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All the ideas for 'Perception', 'The Metaphysics of Causation' and 'Philosophy of Logics'

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55 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
2572 Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack]
     Full Idea: It is surely less plausible to suppose that logical truth consists in correspondence to the facts than that 'factual' truth does.
     From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.6)
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
2570 The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack]
     Full Idea: The definition of truth will have to be, Tarski argues, relative to a language, for one and the same sentence may be true in one language, and false or meaningless in another.
     From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.5)
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
10373 Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Logical form should not have the last word in metaphysics, since it might predicate a property that we have theoretical reason to reject.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.3.1)
     A reaction: These kind of warnings need to be sounded all the time, to prevent logicians and language experts from pitching their tents in the middle of metaphysics. They are welcome guests only,
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
6504 For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Spatial, temporal and causal relations are the only respectable candidates for relations for a physicalist.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], V.4)
     A reaction: This seems to be true, and is an absolutely crucial principle upon which any respectable physicalist account of the world must be built. It means that physicalists must attempt to explain all mental events in causal terms.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
10367 There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: It can be argued that if all facts are logically equivalent, then there is only one fact - the True.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.1)
     A reaction: [he cites Davidson's 'Causal Relations', who cites Frege] This is the sort of bizarre stuff you end up with if you start from formal logic and work out to the world, instead of vice versa.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
6520 If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Some thinkers claim the physical world consists just of relational properties - generally of active powers or fields; ..but an ontology of mutual influences is not an ontology at all unless the possessors of the influence have more substantial features.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.3)
     A reaction: I think this idea is one of the keys to wisdom. It is the same problem with functional explanations - you are left asking WHY this thing can have this particular function. Without the buck stopping at essences you are chasing your explanatory tail.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
6485 When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: When the form of red passes from an object to the eye, the air in between does not become red.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.2)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a crucial and basic fact which must be faced by any philosopher offering a theory of perception. I would have thought it instantly eliminated any sort of direct or naïve realism. The quale of red is created by my brain.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
6521 Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: One thing which is meant by saying that the phenomenal world represents or resembles the transcendental physical world is that the scientific laws devised to apply to the former, if correct, also apply (at least approximately) to the latter.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.3)
     A reaction: This is not, of course, an argument, or a claim which can be easily substantiated, but it does seem to be a nice statement of a central article of faith for representative realists. The laws of the phenomenal world are the only ones we are going to get.
6509 Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: A representative realist believes that at least some of the properties that are ostensively demonstrable in virtue of being exemplified in sense-data are of the same kind as some of those exemplified in physical objects.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VII.5)
     A reaction: It is hard to pin down exactly what is being claimed here. Locke's primary qualities will obviously qualify, but could properties be 'exemplified' in sense-data without them actually being the same as those of the objects?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
6522 Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: It is useful to identify three kinds of phenomenalism: theistic, sceptical and analytic; the first is represented by Berkeley, the second by Hume, and the third by most twentieth-century phenomenalists.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.4)
     A reaction: In Britain the third group is usually represented by A.J.Ayer. My simple objection to all phenomenalists is that they are intellectual cowards because they won't venture to give an explanation of the phenomena which confront them.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
6502 Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Many modern physicalists first analyse perception as no more than the acquisition of beliefs or information through the senses, and then analyse belief and the possession of information in causal or dispositional terms.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], V.1)
     A reaction: (He mentions Armstrong, Dretske and Pitcher). A reduction to dispositions implies behaviourism. This all sounds more like an eliminativist strategy than a reductive one. I would start by saying that perception is only information after interpretation.
6513 Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Molyneux's Problem is whether someone who was born blind and acquired sight would be able to recognise, on sight, which shapes were which; that is, would they see which shape was the one that felt so-and-so?
