Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'talk', 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics' and 'The Roots of Reference'

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
     Full Idea: Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.
     From: Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3
     A reaction: A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
     Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature.
     From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson]
     Full Idea: An intelligible metaphysics will assign a central place to the idea of people (= speakers) with a location in public space and time.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §III)
     A reaction: The 'location' is the interesting bit, requiring people to be bodies, not abstractions. A big, plausible claim, but hard to prove.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Sentences held true (the linguistic representatives of beliefs) determine the meanings of the words they contain.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §II)
     A reaction: Maybe. Historically, truth and belief presumably precede words and sentences. But words separate off from beliefs very easily. I'm not convinced. Words initiate language, not beliefs?