6 ideas
| 8216 | Deconstruction is not neutral; it intervenes [Derrida] |
| Full Idea: Deconstruction, I have insisted, is not neutral. It intervenes. | |
| From: Jacques Derrida (Positions [1971], p.76) | |
| A reaction: This, I think, is because there is in Derrida, as in most French philosophers, a strong streak of Marxism, and a desire to change the world, rather than merely understanding it. Idea 8213 shows the sort of thing he wants to change. |
| 8213 | I try to analyse certain verbal concepts which block and confuse the dialectical process [Derrida] |
| Full Idea: I have tried to analyse certain marks in writing which are undecidables, false verbal properties, which inhabit philosophical opposition, resisting and disorganising it, without ever constituting a third term, withour ever leaving room for a solution. | |
| From: Jacques Derrida (Positions [1971], p.40) | |
| A reaction: [I have simplified his sentence!] Much of Derrida seems to be a commentary on the Hegelian dialectic, and the project is presumably to figure out why philosophy is not advancing in the way we would like. Interesting... |
| 1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
| Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature. | |
| From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8 |
| 22371 | Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot] |
| Full Idea: The determinism which worries the defender of free will is that if human action is subject to a universal law of causation, there will be for any action a set of sufficient conditions which can be traced back to factors outside the control of the agent. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.63) | |
| A reaction: She draws on Russell for this, but neither of them mention whether the causation is physical. Free will seems to imply non-physical causation. |
| 22372 | Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot] |
| Full Idea: We do not expect that everything a rational man does should be done with a motive, ...but we do expect a man to have a motive for many things that he does, and would count anyone who constantly performed troublesome actions without a motive as irrational. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.66) | |
| A reaction: Interestng, because the assessment of whether someone is 'rational' therefore needs a criterion for when a motive seems required and when not. 'Significant' actions need a motive? |
| 22373 | People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot] |
| Full Idea: It makes sense to say that a man acts out of vanity on a particular occasion although he is not in general vain, or even vain about this kind of thing. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.69) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle tells us that virtues and vices are habits, and also have an intellectual component, implying that the person believes in that sort of behaviour. Anyone can have 'a little moment of vanity'. |