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VIII.7)
     A reaction: (Molyneux wrote a letter to John Locke about this). It is a good question, and much discussed in modern times. My estimation is that the person would recognise the shapes. We are partly synaesthetic, and see sharpness as well as feeling it.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
6512 Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Primary qualities and secondary qualities are often distinguished on the grounds that secondaries are restricted to one sensory modality, but primaries can appear in more.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VIII.7)
     A reaction: This distinction seems to me to be accurate and important. It is not just that the two types are phenomenally different - it is that the best explanation is that the secondaries depend on their one sense, but the primaries are independent.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
6497 We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: The idea that objects do not possess secondary qualities intrinsically rests on the thought that they do not figure in the physicist's account of the world; ..as they are causally idle, no purpose is served by attributing them to objects.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], III.1)
     A reaction: On the whole I agree with this, but colours (for example) are not causally idle, as they seem to affect the behaviour of insects. They are properties which can only have a causal effect if there is a brain in their vicinity. Physicists ignore brains.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
6494 If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: If there are good reasons for thinking that physical objects are not literally coloured, and one also refuses to attribute them to sense-contents, then one will have the bizarre theory (which has been recently adopted) that nothing is actually coloured.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.7)
     A reaction: It seems to me that objects are not literally coloured, that the air in between does not become coloured, and that my brain doesn't turn a funny colour, so that only leaves colour as an 'interior' feature of certain brain states. That's how it is.
6499 Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Shape can be directly experienced by either touch or sight, which are subjectively different; but colour and sound can be directly experienced only through experiences which are subjectively like sight and hearing.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], III.1)
     A reaction: This seems to be a key argument in support of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It seems to me that the distinction may be challenged and questioned, but to deny it completely (as Berkeley and Hume do) is absurd.
6500 If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: As secondary qualities are tailored to match senses, a proliferation of senses would lead to a proliferation of secondary qualities.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], III.1)
     A reaction: One might reply that if we experienced, say, magnetism, we would just be discerning a new fine grained primary quality, not adding something new to the ontological stock of properties in the world. It is a matter of HOW we experience the magnetism.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
6484 Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: The representative theory of perception is found in Locke, and is adopted by most moderate empiricists.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.2)
     A reaction: This is, I think, my own position. Anything less than fairly robust realism strikes me as being a bit mad (despite Berkeley's endless assertions that he is preaching common sense), and direct realism seems obviously false.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
6508 Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: The sense-datum theorist is either a representative realist or a phenomenalist (with which we can classify idealism for present purposes).
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VII.5)
     A reaction: The only alternative to these two positions seems to be some sort of direct realism. I class myself as a representative realist, as this just seems (after a very little thought about colour blindness) to be common sense. I'm open to persuasion.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
6480 Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: I understand sense-data as having no intrinsic intentionality; that is, though it may suggest, by habit, things beyond it, in itself it possesses only sensible qualities which do not refer beyond themselves.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.1)
     A reaction: This seems right, as the whole point of proposing sense-data was as something neutral between realism and anti-realism
6482 For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are part of physical objects, for objects consist only of actual or actual and possible sense-data; representative realists say they just have an abstract and structural resemblance to objects.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.1)
     A reaction: He puts Berkeley, Hume and Mill in the first group, and Locke in the second. Russell belongs in the second. The very fact that there can be two such different theories about the location of sense-data rather discredits the whole idea.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
6505 Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Resistance to the sense-datum theory is inspired mainly by the fear that such data constitute a veil of perception which stands between the observer and the external world, threatening scepticism, or even solipsism.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VII.1)
     A reaction: It is very intellectually dishonest to reject any theory because it leads to scepticism or relativism. This is a common failing among quite good professional philosophers. See Idea 241.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
6506 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely' or 'red-squarely' or 'senses redly-squarely-tablely' and other variants sound far worse.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VII.5)
     A reaction: This is a comment on the adverbial theory, which is meant to replace representative theories based on sense-data. The problem is not that it sounds weird; it is that while plain red can be a mode of perception, being a table obviously can't.
