20 ideas
8013 | In the Reformation, morality became unconditional but irrational, individually autonomous, and secular [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Three concepts about morality emerge from the Reformation period: that moral rules are unconditional demands that lack rational justification; that moral agents are sovereign in choices; and that secular powers have their own norms and justifications. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: I get the impression that a rather frank admission of the role of self-interest emerged at that time as well. It is only in the late seventeenth century that the possibility of a secular altruism begins to be investigated. But there's Shakespeare... |
8021 | The Levellers and the Diggers mark a turning point in the history of morality [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The Levellers and the Diggers mark a turning point in the history of morality. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: John Lilburne, the Leveller, 'Free-Born John', was the most important of them. They mainly fought for rights of religious conscience, but it quickly escalated into a demand for economic and social rights. It spread to France and the United States. |
1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature. | |
From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8 |
8006 | When Aristotle speaks of soul he means something like personality [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: When Aristotle speaks of the soul we could very often retain his meaning by speaking of personality. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: MacIntyre contrasts this strongly with Plato's dualist view. Famously Aristotle thinks the soul is the 'form' of the body, but this implies that he also includes the higher-level functions of the body. Soul is character? |
8002 | Sophists don't distinguish a person outside one social order from someone outside all order [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The sophist tradition failed to distinguish the difference between the concept of a man who stands outside and is able to question the conventions of some one given social order, and the concept of a man who stands outside social life as such. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: A very nice distinction. Compare foreigners in Athens with Diogenes of Sinope, who renounced all cities. This is the germ of MacIntyre's view that morality is essentially dependent on some sort of social order. He is a reviver of virtue theory. |
8012 | The value/fact logical gulf is misleading, because social facts involve values [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: One reason why it is highly misleading to talk of a logical gulf between value and fact....is that we cannot characterize the social life of a tribe in their factual terms and escape their evaluations. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: Personally I like the objection that facts about functions cannot avoid the value of good functions, but this is very good. It is much better than simply trying to find a specific counterexample, such as facts about promises. Values just are facts. |
8005 | 'Happiness' is a bad translation of 'eudaimonia', which includes both behaving and faring well [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The name 'eudaimonia' is badly but inevitably translated by 'happiness', badly because it includes both the notion of behaving well and the notion of faring well. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: This seems to imply that it does not include the notion of feeling good. Aristotle, however, concludes that pleasure is part of eudaimonia. I take our 'happiness' to be an internal notion, while the Greek word is an external notion. |
8001 | 'Dikaiosune' is justice, but also fairness and personal integrity [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The Greek 'dikaiosune' is inadequately translated as 'justice', but also as any other word; it combines the notion of fairness in externals with that of personal integrity in a way that no English word does. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: 'Dikaiosune' is said to be the main topic of Plato's 'Republic'. Plato seems to have meant it to cover whatever makes a good character. Justice in behaviour presumably flows from internal justice of character (which is, roughly, inner harmony). |
8023 | My duties depend on my identity, which depends on my social relations [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: I cannot answer the question 'What ought I to do?' until I have answered the question 'Who am I?', and any answer to this question will specify my place in a nexus of social relationships. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: This is the beginning of the modern critique of deontological ethics coming from revived virtue theory. As it stands, MacIntyre's idea sounds contractual, but I think he intends it in a more organic way. I am a fan. |
8022 | I am naturally free if I am not tied to anyone by a contract [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The essence of the claim to natural rights is that no one has a right against me unless he can cite some contract, my consent to it, and his performance of his obligations under it. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This has become the foundation of western democracy, and the rebellious teenager's charter. Children have not consented to a contract with their parents. Close and loving relationships cease to be contractual. |
