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All the ideas for 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy', 'The Intelligence of Evil' and 'fragments/reports'

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
There is no longer anything on which there is nothing to say [Baudrillard]
     Full Idea: There is no longer anything on which there is nothing to say.
     From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 17)
     A reaction: Compare Ideas 2937 and 6870. I'm not sure whether Baudrillard is referring to the limits of philosophy, or merely to social taboos. I like Ansell Pearson's view: we should attempt to discuss what appears to be undiscussable.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
The task of philosophy is to unmask the illusion of objective reality [Baudrillard]
     Full Idea: The task of philosophy is to unmask the illusion of objective reality - a trap that is, in a sense, laid for us by nature.
     From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 40)
     A reaction: There is a vast gap between this and the Lockean view (Idea 7653) that philosophers are there to help reveal reality, probably via science. I retain the Enlightenment faith that there is a reality to be found. Baudrillard must be taken seriously, though.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Drunken boat pilots are less likely to collide than clearly focused ones [Baudrillard]
     Full Idea: Two boats on Lake Constance in dense fog are in less danger of colliding if their pilots are drunk than if they are attempting to master the situation.
     From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.196)
     A reaction: Charming, but I think empirical research would prove it false. At least rational pilots know to keep to the right (?) when a shape looms through the fog. I prefer rational pilots, but then I am one of those sad people who admires the Enlightenment.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Contradiction is impossible [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Antisthenes said that contradiction is impossible.
     From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by Aristotle - Topics 104b21
     A reaction: Aristotle is giving an example of a 'thesis'. It should be taken seriously if a philosopher proposes it, but dismissed as rubbish if anyone else proposes it! No context is given for the remark.
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Instead of thesis and antithesis leading to synthesis, they now cancel out, and the conflict is levelled [Baudrillard]
     Full Idea: Gone is the dialectic, the play of thesis and antithesis resolving itself in synthesis. The opposing terms now cancel each other out in a levelling of all conflict.
     From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.129)
     A reaction: This is from someone who approved of 9/11 (p.137 of this text), and seemed to welcome conflict. His idea, which has plausibility, is that the modern media have become a great warm bath that calmly absorbs every abrasive thrown into it.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
Some fools think you cannot define anything, but only say what it is like [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There is an application of that old chestnut of the cynic Antisthenes' followers (and other buffoons of that kind). Their claim was that a definition of what something is is impossible. You cannot define silver, though you can say it is like tin.
     From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1043b
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: Three periods can be distinguished in philosophical logic: the syntactic stage, from Russell's definite descriptions to the 1950s, the dominance of possible world semantics from the 50s to 80s, and a current widening of the subject.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] I've read elsewhere that the arrival of Tarski's account of truth in 1933, taking things beyond the syntactic, was also a landmark.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: Logical formalization forces the investigator to make the central philosophical concepts precise. It can also show how some philosophical concepts and objects can be defined in terms of others.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 2)
     A reaction: This is the main rationale of the highly formal and mathematical approach to such things. The downside is when you impose 'precision' on language that was never intended to be precise.
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: A (logical) model is a set with functions and relations defined on it that specify the denotation of the non-logical vocabulary. A series of recursive clauses explicate how truth values of complex sentences are compositionally determined from the parts.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 3)
     A reaction: See the ideas on 'Functions in logic' and 'Relations in logic' (in the alphabetical list) to expand this important idea.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: If there is indeed no property of existence that is expressed by the word 'exist', then it makes no sense to ask for its essence.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 2)
     A reaction: As far as I can tell, this was exactly Aristotle's conclusion, so he skirted round the question of 'being qua being', and focused on the nature of objects instead. Grand continental talk of 'Being' doesn't sound very interesting.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Without God we faced reality: what do we face without reality? [Baudrillard]
     Full Idea: The eclipse of God left us up against reality. Where will the eclipse of reality leave us?
     From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004])
     A reaction: Baudrillard's distinctive view is that modern culture is thwarting all our attempts to grasp reality, which itself becomes a fiction. The answer is that you are left in the position of the ancient sceptics. Sextus Empiricus (see) is the saviour.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Nothing is true, but everything is exact [Baudrillard]
     Full Idea: Someone said: everything is true, nothing is exact. I would say the opposite: nothing is true, everything is exact.
     From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.210)
     A reaction: In analytical terminology, this appears to say that vagueness is ontological, not epistemological, agreeing with Williamson and others. To say that 'nothing is true', though, just strikes me as silly. What does Baudrillard mean by 'true'?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: A Tarskian model can in a sense be seen as a model of a possible state of affairs.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 3)
     A reaction: I include this remark to show how possible worlds semantics built on the arrival of model theory.
The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: The notion of a possible worlds model was extended (resulting in the concept of a 'spheres model') in order to obtain a satisfactory logical treatment of counterfactual conditional sentences.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 4)
     A reaction: Thus we add 'centred' worlds, and an 'actual' world, to the loose original model. It is important to remember when we discuss 'close' worlds that we are then committed to these presuppositions.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: The idea of 'impossible worlds' was introduced into epistemic logic.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 4)
     A reaction: Nathan Salmon seems interested in their role in metaphysics (presumably in relation to Meinongian impossible objects, like circular squares, which must necessarily be circular).
