Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why there isn't a ready-made world', 'Contemporary Efficient Causation: Aristotelian themes' and 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts'

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

9390	Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
	A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism

17644	Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam]
	Full Idea: What makes the metaphysical realist a 'metaphysical' realist is his belief that there is somewhere 'one true theory' (two theories which are true and complete descriptions of the world would be mere notational variants of each other).
	From: Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Causation')
	A reaction: This is wrong!!!!! Commitment to one reality doesn't imply that only one comprehensive theory is possible. Theory-making (at least in any human language, or in mathematics) is an inherently limited activity.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism

17648	It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam]
	Full Idea: The idea of a coherent theory of the noumena; consistent, systematic, and arrived at by 'the scientific method' seems to me to be chimerical.
	From: Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Failure')
	A reaction: I sort of agree with this, but it definitely doesn't make me an anti-realist.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay

17643	Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam]
	Full Idea: Relative to the description 'that statue', a certain shape is an essential property of the object; relative to the description 'that piece of clay', the shape not an essential property (but being clay is).
	From: Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Intro')
	A reaction: Relative to the description 'that loathsome object', is the statue essentially loathsome? Asserting the essence of an object is a response to the object, not a response to a description of it. This is not the solution to the statue problem.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

9389	Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
	A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data

17642	The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam]
	Full Idea: Moore and Russell held the strange view that 'sensibilia' (sense data) are mind-independent entities: a view so dotty, on the face of it, that few analytic philosophers like to be reminded that this is how analytic philosophy started.
	From: Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Intro')
	A reaction: I suspect the view was influenced by the anti-psychologism of Frege, and his idea that all the other concepts are mind-independent, living by their own rules in a 'third realm'. Personally I think analytic philosophy needs more psychology, not less.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation

19068	Causation interests us because we want to explain change [Mumford]
	Full Idea: Like Aristotle, the reason we are really interested in causation is because we want to be able to explain change.
	From: Stephen Mumford (Contemporary Efficient Causation: Aristotelian themes [2014], 8)
	A reaction: This pinpoints a very important and simple idea. It raises the question (among others) of whether we have just invented this thing called 'causation', because no explanation of change was visible. Hume certainly couldn't see any explanation.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause

17645	An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]
	Full Idea: Imagine a Venusian lands on Earth and observes a forest fire, and says 'I know what caused that - the atmosphere is saturated with oxygen!'. Thus one man's 'background condition' can easily be another man's 'cause'.
	From: Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Causation')
	A reaction: You can't sweep 'the' cause of a fire away so easily. There is always oxygen on Earth, but only occasional forest fires. The oxygen doesn't 'trigger' the fire (i.e. it isn't the proximate cause).