4 ideas
| 6627 | Radical pragmatists abandon the notion of truth [Stich, by Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Some radical pragmatists, such as Stich, are ready to abandon the notion of truth. | |
| From: report of Stephen P. Stich (The Fragmentation of Reason [1990]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.3 n18 | |
| A reaction: Such a proposal strikes me as silly (unless the vacuum left by truth can be filled by something better than just the test of whether 'it works'). It currently strikes me that pragmatism has a sane wing (led by Peirce), and a mad wing. |
| 19382 | Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: I consider abstracta not as real things but as abbreviated ways of talking ...and to that extent I am a nominalist, at least provisionally ...It suffices to posit only substances as real things, and, to assert truths about these. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Reality of Accidents [1688]), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz | |
| A reaction: I am a modern nominalist, in my hostility to a serious ontological commitment to abstracta. You get into trouble, though, if you say there are only objects or substances. Physics says reality may all be 'fields', or something.... 'Truths' is good. |
| 1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
| Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature. | |
| From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8 |
| 4765 | Stich accepts eliminativism (labelled 'pragmatism') about rationality and normativity [Stich, by Engel] |
| Full Idea: Stich accepts a form of eliminativism (which he calls 'pragmatism') about rationality and normativity generally. | |
| From: report of Stephen P. Stich (The Fragmentation of Reason [1990]) by Pascal Engel - Truth §5.3 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the correct position for a Humean empiricist connectionist. Presumably he has some good reasons for eliminating rationality. |