Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On Minerals' and 'Philosophy without Intuitions'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
So-called 'though experiments' are just philosophers observing features of the world [Cappelen]
     Full Idea: What are called 'thought experiments' in philosophy are in effect just philosophers drawing our attention to interesting features of the world.
     From: Herman Cappelen (Philosophy without Intuitions [2012], 11.3)
     A reaction: Thought experiments are said to rely (perhaps excessively) on 'intuition', but Cappelen says intuition is irrelevant, because we are merely making judgements. It think they ARE experiments, if one feature varies while the rest is held steady.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Substantial forms must exist, to explain the stability of metals like silver and tin [Albertus Magnus]
     Full Idea: There is no reason why the matter in any natural thing should be stable in its nature, if it is not completed by a substantial form. But we see that silver is stable, and tin and other metals. Therefore they will seem to be perfected by substantial forms.
     From: Albertus Magnus (On Minerals [1260], III.1.7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.2
     A reaction: Illuminating. This may be the best reason for proposing substantial forms. Once materialism arrives, the so-called 'laws' of nature have to be imposed on the material to do the job - but what the hell is a law supposed to be?
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
The word 'intuitive' often plays not role at all in arguments, and can be removed [Cappelen]
     Full Idea: Careful study of uses of 'intuitive' will reveal that it often plays no significant argumentative role, and that removal will improve overall argumentative transparency.
     From: Herman Cappelen (Philosophy without Intuitions [2012], 04.1)
     A reaction: This is a key part of Cappelen's argument that 'intuition' is a rather empty concept, and that philosophers do not really rely on it. In effect, he is consigning it to mere rhetoric. He gives lots of examples in support.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
     Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature.
     From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8