4 ideas
| 13827 | Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz] |
| Full Idea: Defining logical consequence in the way Tarski does is a rather meagre result, treating an argument as a black box, observing input and output, while disregarding inner structure. We should define logical consequence on the basis of valid arguments. | |
| From: Dag Prawitz (On the General Idea of Proof Theory [1974], §2) |
| 13826 | Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz] |
| Full Idea: In model theory, which has dominated the last decades, one concentrates on logically valid sentences, and what follows logically from what, but one disregards questions concerning how we know these things. | |
| From: Dag Prawitz (On the General Idea of Proof Theory [1974], §1) |
| 1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
| Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature. | |
| From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8 |
| 8113 | Art is like understanding a natural language, and needs a grasp of a symbol system [Goodman, by Gardner] |
| Full Idea: In Goodman's account, knowing what a painting represents is logically like understanding a sentence in a natural language. It requires a grasp of the 'symbol system' to which the painting belongs. | |
| From: report of Nelson Goodman (The Languages of Art [1976]) by Sebastian Gardner - Aesthetics 2.3.2 | |
| A reaction: This may fit some pictures well (e.g. early Flemish painting, with its complex iconography), but others hardly at all. You can enjoy a first experience of (say) ballet long before you get the hang of the 'symbol system' involved. |