13453
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Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
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Full Idea:
If one thought of second-order quantification as quantification over first-level Fregean concepts [note: one under which only objects fall], talk of domains might be regimented as talk of first-level concepts, which are not objects.
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From:
Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)
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A reaction:
That is (I take it), don't quantify over objects, but quantify over concepts, but only those under which known objects fall. One might thus achieve naïve comprehension without paradoxes. Sound like fun.
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13448
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The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
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Full Idea:
We generally take an assertion's domain of discourse to be implicitly restricted by context. [Note: the standard approach is that this restriction is a semantic phenomenon, but Kent Bach (2000) argues that it is a pragmatic phenomenon]
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From:
Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.1)
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A reaction:
I think Kent Bach is very very right about this. Follow any conversation, and ask what the domain is at any moment. The reference of a word like 'they' can drift across things, with no semantics to guide us, but only clues from context and common sense.
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20062
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If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm]
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Full Idea:
If someone wants to kill his uncle to inherit a fortune, and having this desire makes him so agitated that he loses control of his car and kills a pedestrian, who turns out to be his uncle, the conditions of the causal theory seem to be satisfied.
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From:
Roderick Chisholm (Freedom and Action [1966]), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 6 'Deviant'
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A reaction:
This line of argument has undermined all sorts of causal theories that were fashionable in the 1960s and 70s. Explanation should lead to understanding, but a deviant causal chain doesn't explain the outcome. The causal theory can be tightened.
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20054
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There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm]
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Full Idea:
There must be some event A, presumably some cerebral event, which is not caused by any other event, but by the agent.
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From:
Roderick Chisholm (Freedom and Action [1966], p.20), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 4 'Agent'
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A reaction:
I'm afraid this thought strikes me as quaintly ridiculous. What kind of metaphysics can allow causation outside the natural nexus, yet occuring within the physical brain? This is a relic of religious dualism. Let it go.
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