14 ideas
| 19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: In all inductive reasoning we make the assumption that there is a measure of uniformity in nature; or, roughly speaking, that the future will, in the appropriate respects, resemble the past. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.viii) | |
| A reaction: I would say that nature is 'stable'. Nature changes, so a global assumption of total uniformity is daft. Do we need some global uniformity assumptions, if the induction involved is local? I would say yes. Are all inductions conditional on this? |
| 19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: To know that one exists is not to know anything about oneself any more than knowing that 'this' exists is knowing anything about 'this'. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.iii) | |
| A reaction: Descartes proceeds to define himself as a 'thinking thing', inferring that thinking is his essence. Ayer casts nice doubt on that. |
| 19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: To say 'I am not thinking' is self-stultifying since if it is said intelligently it must be false: but it is not self-contradictory. The proof that it is not self-contradictory is that it might have been false. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.iii) | |
| A reaction: If it doesn't imply a contradiction, then it is not a necessary truth, which is what it is normally taken to be. Is 'This is a sentence' necessarily true? It might not have been one, if the rules of English syntax changed recently. |
| 19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: If there is no experience at all of finding out that one is not conscious, or that one does not exist, ..it is tempting to say that sentences like 'I exist', 'I am conscious', 'I know that I exist' do not express genuine propositions. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.iii) | |
| A reaction: This is, of course, an application of the somewhat discredited verification principle, but the fact that strictly speaking the principle has been sort of refuted does not mean that we should not take it seriously, and be influenced by it. |
| 1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
| Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature. | |
| From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8 |
| 19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: Why should a hypothesis which has failed the test be discarded unless this shows it to be unreliable; that is, having failed once it is likely to fail again? There is no contradiction in a hypothesis that was falsified being more likely to pass in future. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.viii) | |
| A reaction: People may become more likely to pass a test after they have failed at the first attempt. Birds which fail to fly at the first attempt usually achieve total mastery of it. There are different types of hypothesis here. |
| 19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: Inductive reasoning covers all cases in which we pass from a particular statement of fact, or set of them, to a factual conclusion which they do not formally entail. The inference may be to a general law, or by analogy to another particular instance. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.viii) | |
| A reaction: My preferred definition is 'learning from experience' - which I take to be the most rational behaviour you could possibly imagine. I don't think a definition should be couched in terms of 'objects' or 'particulars'. |
| 6479 | Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: I'm not convinced by this, as a simple rule. If I spend my whole life doing just the minimum for my own survival, I don't see why I should have to justify that, and I don't see a state is obliged to justify it either. |
| 6450 | Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: My own view is that moral justification must be capable of motivating, but not in virtue of reliance on pre-moral motives. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: This may well be the core and essence of Kantian moral theory. I'm inclined to think of it as 'Kant's dream', which is of ultra-rational beings who are driven by pure rationality as a motivator. People who fit this bill tend to be academics. |
| 6447 | Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: I do not favour the route taken by Hobbes's modern descendants, using game theory, since I believe the impersonal standpoint makes an essential contribution to individual motivation which must be addressed by any ethically acceptable theory. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: The assumption of self-seeking at the core of game theory seems very bizarre, and leads to moral approval of free riders. Nagel offers the best response, which is the Kantian impersonal view. Nagel may be optimistic about motivation, though. |
| 6446 | In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: In pursuit of the kind of objectivity needed in the physical sciences, we abstract even from our humanity; but nothing further than abstraction from our identity (that is, who we are) enters into ethical theory. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: The 'brief' summary of this boils down to a nice and interesting slogan. It epitomises the modern Kantian approach to ethics. But compare Idea 4122, from Bernard Williams. |
| 6477 | I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: It is implicit in the categorical imperative that I can will that everyone should adopt as a maxim only what everyone else can also will that everyone should adopt as a maxim. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: This is a nice move, because it shifts the theory away from a highly individualistic Cartesian view of morality towards the idea that morality is a community activity. |
| 6448 | A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: A legitimate system is one which reconciles the two universal principles of impartiality and reasonable partiality so that no one can object that his interests are not being accorded sufficient weight or that the demands on him are excessive. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This seems an appealing principle, and a nice attempt at stating the core of Kantian liberalism. It is obviously influenced by Scanlon's contractualist view, in the idea that 'no one can object', because everyone sees the justification. |
| 6478 | Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: As things are, democracy is the enemy of comprehensive equality, once the poor cease to be a majority. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.9) | |
| A reaction: This is obvious once you think about it, but it is well worth saying, because it is tempting to think that we live in an 'equal' society, merely because we are equal in things such as voting rights and equality before the law. |