55 ideas
24146 | All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All the major problems were formulated before Socrates. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[064]) | |
A reaction: So much for it all being 'footnotes to Plato'! Nietzsche's lectures on the pre-Socratics are in print. Given how little survives, this idea is surprising. Nietzsche knew enough to infer a lot of what is lost. |
24142 | What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What can be made out of humans: this is what matters to superior human beings. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[435]) | |
A reaction: That seems to sum up the main aim of Nietzsche's philosophy. What would we then do if the aim was somehow achieved? Does he seriously think that one magnificent ubermensch could achieve this aim? |
24143 | Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It is sufficient if we [thinkers] come to agree about a totality of methodological presuppositions - about 'provisional truths' that we want to use as a guideline for our work. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[449]) | |
A reaction: Descartes attempted this. Maybe Frege is another attempt. Husserl, perhaps? Parmenides? Hume? Lewis? It is hard to imagine Nietzsche joining in a professional consensus! He has just rejected systems. |
24125 | Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Aristotle probably had his best moments when he coldly and clearly (and joyfully) enjoyed the sensual sham of the highest generalities. To perceive the world as a system, and as the pinnacle of human happiness: how the schematic mind betrays itself then! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[017]) | |
A reaction: Painful, this. One of my heroes laughing at the other one. I love systems, and love John Richardson's suggestion that Nietzsche was very systematice, despite his protestations. |
11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: Philosophers who oppose conceptual analysis identify their approach as being 'naturalistic'. Philosophy is supposed to be continuous with science, and philosophical theories are to be defended on explanatory grounds, not by a priori intuitions. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 5.2) | |
A reaction: [They cite Papineau 1993, Devitt 1996 aand Kornblith 2002] I think there is a happy compromise here. I agree that any philosophical knowledge should be continuous with science, but we shouldn't prejudge how the analytic branch of science is done. |
24147 | Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A thought is not taken to be immediately certain, but rather a sign, a question mark. That each thought is initially ambiguous and fluctuating, and is in itself only an occasion for multiple interpretations …is experienced by every deep observer. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[092]) | |
A reaction: This idea makes me a little more sympathetic to the hermeneutic view of philosophy, as endless interpretations. I assumed it only referred to texts. A thought is not a done deal, but an occasion for further thought. He says the same of feelings. |
24137 | Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Mathematics contains axioms (definitions) and conclusions from definitions. Its objects do not exist. The truth of its conclusions rests on the accuracy of logical thought. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[307]) | |
A reaction: Not suprising to find Nietzsche defying platonism. This is evidence that he was a systematic philosopher, who knew mathematics could be a challenge to his naturalism. |
24131 | There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: 'Being' is unprovable, because there is no 'being'. The concept of being is formed out of the opposition to 'nothingness'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[185]) | |
A reaction: Presumably a comment on Hegel's most basic idea. I find both thoughts bewildering. 'Being' is just a generalised (and unhelpful) way of referring to the self-evident existence of stuff. |
24151 | I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I am not interested …in ways of thinking that are not anchored in the body and the senses and in the earth. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[352]) | |
A reaction: Exhibit A for Nietzsche as Naturalist. Indeed, this could be a manifesto for the whole school. I totally and completely and utterly agree with Nietzsche's assertion!. I see the 'anchor' as two-way: thought connects to earth, and thought arises from it. |
24150 | We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We have only one form of understanding - concept, the more general case that subsumes the particular case. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[156]) | |
A reaction: This is precisely Aristotle's problem with scientific explanation - that we aim to understand each particular, but accounts and definitions have to be expressed with universals. |
24138 | Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What we believe the most, everything a priori, is not for that reason more certain, just because it is so strongly believed. Rather, it is perhaps a consequence of the condition for the existence of our species. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[307]) | |
A reaction: This is in defiance of Leibniz and Kant. His proposed explanation is not very convincing. Russell agreed with Nietzsche. |
24130 | An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Belief is already present in every sense impression going back to the very moment it begins: a kind of Yes-saying first intellectual activity! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[168]) | |
A reaction: He seems right that there is an intrinsic commitment to believing sense impressions, even in animals. Presumably more of a default setting than an intellectual choice. |
11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: A growing number of philosophers are attracted to modified forms of empiricism, emphasizing psychological relations between the conceptual system and perceptual and motor states, not semantic relations. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 3.2) | |
A reaction: I suddenly spot that this is what I have been drifting towards for some time! The focus is concept formation, where the philosophers need to join forces with the cognitive scientists. |
24124 | We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We have been granted perspectives in all directions, broader than any humans have ever been granted, everywhere we look there is no end in sight. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[013]) | |
