was sometime the case that P. GP: it will always be the case that P. HP: it has always been the case that P. (P itself is untensed). | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.10) | |
A reaction: Temporal logic begins with A.N. Prior, and starts with □ as 'always', and ◊ as 'sometimes', but then adds these past and future divisions. Two different logics emerge, taking □ and ◊ as either past or as future. |
13728 | The Barcan says nothing comes into existence; the Converse says nothing ceases; the pair imply stability [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The Converse Barcan says nothing passes out of existence in alternative situations. The Barcan says that nothing comes into existence. The two together say the same things exist no matter what the situation. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 4.9) | |
A reaction: I take the big problem to be that these reflect what it is you want to say, and that does not keep stable across a conversation, so ordinary rational discussion sometimes asserts these formulas, and 30 seconds later denies them. |
13729 | The Barcan corresponds to anti-monotonicity, and the Converse to monotonicity [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The Barcan formula corresponds to anti-monotonicity, and the Converse Barcan formula corresponds to monotonicity. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 6.3) |
9725 | 'Predicate abstraction' abstracts predicates from formulae, giving scope for constants and functions [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: 'Predicate abstraction' is a key idea. It is a syntactic mechanism for abstracting a predicate from a formula, providing a scoping mechanism for constants and function symbols similar to that provided for variables by quantifiers. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], Pref) |
6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Realism is an empirical theory; it explains the convergence of scientific theories, where earlier theories are often limiting cases of later theories (which is why theoretical terms preserve their reference); and it explains the success of language. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: I agree. Personally, I think of Plato's Theory of Forms and all religions as empirical theories. The response from anti-realists is generally to undermine confidence in the evidence which these 'empirical theories' are said to explain. |
13730 | The Indiscernibility of Identicals has been a big problem for modal logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Equality has caused much grief for modal logic. Many of the problems, which have struck at the heart of the coherence of modal logic, stem from the apparent violations of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 7.1) | |
A reaction: Thus when I say 'I might have been three inches taller', presumably I am referring to someone who is 'identical' to me, but who lacks one of my properties. A simple solution is to say that the person is 'essentially' identical. |
13725 | □ must be sensitive as to whether it picks out an object by essential or by contingent properties [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: If □ is to be sensitive to the quality of the truth of a proposition in its scope, then it must be sensitive as to whether an object is picked out by an essential property or by a contingent one. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 4.3) | |
A reaction: This incredibly simple idea strikes me as being powerful and important. ...However, creating illustrative examples leaves me in a state of confusion. You try it. They cite '9' and 'number of planets'. But is it just nominal essence? '9' must be 9. |
13731 | Objects retain their possible properties across worlds, so a bundle theory of them seems best [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The property of 'possibly being a Republican' is as much a property of Bill Clinton as is 'being a democrat'. So we don't peel off his properties from world to world. Hence the bundle theory fits our treatment of objects better than bare particulars. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 7.3) | |
A reaction: This bundle theory is better described in recent parlance as the 'modal profile'. I am reluctant to talk of a modal truth about something as one of its 'properties'. An objects, then, is a bundle of truths? |
13726 | Counterpart relations are neither symmetric nor transitive, so there is no logic of equality for them [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The main technical problem with counterpart theory is that the being-a-counterpart relation is, in general, neither symmetric nor transitive, so no natural logic of equality is forthcoming. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 4.5) | |
A reaction: That is, nothing is equal to a counterpart, either directly or indirectly. |
6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
Full Idea: If we held, say, 'All unmarried men are unmarried' as absolutely immune from revision, why would this make it true? | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: A very nice question. Like most American philosophers, Putnam accepts Quine's attack on the unrevisability of analytic truths. His point here is that defenders of analytic truths are probably desperate to preserve basic truths, but it won't work. |
6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Our ability to picture how people are likely to respond may well be innate; indeed, our disposition to believe what other people tell us (which is fundamental to knowledge) could hardly be an inference, as that isn’t good enough for knowledge. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec VI) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim. There could be an intermediate situation, which is a hard-wired non-conscious inference. When dismantled, the 'innate' brain circuits for assessing testimony could turn out to work on logic and evidence. |
6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Empathy with others may give less than 'Knowledge', but it gives more than mere logical or physical possibility; it gives plausibility, or (to revive Platonic terminology) it provides 'right opinion'. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec VI) | |