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: Each possible worlds model contains a set of possible worlds. For this reason, possible worlds semantics is often charged with smuggling in heavy metaphysical commitments.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 3)
     A reaction: To a beginner it looks very odd that you should try to explain possibility by constructing a model of it in terms of 'possible' worlds.
Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: When the possible worlds semantics were further extended to model notions of knowledge and of moral obligation, the application was beginning to look distinctly forced and artificial.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 5)
     A reaction: They accept lots of successes in modelling necessity and time.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
There is no need to involve the idea of free will to make choices about one's life [Baudrillard]
     Full Idea: There is no need to involve the idea of free will to make choices about one's life.
     From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 57)
     A reaction: Someone who believed that free will was metaphysically possible, but that they themselves lacked it, might feel paralysed, defeated or fatalistic about their decision-making. But that would be like falsely believing you were fatally ill.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
In modern times, being useless is the essential aesthetic ingredient for an object [Baudrillard]
     Full Idea: Since the nineteenth century it has been art's claim that it is useless...so it is enough to elevate any object to uselessness to turn it into a work of art...and obsolete useless objects automatically acquire an aesthetic aura.
     From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.111)
     A reaction: Art is 'purposive without purpose' (Kant). An nice summary of the situation, and this seems to explain the role of Duchamp's famous urinal, up on the wall and rendered useless. The obvious rebellion, though, is Arts and Crafts.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Good versus evil has been banefully reduced to happiness versus misfortune [Baudrillard]
     Full Idea: The ideal opposition between good and evil has been reduced to the idealogical oppositions between happiness and misfortune. The reduction of good to happiness is as baneful as that of evil to misfortune.
     From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.139)
     A reaction: A nice example is the use in the media of the word 'tragic' for every misfortune. See the debate over the translation of the Greek 'eudaimonia'. 'Happiness' seems the wrong translation, if it leads to comments like Baudrillard's.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
I would rather go mad than experience pleasure [Antisthenes (I)]
     Full Idea: I would rather go mad than experience pleasure.
     From: Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.3
     A reaction: Did he actually prefer pain? If both experiences would drive him mad, it seems like a desire for death. I cannot understand why anyone is opposed to harmless pleasures.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Antisthenes said virtue is teachable and permanent, is life's goal, and is like universal wealth [Antisthenes (I), by Long]
     Full Idea: The moral propositions of Antisthenes foreshadowed the Stoics: virtue can be taught and once acquired cannot be lost (fr.69,71); virtue is the goal of life (22); the sage is self-sufficient, since he has (by being wise) the wealth of all men (8o).
     From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 1
     A reaction: [He cites Caizzi for the fragments] The distinctive idea here is (I think) that once acquired virtue can never be lost. It sounds plausible, but I'm wondering why it should be true. Is it like riding a bicycle, or like learning to speak Russian?
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
Whole populations are terrorist threats to authorities, who unite against them [Baudrillard]
     Full Idea: One way or another, populations themselves are a terrorist threat to the authorities...and by extension, we can hypothesize a coalition of all governments against all populations.
     From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.120)
     A reaction: This may count as left-wing paranoia, but it is a striking thought, which plants an uneasy notion in the mind whenever we see two world leaders disappear behind closed doors for a chat.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
People like democracy because it means they can avoid power [Baudrillard]
     Full Idea: If the people puts itself into the hands of the political class, it does so more to be rid of power than out of any desire for representation.
     From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 54)
     A reaction: Very nice. If we are all in the grips of some biological 'will to power', that needn't be power over huge numbers of other people, merely power over our immediate lives. It can be expressed by building a wall.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Only in the last 200 years have people demanded the democratic privilege of being individuals [Baudrillard]
     Full Idea: Individuality is a recent phenomenon. It is only over the last two centuries that the populations of the civilized countries have demanded the democratic privilege of being individuals.
     From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 55)
     A reaction: I think Aristotle's ethics and politics imply individuality, given that the only purpose of civic society seems to be to enable individuals to flourish and lead virtuous lives. Society is justified, for example, because it makes friendship possible.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
The arrival of the news media brought history to an end [Baudrillard]
     Full Idea: The course of history came to an end with the entry on the scene of the news media.
     From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 83)
     A reaction: The sort of remark for which Baudrillard became famous. It strikes me as nonsense. The view the British people got of the Battle of Trafalgar was even more distorted than their picture of the Battle of El Alamein. We know what he means, though.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Suicide is ascribed to depression, with the originality of the act of will ignored [Baudrillard]
     Full Idea: Suicide is always ascribed to depressive motivations with no account taken of an originality of, an original will to commit, the act itself.
     From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.153)
     A reaction: Apparently research suggests that most suicides are clinically depressed, but even within the depression there is a startling act of will that goes beyond merely feeling bad.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
Pascal says secular life is acceptable, but more fun with the hypothesis of God [Baudrillard]
     Full Idea: What Pascal says, more or less, is that you can more or less content yourself with a secular existence and its advantages, but it's much more fun with the hypothesis of God.
     From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.155)
     A reaction: Pascal will be a bit startled when he reads this, but it is a lovely way to present his idea. It suddenly sounds much more attractive. Life would be much more fun if we lived according to all sorts of startling beliefs. Relating your life to God is one.
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
Antisthenes says there is only one god, which is nature [Antisthenes (I), by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Antisthenes says there is only one god, which is nature.
     From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.32