Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences' and 'On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius''

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7 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan]
     Full Idea: To deal with the truth conditions for some adverbs, Davidson introduced a domain of 'events', and made adverbs into adjectival predicates of events.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (The Logical Form of Action Sentences [1967]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.9
     A reaction: This seems to be a striking case of a procedure of which I heartily disapprove - deriving you ontology from your semantics. Do all languages have adverbs?
Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson]
     Full Idea: One needs a better reason for believing in events than the help they provide with language-learning.
     From: comment on Donald Davidson (The Logical Form of Action Sentences [1967], §8) by Stephen Yablo - Apriority and Existence §8
     A reaction: I can almost believe in micro-events at the quantum level, but I cannot believe that the Renaissance (made of events within events within events) is an event, even though I may 'quantify over it', and discuss its causes and effects.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider]
     Full Idea: Davidson argued that the best linguistic theory of adverbial modification assigns truth-conditions quantifying over events; thus we must embrace an ontology of events.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (The Logical Form of Action Sentences [1967]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 07.8
     A reaction: Sider is critical and I agree. This is just the sort of linguistic manoeuvre that gets philosophy a bad name. As Yablo remarks, we have a terrible tendency to want to thingify everything.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
     Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature.
     From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
The soul doesn't understand many of its own actions, if perceptions are confused and desires buried [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The soul does many things without knowing how it does them - when it does them by means of confused perceptions and unconscious inclinations or appetites.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius' [1705], [L])
     A reaction: This increasingly strikes me as a wonderful and important insight for its time. He's really paid attention to his own mind, and given up the simplistic view that derives from Descartes. Are birds conscious? Yes or no! Silly.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I think we should keep both sides: we should be more Democritean and make all actions of bodies mechanical and independent of souls, and we should also be more than Platonic and hold that all actions of souls are immaterial and independent of mechanism.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius' [1705], [C])
     A reaction: This is about as dualist as it is possible to get. It certainly looks as if many of Leibniz's doctrines are rebellions against Spinoza (in this case his 'dual aspect monism'). I take Leibniz to be utterly but heroically wrong.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
Minds unconsciously count vibration beats in music, and enjoy it when they coincide [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In music, the soul counts the beats of the vibrating object which makes the sound, and when these beats regularly coincide at short intervals, it finds them pleasing. Thus it counts without knowing it.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius' [1705], [L])
     A reaction: Only a mathematician would see music this way! He is defending his account of the unconscious mind. The proposal that we unconsciously count sounds highly implausible. He needs to recognise the patterns that ground mathematics.