Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'talk', 'On the Frame of Reference' and 'Nietzsche's Immoralism'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification

10009	Substitutional quantification is just a variant of Tarski's account [Wallace, by Baldwin]
	Full Idea: In a famous paper, Wallace argued that all interpretations of quantifiers (including the substitutional interpretation) are, in the end, variants of that proposed by Tarski (in 1936).
	From: report of Wallace, J (On the Frame of Reference [1970]) by Thomas Baldwin - Interpretations of Quantifiers
	A reaction: A significant-looking pointer. We must look elsewhere for Tarski's account, which will presumably subsume the objectual interpretation as well. The ontology of Tarski's account of truth is an enduring controversy.

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention

1556	By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
	Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature.
	From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility

22474	Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot]
	Full Idea: Moral, as opposed to aesthetic, evaluation does require some distinction between actions for which we are responsible and those for which we are not responsible.
	From: Philippa Foot (Nietzsche's Immoralism [1991], p.154)
	A reaction: It is hard to disagree with this, but difficult to give a precise account of responsibility, probably because it is not an all-or-nothing matter. If we accept responsibility for our controlled actions, why not for our considered aesthetic judgements?

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice

22472	The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality [Foot]
	Full Idea: I wonder whether the practice of justice may not absolutely require a certain recognition of equality between human beings, not a pretence of the equality of talents, but something deeper.
	From: Philippa Foot (Nietzsche's Immoralism [1991], p.152)
	A reaction: {My 'something deeper' is expressed by Foot in a quotation from Gertrude Stein]. This may well be the most fundamental division which runs across a society - between those who accept and those reject human equality.