6507 Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: The defining claim of adverbialism is that the contents of sense-experience are modes, not objects, of sensory activity.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VII.5)
     A reaction: This seems quite a good account of simple 'modes' like colour, but not so good when you instantly perceive a house. It never seems wholly satisfactory to sidestep the question of 'what are you perceiving when you perceive red or square?'
6511 If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: If only modes of sensing are ostensively available, ..then it is a category mistake to see any resemblance between what is available and properties of bodies; one could as sensibly say that a physical body is proud or lazy as that it is red or square.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VII.5)
     A reaction: This is an objection to the 'adverbial' theory of perception. It looks to me like a devastating objection, if the theory is meant to cover primary qualities as well as secondary. Red could be a mode of perception, but not square, surely?
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
6515 An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Any search for an explanation presupposes that there is something in need of an explanation - that is, something which is improbable unless explained.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.3)
     A reaction: Elementary enough, but it underlines the human perspective of all explanations. I may need an explanation of baseball, where you don't.
6517 If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: The fact that order requires an explanation seems to be an a priori principle; ..we assume all possibilities are equally likely, and so no striking regularities should emerge; the sceptic replies that a highly ordered sequence is as likely as any other.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.3)
     A reaction: An independent notion of 'order' is required. If I write down '14356', and then throw 1 4 3 5 6 on a die, the match is the order; instrinsically 14356 is nothing special. If you threw the die a million times, a run of six sixes seems quite likely.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
6481 If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Intentional states are mysterious things; if they are intrinsically about other things, what properties, if any, do they possess intrinsically?
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.1)
     A reaction: A very nice question, which I suspect to be right at the heart of the tendency towards externalist accounts of the mind. Since you can only talk about the contents of the thoughts, you can't put forward a decent internalist account of what is going on.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
6503 Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: It is generally conceded by reductive physicalists that a state of the brain cannot be intrinsically about anything, for intentionality is not an intrinsic property of anything, so there can be no internal objects for a physicalist.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], V.4)
     A reaction: Perhaps it is best to say that 'aboutness' is not a property of physics. We may say that a brain state 'represents' something, because the something caused the brain state, but representations have to be recognised
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
6519 Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Notoriously, Locke's filler for Descartes's geometrical matter, solidity, will not do, for that quality collapses on examination into a composite of the dispositional-cum-relational propery of impenetrability, and the secondary quality of hardness.
     From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.3)
     A reaction: I would have thought the problem was that 'matter is solidity' turns out on analysis to be a tautology. We have a handful of nearly synonymous words for matter and our experiences of it, but they boil down to some 'given' thing for which we lack words.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
10359 In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The questions about causation concern their relata (in space-time, how fine-grained, how many?) and the metaphysics (distinguish causal sequences from others, the direction of causation, selecting causes among pre-conditions?).
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], Intro)
     A reaction: A very nice map (which has got me thinking about restructuring this database). I can't think of a better way to do philosophy than this (let's hear it for analysis - but the greatest role models for the approach are Aristotle and Aquinas).
10372 Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: It is not clear whether causation is transitive. For example, if a boulder roll's towards a hiker's head, causing the hiker to duck, which causes the hiker to survive, it does not seem that the rolling boulder causes the survival of the hiker.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.2)
     A reaction: Maybe survival is not an event or an effect. How many times have I survived in my life? We could, though, say that the hiker strained a muscle as he or she ducked. But then it is unclear whether the boulder caused the muscle-strain.
