99 ideas
3426 | If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim] |
Full Idea: If we reduce one theory to another, we reduce the number of independent assumptions about the world. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.215) |
3431 | Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim] |
Full Idea: Supervenience opens up the possibility of a relationship that gives us determination, or dependence, without reduction (as beauty supervenes on physical properties, but can't be given a physical definition). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.223) | |
A reaction: Beauty is a bad analogy, since it rather obviously involves a beholder. There is nothing more to a statue than a substance of a certain shape. There are no good analogies for this sort of supervenience, because it doesn't exist. |
6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Spatial, temporal and causal relations are the only respectable candidates for relations for a physicalist. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], V.4) | |
A reaction: This seems to be true, and is an absolutely crucial principle upon which any respectable physicalist account of the world must be built. It means that physicalists must attempt to explain all mental events in causal terms. |
3437 | 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim] |
Full Idea: Physicalists are fond of saying that physical facts determine all the facts. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.232) | |
A reaction: I totally agree with this slogan. As a view, it seems to me that it is reinforced by essentialism (see the ideas of Brian Ellis), which gives some indication of how facts are physically determined, and why there is no alternative. |
3430 | Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim] |
Full Idea: Resemblance or similarity is the very core of our concept of a property. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.219) |
6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Some thinkers claim the physical world consists just of relational properties - generally of active powers or fields; ..but an ontology of mutual influences is not an ontology at all unless the possessors of the influence have more substantial features. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.3) | |
A reaction: I think this idea is one of the keys to wisdom. It is the same problem with functional explanations - you are left asking WHY this thing can have this particular function. Without the buck stopping at essences you are chasing your explanatory tail. |
3432 | Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Emergent properties are said to be irreducible to, and unpredictable from, the lower-level phenomena from which they emerge (as weight is a 'resultant' property, but the transparency of water is an 'emergent' property). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.228) | |
A reaction: So weight is predictable, but transparency is a surprise? But presumably the transparency of water is totally predictable, once you understand it. Emergent properties are either dualist or reducible, in my view. |
3434 | Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim] |
Full Idea: For the emergentist why pain emerges when C-fibres are excited remains a mystery (a 'brute fact'), but such properties then take on a life of their own as 'downward causation'. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.229) | |
A reaction: I don't think there are any 'brute facts', except perhaps at the lowest level of physics. Whatever happened to the principle of sufficient reason? Is the mind like God - a causal source which is uncaused? |
3436 | Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Arguably, properties must be individuated in terms of their causal powers. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.230) |
15959 | If the substantial form of brass implies its stability, how can it melt and remain brass? [Alexander,P] |
Full Idea: If we account for the stability of a piece of brass by reference to the substantial form of brass, then it is mysterious how it can be melted and yet remain brass. | |
From: Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 02.3) | |
A reaction: [Alexander is discussing Boyle] |
15956 | The peripatetics treated forms and real qualities as independent of matter, and non-material [Alexander,P] |
Full Idea: The peripatetic philosophers, in spite of their disagreements, all treated forms and real qualities as independent of matter and not to be understood in material terms. | |
From: Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 54) | |
A reaction: This is the simple reason why hylomorphism became totally discredited, in the face of the 'mechanical philosophy'. But there must be a physical version of hylomorphism, and I don't think Aristotle himself would reject it. |
3406 | Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG] |
Full Idea: For counterfactuals there is the 'nomic-derivational' approach (which logically derives them from laws), and the 'possible world' approach (based on truth in worlds close to the actual one). | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.141) by PG - Db (ideas) |
6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: When the form of red passes from an object to the eye, the air in between does not become red. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a crucial and basic fact which must be faced by any philosopher offering a theory of perception. I would have thought it instantly eliminated any sort of direct or naïve realism. The quale of red is created by my brain. |
6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: One thing which is meant by saying that the phenomenal world represents or resembles the transcendental physical world is that the scientific laws devised to apply to the former, if correct, also apply (at least approximately) to the latter. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.3) | |
