23669
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Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid]
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Full Idea:
Those philosophers who attribute to matter the power of gravitation, and other active powers, teach us, at the same time, that matter is a substance altogether inert, and merely passive; …that those powers are impressed on it by some external cause.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power [1788], 6)
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A reaction:
This shows the dilemma of the period, when 'laws of nature' were imposed on passive matter by God, and yet gravity and magnetism appeared as inherent properties of matter.
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23666
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It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid]
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Full Idea:
It is evident that a power is a quality, and cannot exist without a subject to which it belongs. That power may exist without any being or subject to which that power may be attributed, is an absurdity, shocking to every man of common understanding.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power [1788], 1)
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A reaction:
This is understandble in the 18th C, when free-floating powers were inconceivable, but now that we have fields and plasmas and whatnot, we can't rule out pure powers as basic. However, I incline to agree with Reid. Matter is active.
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22449
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When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
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Full Idea:
One might think that 'is red' means the same as 'seems red to most people', forgetting that when asked if an object is red we look at it to see if it is red, and not in order to estimate the reaction that others will have to it.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.23)
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A reaction:
True, but we are conscious of our own reliability as observers (e.g. if colourblind, or with poor hearing or eyesight). I don't take my glasses off, have a look, and pronounce that the object is blurred. Ordinary language philosophy in action.
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22451
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All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
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Full Idea:
There is a great deal that all men have in common; all need affection, the cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.33)
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A reaction:
There seem to be some people who don't need affection or a place in a community, though it is hard to imagine them being happy. These kind of facts are the basis for any sensible cognitivist view of ethics. They are basic to Foot's view.
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22452
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Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
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Full Idea:
Do we know what we mean by saying that anything has value, or even that we value it, as opposed to wanting it or being prepared to go to trouble to get it?
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From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.35)
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A reaction:
Well, I value Rembrandt paintings, but have no aspiration to own one (and would refuse it if offered, because I couldn't look after it properly). And 'we' don't want to move the Taj Mahal to London. She has not expressed this good point very well.
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8383
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Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane]
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Full Idea:
A famous example of Thomas Reid: day regularly follows night, and night regularly follows day. There is therefore a constant conjunction between night and day. But day does not cause night, nor does night cause day.
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From:
report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power [1788]) by Tim Crane - Causation 1.2.2
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A reaction:
Not a fatal objection to Hume, of course, because in the complex real world there are huge numbers of nested constant conjunctions. Night and the rotation of the Earth are conjoined. But how do you tell which constant conjunctions are causal?
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23667
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Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid]
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Full Idea:
A train of events following one another ever so regularly, could never lead us to the notion of a cause, if we had not, from our constitution, a conviction of the necessity of a cause for every event.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power [1788], 5)
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A reaction:
Presumably a theist like Reid must assume that the actions of God are freely chosen, rather than necessities. It's hard to see why this principle should be innate in us, and hard to see why it must thereby be true. A bit Kantian, this idea.
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23670
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Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid]
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Full Idea:
A Newtonian philosopher …confesses his ignorance of the true cause of magnetic motion, and thinks that his business, as a philosopher, is only to find from experiment the laws by which it is regulated in all cases.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power [1788], 6)
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A reaction:
Since there is a 'true cause', that implies that the laws don't actively 'regulate' the magnetism, but only describe its regularity, which I think is the correct view of laws.
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