10374 There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Theories of causal connection are: nomological subsumption, statistical correlation, counterfactual dependence, agential manipulability, contiguous change, energy flow, physical processes, property transference, primitivism and eliminativism.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.3.1)
     A reaction: Schaffer reduces these to probability and process. I prefer the latter. The first two are wrong, the third right but superficial, the fourth wrong, the fifth, sixth and seventh on the right lines, the eighth wrong, the ninth tempting, and the last wrong.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
10366 Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The main argument for causation being transcendent (rather than being immanent in nature) is that absences can be involved in causal relations. Thus a rock-climber is caused to survive by not falling.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.1)
     A reaction: I don't like that. The obvious strategy is to redescribe the events. Even being hit with a brick could be described as an 'absence of brick-prevention'. So not being hit by a brick can be described as 'presence of brick prevention'.
10377 Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: One problem case for the process view of causation is 'disconnection'. If a brick breaks a window by being fired from a catapult, a latch is released which was preventing the catapult from firing, so the 'process' is just internal to the catapult.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.1)
     A reaction: Schaffer says the normal reply is to deny that the catch-releasing is genuinely causal. I would have thought we should go more fine-grained, and identify linked components of the causal process.
10378 A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: A problem case for the process view of causation is 'misconnection'. A process may be connected to an effect, without being causal, as when someone watches an act of vandalism in dismay.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.1)
     A reaction: This is a better objection to the process view than Idea 10377. If I push a window with increasing force until it breaks, the process is continuous, but it suddenly becomes a cause.
10382 Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: It might be that if causation is said to be a process, then a process is nothing more than a causal sequence, so that causation is primitive.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: This again is tempting (as well as the primitivist view of probabilistic causation). If one tries to define a process as mere chronology, then the causal and accidental are indistinguishable. I take the label 'primitive' to be just our failure.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
10375 At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The traditional view that the direction of causation is the direction of time has been challenged, by the direction of forking, by overdetermination, by independence, and by manipulation, which all seem to be one-directional features.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.3.1)
     A reaction: Personally I incline to the view that time is prior, and fixes the direction of causation. I'm not sure that 'backward causation' can be stated coherently, even if it is metaphysically or naturally possible.
10389 Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Reasons for causal order being temporal order are that otherwise the effect might occur but the cause then get prevented, ..and that they must be the same, because the temporal order can only be analysed in terms of the causal order.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.2)
     A reaction: If one took both time and causation as primitive, then the second argument would be void. The first argument, though, sounds pretty overwhelming to me.
10390 Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Reasons for denying that causal order is temporal order are that time travel seems possible, that cause and effect can be simultaneous, because joint effects have temporal order without causal connection, and because backward causation may exist.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.2)
     A reaction: The possibility of time travel and backward causation can clearly be doubted, and certainly can't be grounds for one's whole metaphysics. The other two need careful analysis, but I think they can be answered. Causation is temporal.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
10380 Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Primitivism arises from our failure to reduce causation, but also from causation being too central to reduce. The probability and process accounts are said to be inevitably circular, as they cannot be understood without reference to causation.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: This is very tempting. The primitive view, though, must deal with the direction problem, which may suggest that time is even more primitive. Can we have a hierarchy of primitiveness? To be alive is to be causal.
10385 If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The three main objections to causation being primitive are that causation can't be anything more than what we observe, or that such a primitive is too spooky to be acceptable, or that primitivism leads to elimination of causation.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: [summarised] I don't like the first (Humean) view. I suspect that anything which we finally decide has to be primitive (time, for example) is going to be left looking 'spooky', and I suspect that eliminativism is just Humeanism in disguise.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
10387 The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The concepts of 'event', 'law', 'cause' and 'explanation' are nomic concepts which serve to allow a systematic understanding of science; they do not themselves appear in the equations.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: This is a criticism of Russell's attempt to eliminate causation from science. It shows that there has to be something we can call 'metascience', which is the province of philosophers, since scientists don't have much interest in it.