A reaction: Clearly perspectivism is not the simple relativism of being trapped in our own private perspective. What strikes me as missing from Nietzsche's brief thoughts is the question of consensus, and even rational and objective consensus. |
1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature. | |
From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8 |
24145 | Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The entire cognitive mechanism is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification - not aimed at knowing, but taking control of things. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[061]) | |
A reaction: It is my view that we can explain our metaphysics in this way, though I am more realist than Nietzsche, because I think the world has created these capacities within us, so they fit the world. To control, you must know. |
24144 | A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A cognitive mechanism that wants to know itself!! We definitely should have moved beyond this absurd goal! (The stomach that consumes itself! -) | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[018]) | |
A reaction: We see his point, but Nietzsche learns a huge amount about himself by introspection. To know the Self is a cat chasing its tail. I don't have to leave England to study England. |
24139 | A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Individuals contain many more persons than they think. 'Person' is merely a point of emphasis, synopsis of characteristics and qualities | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[363]) | |
A reaction: He makes similar remarks abour character. For Locke 'person'' is a forensic and legal concept, and so must be enduring and unique. |
24133 | I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I have perfected fatalism, through eternal recurrence and preexistence, and through the elimination of the concept 'will'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[214]) | |
A reaction: 'Amor fati' - love of fate - was his oft repeated slogan. We can all understand 'go with the flow', but I'm not sure about anything more universal than that. |
24152 | Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Fate is an inspiring thought for those who understand that they are part of it. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[442]) | |
A reaction: Sounds a bit like the Niagara Falls being inspiring if you are being swept over it. I find the possibility of fatalism neutral, rather than inspiring. |
11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: It is claimed, on the basis of empirical research, that the type of body that an organism has profoundly affects it cognitive operations and the way it conceptualises the world. We can't assume that human minds could inhere in wildly different body types. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Sounds interesting. They cite Lawrence Shapiro 2004. It needs a large effort of imagination to think how a snake or whale or albatross might conceptualise the world, in relation to their bodies. |
11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The language of thought is taken to have subject/predicate form and include logical devices, such as quantifiers and variables. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.1) |
11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The three main options for the ontological status of concepts are to identify them with mental representations, or with abilities, or with Fregean senses. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1) |
24129 | We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Images first, the words applied to images. Finally concepts, not possible until there are words a summary of many images. When see similar images for which there is one word - this weak emotion is the common element, the foundation of the concept. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[168]) | |
A reaction: Unusual to have an account of the origin of concepts in 1884. His theory entails that animals can't have concepts, but presumably they can combine images, and hence recognise things. I think he is wrong, but interestng. Mental files. |
11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: It may be possible to have propositional attitudes without having the mental representations tokened in one's head. ...We may say a chess-playing computer thinks it should develop its queen early, though we know it has no representation with that content. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [Thye cite Dennett - who talks of the 'intentional stance'] It is, of course, a moot point whether we would attribute a propositional attitude (such as belief) to a machine once we knew that it wasn't representing the relevant concepts. |
11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: A standard criticism is that the mental representation view of concepts creates just another item whose significance bears explaining. Either we have a vicious regress, or we might as well explain external language directly. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.2) | |
A reaction: [They cite Dummett, with Wittgenstein in the background] I don't agree, because I think that explanation of concepts only stops when it dovetails into biology. |
11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The view that concepts are abilities (e.g. found in Brandom, Dummett and Millikan) would say that the concept CAT amounts to the ability to discriminate cats from non-cats and to draw certain inferences about cats. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Feels wrong. The concept is what makes these abilities possible, but it seems rather behaviourist to identify the concept with what is enabled by the concept. You might understand 'cat', but fail to recognise your first cat (though you might suspect it). |
11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The abilities view of concepts, by its rejection of mental representation, is ill-equipped to explain the productivity of thought; and it can say little about mental processes. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The latter point arises from its behaviouristic character, which just gives us a black box with some output of abilities. In avoiding a possible regress, it offers no explanation at all. |
11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The structures of concepts are invoked to explain typicality effects, reflective categorization, cognitive development, reference determination, and compositionality. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.5) |
