Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Empirical Stance' and 'Sententia on 'De Caelo''

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims to know the truth about the way things are [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: The study of philosophy has as its purpose to know not what people have thought, but rather the truth about the way things are.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Sententia on 'De Caelo' [1268], I.22.228), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 05
     A reaction: I agree with this deeply unfashionable opinion. Of course, modern investigations must be more sensitive to biases built into language, culture and conceptual schemes. But I am one of those sad old folks who still think truths can be stated.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise [Fraassen]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise; philosophy is in false consciousness when it sees itself otherwise.
     From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.5)
     A reaction: It is one thing to be permeated with values, and another to be value-driven. Truth, reason and logic are (I take it) granted a high value in philosophy, just as the offside rule is in football. I am trying to place reality in charge, not humanity.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Is it likely that a successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? [Fraassen]
     Full Idea: How likely is it that a truly successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true?
     From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.5)
     A reaction: Van Fraassen announces "I reject metaphysic" (p.3), so we know where he stands. Anything becomes less certain as it moves to a higher level of generality. Should we abandon generalisation? There is much illumination in metaphysics.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analytic philosophy has an exceptional arsenal of critical tools [Fraassen]
     Full Idea: Analytical philosophy can rightly pride itself on having produced the greatest critical arsenal the world has ever known.
     From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.6)
     A reaction: This is, of course, in the context of a scathing attack on the desire to use analytical methods to do speculative metaphysics. I say that if these are the best tools, then we should push forward with them to see how far we can get.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
We may end up with a huge theory of carefully constructed falsehoods [Fraassen]
     Full Idea: The specter that faces us is that we may end up having explained all that is dreamt of in our philosophies by intricately crafted postulates that are false.
     From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.5)
     A reaction: This is more persuasive that Idea 12769. People who cannot bear to live with a total absence of explanation (with Keats's 'negative capability') are most in danger from this threat.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
     Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature.
     From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
Inference to best explanation contains all sorts of hidden values [Fraassen]
     Full Idea: The very phrase 'inference to the best explanation' should wave a red flag for us. What is good, better, best? What values are slipped in here, under a common name, and where do they come from?
     From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.5)
     A reaction: A point worth making, but overstated. If we are going to refuse to make judgements for fear that some wicked 'value' might creep in, our lives will be reduced to absurdity.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
We accept many scientific theories without endorsing them as true [Fraassen]
     Full Idea: The choice among theories in science may be a choice to accept in some sense falling far short of endorsement as true.
     From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.5)
     A reaction: When put like this, it is hard to deny the force of Van Fraassen's reservations about science. Lots of people, including me, use scientific theories as working assumptions for life, with nothing like full confidence in their truth.