Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?' and 'Papers of 1906'

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4 ideas

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible

16473	Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Chalmers, by Stalnaker]
	Full Idea: Chalmers' 'modal rationalist' is one who identifies what is possible with what is conceivable; the central claim of the doctrine is that we have a priori access to modal truth.
	From: report of David J.Chalmers (Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? [2002]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 5
	A reaction: A helpful clarification, as I can now see how hopelessly and utterly wrong Chalmers is (about almost everything), and I find my confidence in any sort of genuine a priori knowledge (except of conceptual relations) dwindling by the minute.

19258	Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Chalmers, by Vaidya]
	Full Idea: For Chalmers, that water is XYZ is 'primary possible' (a priori, or conceptually), because it is true in some world considered as actual. It is 'secondary impossible', when it is evaluated from the Earth as actual.
	From: report of David J.Chalmers (Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? [2002]) by Anand Vaidya - Understanding and Essence Intro
	A reaction: [compressed] This is Chalmers' account of how we can know possibility from conceivability, via his two-dimensional semantics (see alphabetical themes).

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention

1556	By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
	Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature.
	From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error

22306	To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell]
	Full Idea: To explain belief in what is false we shall have to regard what is called belief in a proposition as not a thought related to the proposition, but rather as a thought related to the constituents of the proposition.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Papers of 1906 [1906], V.321), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 40 '1906'
	A reaction: Russell proposed a new theory of judgement, in order to explain erroneous judgements, given that true propositions are identical with facts. Of course there might be errors about the constituents, as well as about their structure. Othello is his example.