3 ideas
6410 | The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Russell argued that the only 'logically proper' names are those which denote particular entities with which one can be acquainted. The best examples are 'this' and 'that'; other apparent names turn out, when analysed, to be definite descriptions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Acquaintance [1914]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This view is firm countered by the causal theory of reference, proposed by Kripke and others, in which not only people like Aristotle are 'baptised' with a name, but also natural kinds such as water. It is hard to disagree with Kripke on this. |
1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature. | |
From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8 |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro | |
A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it. |