A reaction: This is not, of course, an argument, or a claim which can be easily substantiated, but it does seem to be a nice statement of a central article of faith for representative realists. The laws of the phenomenal world are the only ones we are going to get. |
6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: A representative realist believes that at least some of the properties that are ostensively demonstrable in virtue of being exemplified in sense-data are of the same kind as some of those exemplified in physical objects. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VII.5) | |
A reaction: It is hard to pin down exactly what is being claimed here. Locke's primary qualities will obviously qualify, but could properties be 'exemplified' in sense-data without them actually being the same as those of the objects? |
6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: It is useful to identify three kinds of phenomenalism: theistic, sceptical and analytic; the first is represented by Berkeley, the second by Hume, and the third by most twentieth-century phenomenalists. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.4) | |
A reaction: In Britain the third group is usually represented by A.J.Ayer. My simple objection to all phenomenalists is that they are intellectual cowards because they won't venture to give an explanation of the phenomena which confront them. |
6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Many modern physicalists first analyse perception as no more than the acquisition of beliefs or information through the senses, and then analyse belief and the possession of information in causal or dispositional terms. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], V.1) | |
A reaction: (He mentions Armstrong, Dretske and Pitcher). A reduction to dispositions implies behaviourism. This all sounds more like an eliminativist strategy than a reductive one. I would start by saying that perception is only information after interpretation. |
6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Molyneux's Problem is whether someone who was born blind and acquired sight would be able to recognise, on sight, which shapes were which; that is, would they see which shape was the one that felt so-and-so? | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VIII.7) | |
A reaction: (Molyneux wrote a letter to John Locke about this). It is a good question, and much discussed in modern times. My estimation is that the person would recognise the shapes. We are partly synaesthetic, and see sharpness as well as feeling it. |
6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Primary qualities and secondary qualities are often distinguished on the grounds that secondaries are restricted to one sensory modality, but primaries can appear in more. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VIII.7) | |
A reaction: This distinction seems to me to be accurate and important. It is not just that the two types are phenomenally different - it is that the best explanation is that the secondaries depend on their one sense, but the primaries are independent. |
6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: The idea that objects do not possess secondary qualities intrinsically rests on the thought that they do not figure in the physicist's account of the world; ..as they are causally idle, no purpose is served by attributing them to objects. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], III.1) | |
A reaction: On the whole I agree with this, but colours (for example) are not causally idle, as they seem to affect the behaviour of insects. They are properties which can only have a causal effect if there is a brain in their vicinity. Physicists ignore brains. |
6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: If there are good reasons for thinking that physical objects are not literally coloured, and one also refuses to attribute them to sense-contents, then one will have the bizarre theory (which has been recently adopted) that nothing is actually coloured. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.7) | |
A reaction: It seems to me that objects are not literally coloured, that the air in between does not become coloured, and that my brain doesn't turn a funny colour, so that only leaves colour as an 'interior' feature of certain brain states. That's how it is. |
6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Shape can be directly experienced by either touch or sight, which are subjectively different; but colour and sound can be directly experienced only through experiences which are subjectively like sight and hearing. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], III.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a key argument in support of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It seems to me that the distinction may be challenged and questioned, but to deny it completely (as Berkeley and Hume do) is absurd. |
6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: As secondary qualities are tailored to match senses, a proliferation of senses would lead to a proliferation of secondary qualities. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], III.1) | |
A reaction: One might reply that if we experienced, say, magnetism, we would just be discerning a new fine grained primary quality, not adding something new to the ontological stock of properties in the world. It is a matter of HOW we experience the magnetism. |
6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: The representative theory of perception is found in Locke, and is adopted by most moderate empiricists. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This is, I think, my own position. Anything less than fairly robust realism strikes me as being a bit mad (despite Berkeley's endless assertions that he is preaching common sense), and direct realism seems obviously false. |
