12 ideas
| 17423 | The essence of natural numbers must reflect all the functions they perform [Sicha] |
| Full Idea: What is really essential to being a natural number is what is common to the natural numbers in all the functions they perform. | |
| From: Jeffrey H. Sicha (Counting and the Natural Numbers [1968], 2) | |
| A reaction: I could try using natural numbers as insults. 'You despicable seven!' 'How dare you!' I actually agree. The question about functions is always 'what is it about this thing that enables it to perform this function'. |
| 17425 | To know how many, you need a numerical quantifier, as well as equinumerosity [Sicha] |
| Full Idea: A knowledge of 'how many' cannot be inferred from the equinumerosity of two collections; a numerical quantifier statement is needed. | |
| From: Jeffrey H. Sicha (Counting and the Natural Numbers [1968], 3) |
| 17424 | Counting puts an initial segment of a serial ordering 1-1 with some other entities [Sicha] |
| Full Idea: Counting is the activity of putting an initial segment of a serially ordered string in 1-1 correspondence with some other collection of entities. | |
| From: Jeffrey H. Sicha (Counting and the Natural Numbers [1968], 2) |
| 1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
| Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature. | |
| From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8 |
| 3282 | The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: I believe the general form of moral reasoning is to put yourself in other people's shoes. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §9) |
| 3278 | An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: What makes a system egalitarian is the priority it gives to the claims of those whose overall life prospects put them at the bottom. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §6) |
| 3275 | Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: Egalitarianism was once opposed to aristocratic values, but now it is opposed by adherents of two non-aristocratic values: utility (increase benefit, even if unequally) and individual rights (which redistribution violates). | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §2) |
| 3281 | The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §8) |
| 3277 | In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: In assessing equality of claims, it must be decided whether to use a single, objective standard, or whether interests should be ranked by the person's own estimation. Also should they balance momentary or long-term needs? | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §6) |
| 3274 | Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: The communitarian defence of equality says it is good for society as a whole, whereas the individualistic defence defends equality as a correct distributive principle. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §2) |
| 3273 | Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: Contemporary political debate recognises four types of equality: political, social, legal and economic. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §1) | |
| A reaction: Meaning equality of 1) power and influence, 2) status and respect, 3) rights and justice, 4) wealth. |
| 3276 | A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: The morality of rights tends to be a limited, even minimal, morality. It leaves a great deal of human life ungoverned by moral restrictions or requirements. | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §5) |