6 ideas
| 22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: Quine rejects Carnap's view that the methods of science and philosophy are distinct. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (On Carnap's Views on Ontology [1951]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 5 | |
| A reaction: I can't decide this one. Leibniz agreed with Carnap, but rated philosophy more highly. I like the view of philosophy as continuous with science, but that doesn't make it a branch of science. I incline towards science being a branch of philosophy. |
| 19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
| Full Idea: I think there is no commitment to entities through use of alleged names of them; other things being equal, we can always deny the allegation that the words in question are names. | |
| From: Willard Quine (On Carnap's Views on Ontology [1951], p.205) | |
| A reaction: Hm. So why can't you deny that variables actually refer to existing entities? If I say 'I just saw James', it's a bit cheeky to then deny that James refers to anyone. He uses Russell's technique to paraphrase names. |
| 19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Through our variables of quantification we are quite capable of committing ourselves to entities which cannot be named individually at all in the resources of our language; witness the real numbers. | |
| From: Willard Quine (On Carnap's Views on Ontology [1951], p.205) | |
| A reaction: The real numbers are uncountable, and thus cannot all be named. This is quite an impressive point. I've always had doubts about the existence of real numbers, on the grounds that they could never all be named. |
| 1799 | If we can't know minds, we can't know if Pyrrho was a sceptic [Theodosius, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: We can't say the school of Pyrrho is sceptical, because the motion of the mind in each individual is incomprehensible to others, so we don't know Pyrrho's disposition. | |
| From: report of Theodosius (Chapters on Scepticism [c.100 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.8 |
| 5495 | Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: In machine functionalism, pain tokens (individual instances of pain) are identical with particular neurophysiological states, but pain itself, the kind, universal, or 'type', can be identified only with something more abstract. | |
| From: report of Hilary Putnam (The Mental Life of Some Machines [1967]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.6 | |
| A reaction: This is where the "what is it like?" question seems important. Pain doesn't seem like a physical object, or an abstract idea. Personally I think the former is more likely to be correct than the latter. Causation by pain is not like causation by gravity. |
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
| Full Idea: If there is no proper distinction between analytic and synthetic, then no basis at all remains for the contrast which Carnap urges between ontological statements and empirical statements of existence. Ontology then ends up on a par with natural science. | |
| From: Willard Quine (On Carnap's Views on Ontology [1951], p.211) | |
| A reaction: Carnap says ontology is relative to a linguistic framework. 'External' ontology is empty. This quotation gives Quine's main motivation for denying the analytic/synthetic distinction. |