Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Mental Life of Some Machines', 'Treatise of Freewill' and 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
We overvalue whether arguments are valid, and undervalue whether they are interesting [Monk]
     Full Idea: We encourage students to be concerned with whether an argument is valid or not, and we don't encourage them much to consider the question of whether the argument is interesting or not.
     From: Ray Monk (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.16)
     A reaction: What do you make of arguments which are very interesting, but (unfortunately) totally invalid? That said, this is a nice comment. A philosopher cannot contemplate too long or too deeply on the question of what is really 'interesting'.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan]
     Full Idea: In machine functionalism, pain tokens (individual instances of pain) are identical with particular neurophysiological states, but pain itself, the kind, universal, or 'type', can be identified only with something more abstract.
     From: report of Hilary Putnam (The Mental Life of Some Machines [1967]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.6
     A reaction: This is where the "what is it like?" question seems important. Pain doesn't seem like a physical object, or an abstract idea. Personally I think the former is more likely to be correct than the latter. Causation by pain is not like causation by gravity.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
Wittgenstein pared his life down in his search for decency [Monk]
     Full Idea: One of the most conspicuous things about Wittgenstein is that, on the ethics side, he pared his life down to the minimum, so as to make as central as possible his search for decency, the drive to be a decent person.
     From: Ray Monk (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.14)
     A reaction: It rather looks as if decency was quite an effort for him, as he had a rather waspish temperament, and people found it hard to get close to him. On the whole, though, he sounds like good company, as do nearly all the great philosophers.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
There is a self-determing power in each person, which makes them what they are [Cudworth]
     Full Idea: This hegemonicon (self-power) always determines the passive capability of men's nature one way or other, either for better or for worse; and has a self-forming and self-framing power by which every man is self-made into what he is.
     From: Ralph Cudworth (Treatise of Freewill [1688], §X)
     A reaction: The idea that we can somehow create our own selves seems to me the core of existentialism, and the opposite of the Aristotelian belief in a fairly fixed human nature. See Stephen Pinker's 'The Blank Slate' for a revival of the old view.