11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The classical theory is that a concept has a definitional structure in that it is composed of simpler concepts that express necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under the concept, the stock example being unmarried and a man for 'bachelor'. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This is the background idea to philosophy as analysis, and it makes concepts essentially referential, in that they are defined by their ability to pick things out. There must be some degree of truth in the theory. |
11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The appeal of the classical theory of concepts is that it offers unified treatments of concept acquisition (assembling constituents), categorization (check constituents against target), and reference determination (whether they apply). | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [See Idea 11128 for the theory] As so often, I find myself in sympathy with the traditional view which has been relegated to ignominy by our wonderful modern philosophers. |
11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The classical view is challenged by the discovery that certain categories are taken to be more typical, with typicality widely correlating with other data. Apples are judged to be more typical of (and have more common features with) fruit than plums are. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This discovery that people use prototypes in thinking has been the biggest idea to ever hit the philosophy of concepts, and simply cannot be ignored (as long as the research keeps reinforcing it, which I believe it does). The classical view might adapt. |
11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: In the light of problems such as the definition of knowledge, many philosophers now take seriously the possibility that our concepts lack definitional structure. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This challenges the classical view, that there are precise conditions for each concept. That view would obviously be in difficulties with atomic concepts, so our account of those might be applied all the way up. |
11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: An objection to the prototype view concerns compositionality. A complex concept often has emergent properties, as when it seems that 'pet fish' encodes for brightly coloured, which has no basis in the prototypes for 'pet' or 'fish'. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I would take 'pet fish' to work like a database query. 'Fish' has a very vague prototype, and then 'pet fish' narrows the search to fish which are appropriate to be pets. We might say that the prototype is refined, or the Mk 2 prototype appears. |
11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: In the prototype theory of concepts, a lexical concept has probabilistic structure in that something falls under it if it satisfies a sufficient number of properties encoded by the constituents. It originates in Wittgenstein's 'family resemblance'. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: It would seem unlikely to be a matter of the 'number' of properties, and would have to involve some notion of what was essential to the prototype. |
11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: Many patently complex concepts don't even have a prototype structure, such as 'Chairs that were purchased on a Wednesday'. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: [The example seems to be from Fodor] I disagree. If we accept the notion of 'refining' the prototype (see Idea 11135), then the compositionality of the expression will produce a genuine but very unusual prototype. |
11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: When it comes to more reflexive judgements, people go beyond the outcome of a similarity comparison. Even children say that a dog surgically altered to look like a raccoon is still a dog. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: We can defend the theory by not underestimating people so much. Most categorisation is done on superficial grounds, but even children know there may be hidden similarities (behind the mask, under the bonnet) which are more important. |
11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: On the prototype theory, categorization is to be understood as a similarity comparison process, where similarity is computed as a function of the number of constituents that two concepts hold in common. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Again it strikes me that 'computing' similarity by mere 'number' of shared constituents won't do, as there is a prior judgement about which constituents really matter, or are essential. That may even be hard-wired. |
11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: The theory theory of concepts says that terms are related as in a scientific theory, and that categorization resembles theorising. It is generally assumed that scientific terms are interdefined so that content is determined by its role in the theory. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.3) | |
A reaction: I never like this sort of account. What are the characteristics of the thing which enable it to fulfil its role? You haven't defined a car when you've said it gets you from A to B. |
11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: A problem with the theory theory of concepts is that it is holistic, saying a concept is determined by its role, not by its constituents. It then seems difficult for different people to possess the same concepts (or even the same person, over time). | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This seems a good objection to any holistic account of concepts or meaning - spotted by Plato in motivating his theory of Forms, to give the necessary stability to communication. |
11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: According to conceptual atomism, lexical concepts have no semantic structure, and the content of a concept isn't determined by its relation to other concepts but by its relations to the world. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.4) | |
A reaction: [They cite Fodor 1998 and Millikan 2000] I like the sound of that, because I take the creation of concepts to be (in the first instance) a response to the world, not a response to other concepts. |
11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: People seem to be able to formulate novel concepts which are left to be named later; the concept comes first, the name second. | |
From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 4.2) | |