6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: The sense-datum theorist is either a representative realist or a phenomenalist (with which we can classify idealism for present purposes). | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VII.5) | |
A reaction: The only alternative to these two positions seems to be some sort of direct realism. I class myself as a representative realist, as this just seems (after a very little thought about colour blindness) to be common sense. I'm open to persuasion. |
6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: I understand sense-data as having no intrinsic intentionality; that is, though it may suggest, by habit, things beyond it, in itself it possesses only sensible qualities which do not refer beyond themselves. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This seems right, as the whole point of proposing sense-data was as something neutral between realism and anti-realism |
6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are part of physical objects, for objects consist only of actual or actual and possible sense-data; representative realists say they just have an abstract and structural resemblance to objects. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.1) | |
A reaction: He puts Berkeley, Hume and Mill in the first group, and Locke in the second. Russell belongs in the second. The very fact that there can be two such different theories about the location of sense-data rather discredits the whole idea. |
6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Resistance to the sense-datum theory is inspired mainly by the fear that such data constitute a veil of perception which stands between the observer and the external world, threatening scepticism, or even solipsism. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VII.1) | |
A reaction: It is very intellectually dishonest to reject any theory because it leads to scepticism or relativism. This is a common failing among quite good professional philosophers. See Idea 241. |
6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely' or 'red-squarely' or 'senses redly-squarely-tablely' and other variants sound far worse. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VII.5) | |
A reaction: This is a comment on the adverbial theory, which is meant to replace representative theories based on sense-data. The problem is not that it sounds weird; it is that while plain red can be a mode of perception, being a table obviously can't. |
6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: The defining claim of adverbialism is that the contents of sense-experience are modes, not objects, of sensory activity. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VII.5) | |
A reaction: This seems quite a good account of simple 'modes' like colour, but not so good when you instantly perceive a house. It never seems wholly satisfactory to sidestep the question of 'what are you perceiving when you perceive red or square?' |
6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: If only modes of sensing are ostensively available, ..then it is a category mistake to see any resemblance between what is available and properties of bodies; one could as sensibly say that a physical body is proud or lazy as that it is red or square. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VII.5) | |
A reaction: This is an objection to the 'adverbial' theory of perception. It looks to me like a devastating objection, if the theory is meant to cover primary qualities as well as secondary. Red could be a mode of perception, but not square, surely? |
6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Any search for an explanation presupposes that there is something in need of an explanation - that is, something which is improbable unless explained. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.3) | |
A reaction: Elementary enough, but it underlines the human perspective of all explanations. I may need an explanation of baseball, where you don't. |
6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: The fact that order requires an explanation seems to be an a priori principle; ..we assume all possibilities are equally likely, and so no striking regularities should emerge; the sceptic replies that a highly ordered sequence is as likely as any other. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.3) | |
A reaction: An independent notion of 'order' is required. If I write down '14356', and then throw 1 4 3 5 6 on a die, the match is the order; instrinsically 14356 is nothing special. If you threw the die a million times, a run of six sixes seems quite likely. |
15975 | Can the qualities of a body be split into two groups, where the smaller explains the larger? [Alexander,P] |
Full Idea: Is there any way of separating the qualities that bodies appear to have into two groups, one as small as possible and the other as large as possible, such that the smaller group can plausibly be used to explain the larger? | |
From: Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 5.02) | |
A reaction: Alexander implies that this is a question Locke asked himself. This is pretty close to what I take to be the main question for essentialism, though I am cautious about couching it in terms of groups of qualities. I think this was Aristotle's question. |
3368 | Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is generally held that there are two broad categories of mental phenomena - qualitative states and intentional states (but what do they have in common?). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 23) | |
A reaction: I am happy to accept this orthodox modern analysis. Putting it more simply: minds exist to enable experience and thought. I judge a priori that the two aspects are not separate. Qualia exist to serve thought, and qualia are necessary for thought. |
3392 | Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim] |
Full Idea: Unless mental properties have causal powers, there would be little point in worrying about them. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.118) | |
