Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy', 'Open Society and Its Enemies:Hegel and Marx' and 'The Nature of Judgement'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: The rejection of idealism by Moore and Russell was marked in 1898 by the publication of Moore's article 'The Nature of Judgement'.
     From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
     A reaction: This now looks like a huge landmark in the history of British philosophy.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk]
     Full Idea: For Moore and Russell analysis is not - as is commonly understood now - a linguistic activity, but an ontological one. To analyse a proposition is not to investigate language, but to carve up the world so that it begins to make some sort of sense.
     From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4
     A reaction: A thought dear to my heart. The twentieth century got horribly side-tracked into thinking that ontology was an entirely linguistic problem. I suggest that physicists analyse physical reality, and philosophers analyse abstract reality.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: Three periods can be distinguished in philosophical logic: the syntactic stage, from Russell's definite descriptions to the 1950s, the dominance of possible world semantics from the 50s to 80s, and a current widening of the subject.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] I've read elsewhere that the arrival of Tarski's account of truth in 1933, taking things beyond the syntactic, was also a landmark.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: Logical formalization forces the investigator to make the central philosophical concepts precise. It can also show how some philosophical concepts and objects can be defined in terms of others.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 2)
     A reaction: This is the main rationale of the highly formal and mathematical approach to such things. The downside is when you impose 'precision' on language that was never intended to be precise.
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: A (logical) model is a set with functions and relations defined on it that specify the denotation of the non-logical vocabulary. A series of recursive clauses explicate how truth values of complex sentences are compositionally determined from the parts.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 3)
     A reaction: See the ideas on 'Functions in logic' and 'Relations in logic' (in the alphabetical list) to expand this important idea.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: If there is indeed no property of existence that is expressed by the word 'exist', then it makes no sense to ask for its essence.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 2)
     A reaction: As far as I can tell, this was exactly Aristotle's conclusion, so he skirted round the question of 'being qua being', and focused on the nature of objects instead. Grand continental talk of 'Being' doesn't sound very interesting.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner]
     Full Idea: Karl Popper vehemently rejected the essentialism which underpins Plato and Aristotle, taking it to be a major obstacle to political, moral and scientific progress.
     From: report of Karl Popper (Open Society and Its Enemies:Hegel and Marx [1945]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.179
     A reaction: This makes Popper sound like an existentialist, which seems unlikely. Modern essentialism would say the opposite about science - that hunting for external imposed laws is a red herring, and we should try to understand essences.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: A Tarskian model can in a sense be seen as a model of a possible state of affairs.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 3)
     A reaction: I include this remark to show how possible worlds semantics built on the arrival of model theory.
The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: The notion of a possible worlds model was extended (resulting in the concept of a 'spheres model') in order to obtain a satisfactory logical treatment of counterfactual conditional sentences.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 4)
     A reaction: Thus we add 'centred' worlds, and an 'actual' world, to the loose original model. It is important to remember when we discuss 'close' worlds that we are then committed to these presuppositions.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: The idea of 'impossible worlds' was introduced into epistemic logic.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 4)
     A reaction: Nathan Salmon seems interested in their role in metaphysics (presumably in relation to Meinongian impossible objects, like circular squares, which must necessarily be circular).
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: Each possible worlds model contains a set of possible worlds. For this reason, possible worlds semantics is often charged with smuggling in heavy metaphysical commitments.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 3)
     A reaction: To a beginner it looks very odd that you should try to explain possibility by constructing a model of it in terms of 'possible' worlds.
Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: When the possible worlds semantics were further extended to model notions of knowledge and of moral obligation, the application was beginning to look distinctly forced and artificial.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 5)
     A reaction: They accept lots of successes in modelling necessity and time.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
     Full Idea: Moore avoided the problematic correspondence between propositions and reality by identifying the former with the latter; the world consists of true propositions, and there is no difference between a true proposition and the fact that makes it true.
     From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 28 'Refut'
     A reaction: This is "the most platonic system of modern times", he wrote (letter 14.8.1898). He then added platonist ethics. This is a pernicious and absurd doctrine. The obvious problem is that false propositions can be indistinguishable, but differ in ontology.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk]
     Full Idea: Moore rejected the Hegelian view, that a proposition is a unity that defies analysis; instead, it is a complex that positively cries out to be broken up into its constituent parts, which parts Moore called 'concepts'.
     From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4
     A reaction: Russell was much influenced by this idea, though it may be found in Frege. Anglophone philosophers tend to side instantly with Moore, but the Hegel view must be pondered. An idea comes to us in a unified flash, before it is articulated.