5 ideas
8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
Full Idea: In characterizing an observational episode or state as 'knowing', we are not giving an empirical description of it; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. | |
From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123) | |
A reaction: McDowell has made the Kantian phrase 'the logical space of reasons' very popular. This is a very nice statement of the internalist view of justification, with which I sympathise more and more. It is a rationalist coherentist view. It needn't be mystical! |
8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
Full Idea: Observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form 'X is a reliable symptom of Y'. | |
From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123) | |
A reaction: This is a nicely observed version of the regress problem with justification. I would guess that foundationalists would simply deny that this further knowledge is required; 'this is green' arises out of the experience, but it is not an inference. |
1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature. | |
From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8 |
8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |
Full Idea: One can only have the concept of green by having a whole battery of concepts of which it is one element. | |
From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.120) | |
A reaction: This points in the direction of holism about language and thought, but need not imply it. It might be that concepts have to be learned in small families. It is not clear, though, what is absolutely essential to 'green', except that it indicates colour. |
9626 | A structure is an abstraction, focussing on relationships, and ignoring other features [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: A structure is the abstract form of a system, focussing on the interrelationships among the objects, and ignoring any features of them that do not affect how they relate to other objects in the system. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Structure and Ontology [1989], 146), quoted by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.4 | |
A reaction: I find this account very attractive, even though it appeals to supposedly outmoded psychological abstractionism. It seems pretty close to Aristotle's view of things. Shapiro's account must face up to Frege's worries about these matters. |