6 ideas
| 5998 | From the necessity of the past we can infer the impossibility of what never happens [Diod.Cronus, by White,MJ] |
| Full Idea: Diodorus' Master Argument inferred that since what is past (i.e. true in the past) is necessary, and the impossible cannot follow from the possible, that therefore if something neither is nor ever will be the case, then it is impossible. | |
| From: report of Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]) by Michael J. White - Diodorus Cronus | |
| A reaction: The argument is, apparently, no longer fully clear, but it seems to imply determinism, or at least a rejection of the idea that free will and determinism are compatible. (Epictetus 2.19) |
| 20832 | The Master Argument seems to prove that only what will happen is possible [Diod.Cronus, by Epictetus] |
| Full Idea: The Master Argument: these conflict 1) what is past and true is necessary, 2) the impossible does not follow from the possible, 3) something possible neither is nor will be true. Hence only that which is or will be true is possible. | |
| From: report of Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]) by Epictetus - The Discourses 2.19.1 | |
| A reaction: [Epictetus goes on to discuss views about which of the three should be given up] It is possible there will be a sea fight tomorrow; tomorrow comes, and no sea fight; so there was necessarily no sea fight; so the impossible followed from the possible. |
| 14304 | Conditionals are true when the antecedent is true, and the consequent has to be true [Diod.Cronus] |
| Full Idea: The connected (proposition) is true when it begins with true and neither could nor can end with false. | |
| From: Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 03.4 | |
| A reaction: [Mumford got the quote from Bochenski] This differs from the truth-functional account because it says nothing about when the antecedent is false, which fits in also with the 'supposition' view, where A is presumed. This idea adds necessity. |
| 6456 | Sense-data are neutral uninterpreted experiences, separated from objects and judgements [Angeles] |
| Full Idea: Sense-data are that which is given to us directly and immediately such as colour, shape, smell, without identification of them as specific material objects; they are usually thought to be devoid of judgment, interpretation, bias, preconception. | |
| From: Peter A. Angeles (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1981], p.254) | |
| A reaction: This definition makes them clearly mental (rather than being qualities of objects), and they sound like Hume's 'impressions'. They are not features of the external world, but the first steps we make towards experience. |
| 1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
| Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature. | |
| From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8 |
| 6024 | Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying [Diod.Cronus, by Gellius] |
| Full Idea: No one says or thinks anything ambiguous, and nothing should be held to be being said beyond what the speaker thinks he is saying. | |
| From: report of Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]) by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 11.12.2 | |
| A reaction: A key argument in favour of propositions, implied in this remark, is that propositions are never ambiguous, though the sentences expressing them may be |