10388 Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Causation can't be eliminated if it is needed to explain persistence, explanation, disposition, perception, warrant, action, responsibility, mental functional role, conceptual content, and reference. It's elimination would be catastrophic.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: [compressed list] I think I am going to vote for the view that causation is one of the primitives in the metaphysics of nature, so I have to agree with this. Most of the listed items, though, are controversial, so eliminativists are not defeated.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
10384 If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Causation seems to be primitive if the same laws and patterns of events might embody three different possible causes, as when two magicians cast the same successful spell, each with a 50% chance of success, and who was successful is unclear.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: I'm cautious when the examples involve magic. It implies that the process that leads to the result will be impossible to observe, but if magic never really happens, then the patterns of events will always be different.
10386 If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The view that causation is primitive can be defended against Humean critics by saying that causation can be directly observed in the will or our bodies, or that it can be inferred as the best explanation.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: I like both views, and have just converted myself to the primitivist view of causation! I can't know the essence of a tree, because I am not a tree, but I can know the essence of causation. The Greek fascination with explaining movement is linked.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
10361 Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Events are relatively coarse-grained, unlike facts; so the event of John's saying 'hello' seems to be the same event as John's saying 'hello' loudly, while they seem to be different facts.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1)
     A reaction: The example seems good support for facts, since saying 'hello' loudly could have quite different effects from just saying 'hello'. I also incline temperamentally towards a fine-grained account, because it is more reductivist.
10360 Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The standard view make causal relata events (Davidson, Kim, Lewis), but there is considerable support for facts (Bennett, Mellor), and occasional support for features (Dretske), tropes (Campbell), states of affairs (Armstrong), and situations and aspects.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1)
     A reaction: An event is presumed to be concrete, while a fact is more abstract (a proposition, perhaps). I'm always drawn to 'processes' (because they are good for discussing the mind), so an event, as a sort of natural process, looks good.
10362 One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The view that there are two causal relata is widely assumed but seldom defended. But the account based on 'effectual difference' says the form is 'c causes e rather than e*'. One might defend four relata, in 'c rather than c* causes e rather than e*'.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] This doesn't sound very plausible to me. How do you decide which is e*? If I lob a brick into the crowd, it hits Jim rather than - who?
10368 If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Theorists who reject both events and facts as causal relata do so because the relata must be immanent in nature, and thus not facts, but also fine-grained and thus not events.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.2)
     A reaction: Kim, however, offers a fine-grained account of events (as triples), and Bennett individuates them even more finely (as propositions), so events might be saved. Descriptions can be very fine-grained.
10383 The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The primitivist about causation might say that the notion of an event (or other relata) cannot be understood without reference to causation, because properties themselves are individuated by their causal role.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: Having enthusiastically embraced the causal view of properties (see Shoemaker and Ellis), I suddenly realise that I seem required to embrace primitivism about causation, which I hadn't anticipated! I've no immediate problem with that.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
10393 Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The main argument against saying that there is no basis for selecting the one cause of an event is that our selections are too predictable to be without a basis.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.3)
     A reaction: The problem is that we CAN, if we wish, whimsically pick out any pre-condition of an event for discussion (e.g. the railways before WW1). I would say that sensitivity to nature leads us to a moderately correct selection of 'the' cause.
10394 Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Another argument against the view that there is no basis for selecting 'the' cause is that we have no concept of causation without such a selection.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.3)
     A reaction: Good. Otherwise we could only state the conditions preceding an event, and then every event that occurred at any given moment in a region would have the same cause. How can 'the' cause be necessary, and yet capricious?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
10376 The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: If Pam threw the brick that broke the window, then Bob (who refrained) might be a more reliable vandal, so that Pam's throw might have made the shattering less likely, so probability-raising is not necessary for causation.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1)
     A reaction: That objection looks pretty conclusive to me. I take the probabilistic view to be a non-starter.
10381 All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive: nomological - to distinguish laws from generalizations; statistical - to decide background; counterfactual - decide background; agent intervention - to understand intervention.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: I don't need much convincing that the probabilistic view is wrong. To just accept causation as primitive seems an awful defeat for philosophy. We should be able to characterise it, even if we cannot know its essence.