A reaction: See Ideas 174 and 2140 for Plato. Putnam is exploring areas of knowledge outside the limits of strict science. Behind this claim seems to lie the Principle of Charity (3971), but a gang of systematic liars (e.g. evil students) would be a problem case. |
17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Explanation is an interest-relative notion …explanation has to be partly a pragmatic concept. To regard the 'pragmatics' of explanation as no part of the concept is to abdicate the job of figuring out what makes an explanation good. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], p. 41-2), quoted by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 1 | |
A reaction: I suppose this is just obvious, depending on how far you want to take the 'interest-relative' bit. If a fool is fobbed off with a trivial explanation, there must be some non-relative criterion for assessing that. |
6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: How can you have a theory of understanding without a meaning that requires to be understood? Personally I think about the minds of small animals when pondering this, and that seems to put reference and truth at the front of the queue. |
6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
Full Idea: You can't treat understanding a sentence as knowing its truth conditions, because it then becomes unintelligible what that knowledge in turn consists in. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: The implication, I take it, is circularity; how can you specify truth conditions if you don't understand sentences? Putnam here agrees with Dummett that verification must be involved. Something has to be taken as axiomatic in all this. |
6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
Full Idea: I am suggesting that we reject the view that truth (based on the semantic theory) is prior to meaning. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: It is a nice question which of truth or meaning has logical priority. One might start by speculating about how and why animals think. A moth attracted to flame is probably working on truth without much that could be called 'meaning'. |
6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
Full Idea: A theory of how reference is specified isn't a theory of what reference is. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec V) | |
A reaction: A simple and important point. We may achieve reference by naming, describing, grunting or pointing, but the question is, what have we achieved when we get there? |
6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The line of reasoning of Kuhn and Feyerabend can be blocked by arguing (as I have in various places, and as Saul Kripke has) that scientific terms are not synonymous with descriptions. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec II.2) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of the motivation for creating the causal theory of reference. See Idea 6162. We could still go back and ask whether we could block scientific relativism by rethinking how descriptions work, instead of abandoning them. |
6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
Full Idea: A language made up and used by a being who belonged to no community would have no need for such a concept as the 'meaning' of a term. To state the reference of each term and what the language speaker believes is to tell the whole story. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: A subtle response to Wittgenstein's claim (e.g. Ideas 4152,4158), but I am not sure what Putnam means. I would have thought that beliefs had to be embodied in propositions. They may not need 'meaning' quite as urgently as sentences, but still… |
6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
Full Idea: What it is to be a correct translation is to be the translation that best explains the behaviour of the speaker. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec III) | |
A reaction: This seems fairly close to Quine, but rather puzzlingly uses the word 'correct'. If our criteria of translation are purely behavioural, there is no way we can be correct after one word ('gavagai'), so at what point does it become 'correct'? |
6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
Full Idea: We could say that the language has more than one correct way of being mapped onto the world (it must, since it has more than one way of being correctly mapped onto a language which is itself correctly mapped onto the world). | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: This spells out nicely the significance of Quine's 'indeterminacy of translation'. Others have pointed out that the fact that language maps onto world in many ways need not be anti-realist; the world is endless, and language is limited. |
6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The maxim that 'most of a speaker's beliefs are true' as an a priori principle governing radical translation seems to me to go too far; first, I don't know how to count beliefs; second, most people's beliefs on some topics (philosophy) are probably false. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: Putnam prefers a pragmatic view, where charity is applicable if behaviour is involved. Philosophy is too purely theoretical. The extent to which Charity should apply in philosophy seminars is a nice question, which all students should test in practice. |
15961 | I don't see how mere moving matter can lead to the bodies of men and animals, and especially their seeds [Boyle] |
Full Idea: I confess I cannot well conceive how from matter, barely put into motion and left to itself, there could emerge such curious fabricks as the bodies of men and perfect animals, and more admirably contrived parcels of matter, as seeds of living creatures. | |
From: Robert Boyle (The Sceptical Chemist [1661], p.569), quoted by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles | |
A reaction: This is here to show that one of the most brilliant intellects of the seventeenth century thought carefully about this question and couldn't answer it. Natural selection really was a rather clever idea. |