A reaction: [This seems to have empirical support, and he cites Pinker 1994] I do not find this remotely surprising, since I presume that human concepts are a continuous kind with animal concepts, including non-conscious concepts (why not?). |
24127 | Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To judge people by intentions! That would be like classifying artists, not according to their paintings, but according to their visions! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[119]) | |
A reaction: What is wrong is to judge an action by any simple single principle. Our nuanced attitude to excuses shows the true complexity of it. 'I didn't mean to do that'. |
24149 | Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All value judgements involve a particular perspective: preservation of the individual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a belief, a culture. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[119]) | |
A reaction: This chimes in with my Aristotelian view of value, as arising out of the thing valued, rather than descending on it from outside. I think more than mere 'preservaation' is at stake. Fostering, cherishing. |
24148 | If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To appreciate and love anything, I must understand it as absolutely necessarily connected with everything that is - therefore I must affirm the goodness of all existence for its own sake. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[117]) | |
A reaction: For those of you out there imagining that Nietzsche was a nihilist…… It's a plausible idea. You could hardly love your dog, but hate the whole universe. A true misanthrope would struggle to love one exceptional person. |
24135 | Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Egoism! But no one has ever asked: what kind of ego! Instead, every person automatically assumes that the ego of every ego is equal. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[287]) | |
A reaction: The implication, I presume, is that you should be egoistic if you have a really excellent ego, but very altruistic if you are a loser. Or a slave. Or a monk. |
24132 | After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: From Socrates onwards arete [virtue] is misunderstood - first it had to reestablish itself over and over, and yet it did not want to do this on an individual basis! But rather tyrannically 'good for all!'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[208]) | |
A reaction: Why not both? The virtues of a good citizen can't be private, but we are all allowed to develop virtues that concern us alone. |
24126 | We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is a multitude of characters hidden within each one of us: and attempts should be made to allow some of them to appear. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[021]) | |
A reaction: So character is not fate, contrary to Heraclitus (his hero). We are more inclined now to see varied characters as social roles (as in Irving Goffman). This idea challenges it, with our intrinsic nature containing variety. |
24136 | Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I conduct the great test: who will endure the thought of eternal recurrence? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[290]) | |
A reaction: He sometimes talks as if eternal recurrence were a cosmic fact, but we should definitely ignore that. This idea captures his idea best, I think - that we should try to live with the prospect of recurrence always in mind. A type of existentialism. |
24154 | If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Whoever wants to have a single experience again must want all of them again. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 29[054]) | |
A reaction: Nehemas says this is the main factual commitment of eternal recurrence (and certainly not that global recurrence actually occurs). It might be expressed in terms of possible worlds. We yearn for recurrence, then dread it? |
24153 | Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If a community is what absolutely determines the nature of humans, then the drive that allows the community to be preserved will be most forcefully developed in them. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 27[030]) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche was a loner, who despised 'the herd' and its dull 'good and evil', but humans are obviously social creatures, who need to raise families, so it seems perverse to despise the values this requires. Note the Marxist view of human nature. |
24134 | There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In truth there is always slavery - whether you want it or not; e.g. Prussian officials. Scholars. Monks. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[225]) | |
A reaction: Not very persuasive examples. Monks are free to join and to leave. Maybe a lot of marriages are close to slavery for one side (usually the woman). Strict slavery has almost ceased in western civilisation (I think!). Nietzsche saw 'the herd' as slaves. |
24128 | After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Earlier we sought God's intentions in history: then an unconscious purposefulness, in a people or an idea. Only recently are we considering the history of animals, and the first insight is that no plan has so far existed. Coincidences have been dominant. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[127]) | |
A reaction: Not a Whig historian then! Presumably Hegel is his main target. In 2024 there is a definite feeling that western democracies are regressing. |
24140 | Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Cause and effect is not a truth but rather a hypothesis - and indeed the one which we use to anthropomorphise the world for ourselves, bringing it in closer proximity to our feelings ('willing' is projected into it). | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[371]) | |
A reaction: That is (I think), we read the gap between thought and action onto natural external events, dividing them up. We treat the flow of events as if they were agent causation. Modern theories seem close to Nietzsche's unified view. |
24141 | Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Our derivation of the sense of time etc. still presupposes time as absolute. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[406]) | |
A reaction: 'Etc.'? I suppose this is meant to pre-empt whatever Bergson might have been planning to say. The idea that time actually is subjective strikes as very wrong. Whether physicists can reduce time to something else is above my pay scale. |