8031 | Fans of natural rights or laws can't agree on what the actual rights or laws are [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: It is notorious that adherents of theories about natural rights or natural laws offer lists of rights or laws which differ in substance from each other. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: There seems to have been a consensus early on that self-defence was a natural right, but divergence presumably occurs when you get bolder and more complex. There is a lot of divergence over which is Shakespeare's best play. |
21332 | We don't get a love of 'order' from nature - which is thoroughly chaotic [Mill] |
Full Idea: Even the love of 'order' which is thought to be a following of the ways of nature is in fact a contradiction of them. All which people are accustomed to deprecate as 'disorder' is precisely a counterpart of nature's ways. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.116) | |
A reaction: The Greeks elevated the idea that the cosmos was orderly, but almost entirely based on the regular movement of the planets. They turned a blind eye to the messy bits of nature. As you magnify nature, order and chaos seem to alternate. |
8008 | The Bible is a story about God in which humans are incidental characters [MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The Bible is a story about God in which human beings appear as incidental characters. | |
From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Very illuminating. He creates man, is betrayed by man, drowns him and starts again, sends a redeemer who gets murdered, and finally enlightens a small band who continue the uphill struggle to promote God's way. What next? |
21333 | Evil comes from good just as often as good comes from evil [Mill] |
Full Idea: If good frequently comes out of evil, the converse fact, evil coming out of good, is equally common. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.117) | |
A reaction: Mill surmises that on the whole good comes from good, and evil from evil, but the point is that the evidence doesn't favour the production of increased good. |
21335 | Belief that an afterlife is required for justice is an admission that this life is very unjust [Mill] |
Full Idea: The necessity of redressing the balance [of injustice] is deemed one of the strongest arguments for another life after death, which amounts to an admission that the order of things in this life is often an example of injustice, not justice. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874]) | |
A reaction: It certainly seems that an omnipotent God could administer swift justice in this life. If the whole point is that we need freedom of will, then why is justice administered at a much later date? The freedom seems to be illusory. |
21334 | No necessity ties an omnipotent Creator, so he evidently wills human misery [Mill] |
Full Idea: If a Creator is assumed to be omnipotent, if he bends to a supposed necessity, he himself makes the necessity which he bends to. If the maker of the world can all that he will, he wills misery, and there is no escape from the conclusion. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.119) | |
A reaction: If you add that the Creator is supposed to be perfectly benevolent, you arrive at the paradox which Mackie spells out. Is the correct conclusion that God exists, and is malevolent? Mill doesn't take that option seriously. |
21329 | Nature dispenses cruelty with no concern for either mercy or justice [Mill] |
Full Idea: All of this [cruel killing] nature does with the most supercilious disregard both of mercy and of justice, emptying her shafts upon the best and noblest indifferently with the meanest and worst | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.115) | |
A reaction: The existence of an afterlife at least offers an opportunity to rectify any injustice, but that hardly meets the question of why there was injustice in the first place. It would be odd if it actually is justice, but none of us can see why that is so. |
21328 | Killing is a human crime, but nature kills everyone, and often with great tortures [Mill] |
Full Idea: Killing, the most criminal act recognised by human laws, nature does once to every being that lives, and frequently after protracted tortures such as the greatest know monsters purposely inflicted on their living fellow creatures | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.115) | |
A reaction: We certainly don't condemn lions for savaging gazelles, but the concept of a supreme mind controlling nature forces the question. Theology needs consistency between human and divine morality, and the supposed derivation of the former from the latter. |
21331 | Hurricanes, locusts, floods and blight can starve a million people to death [Mill] |
Full Idea: Nature often takes the means by which we live. A single hurricane, a flight of locusts, or an inundation, or a trifling chemical change in an edible root, starve a million people. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.116) | |
A reaction: [second sentence compressed] The 'edible root' is an obvious reference to the Irish potato famine. Some desertification had human causes, but these are telling examples. |
21330 | Nature makes childbirth a miserable experience, often leading to the death of the mother [Mill] |
Full Idea: In the clumsy provision which nature has made for the perpetual renewal of animal life, ...no human being ever comes into the world but another human being is literally stretched on the rack for hours or day, not unfrequently issuing in death. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.116) | |
A reaction: This is a very powerful example, which is rarely cited in modern discussions. |