A reaction: This doesn't, on its own, actually rule out epiphenomenalism, but it does show why it barely qualifies as a serious theory. One might, in fact, say that we simply can't worry about something which has no causal powers. The powers might not be physical… |
3396 | Experiment requires mental causation [Kim] |
Full Idea: Experimentation presupposes mental-to-physical causation and is impossible without it. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.128) | |
A reaction: So an epiphenomenalist can't do experiments? Kim implies that there is some special mental assessment of the feedback from physical events, but presumably a robot or a zombie could do experiments. Spiders do experiments. |
3397 | Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim] |
Full Idea: A brief reflection makes it evident that most of our beliefs are generated by other beliefs we hold, and "generation" here could only mean causal generation. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.128) | |
A reaction: This seems right, and yet implies an uncomfortable determinism, as if all our beliefs just happened to us. I don't claim proper free will, but I do say there is an element in belief formation which is just caused by bunches of beliefs. Call it character. |
3367 | Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim] |
Full Idea: Mental states are not the only things which exhibit intentionality - words and sentences can also refer to or represent facts or states of affairs. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 22) | |
A reaction: This points to Searle's distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'derived' intentionality (see Idea 3465). We must now explain the difference between verbal intentionality and non-verbal intentionality (both as phenomena, and as information). |
6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Intentional states are mysterious things; if they are intrinsically about other things, what properties, if any, do they possess intrinsically? | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.1) | |
A reaction: A very nice question, which I suspect to be right at the heart of the tendency towards externalist accounts of the mind. Since you can only talk about the contents of the thoughts, you can't put forward a decent internalist account of what is going on. |
3365 | Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim] |
Full Idea: There is referential intentionality (that some of our thoughts refer, or are 'about' something) and content intentionality (that propositional attitudes have content or meaning, often expressed by full sentences). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 21) | |
A reaction: So could these be the external and internal components of content? Which might be the causal/historical component, and the descriptive component? Which might be known by (indirect) acquaintance and description? |
3360 | Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Are pains only sensory events, or do they also have a motivational component (e.g. aversiveness)? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 7) | |
A reaction: A nice question. Given the occasional genuine masochist, and the way some people love tastes that others hate, it has always seemed to me that aversiveness was not a necessary property of pain. I couldn't train myself to like pain, though… |
3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
Full Idea: Some mental phenomena - in particular, sensations like tickles and pains - do not seem to exhibit either reference or content. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 21) | |
A reaction: This could be challenged. These sensations cannot be had without a bodily location, and they give information about possible contact or damage. |
3389 | Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim] |
Full Idea: If inverted qualia, or absent qualia (zombies), are possible in functionally equivalent systems, qualia are not capturable by functional definitions. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.114) | |
A reaction: The point here (I take it) is that we don't have to go the whole hog of saying the qualia are therefore epiphenomenal, although that is implied. How about a fail-safe situation, where qualia do it for me, and something else does the same for zombies? |
3391 | Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG] |
Full Idea: If you crosswire your 'pain box' and your 'itch box', the functionalist says you are in pain if the inputs and outputs are for pain, even though the feeling is of an itch. | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.115) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: If functionalists would indeed say this, then the objection seems to me almost conclusive. But they might well say that such simple crosswiring won't work. Itching won't produce pain behaviour - it lacks the correct function. |
3422 | Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim] |
Full Idea: Externalism about content would have the consequence that most of our knowledge of our own intentional states is indirect and must be based on external evidence. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.207) | |
A reaction: I think this is a confusion, endemic in discussions of externalism. If what Shakespeare meant by 'water' is H2O, or Putnam means by 'elm' what experts say, the point is that their meanings are NOT part of their intentional states, which are bookmarks. |
3363 | We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is not always easy for us to determine what emotion (or even physical sensations) we are experiencing. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 18) | |
A reaction: Confused sensations are, I would have thought, rare. Emotions, I think, are only confused when they are weak, and then a lot of the confusion is merely verbal. Our body and intuitions understand the feeling well enough, but we lack the vocabulary. |
3412 | How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim] |
Full Idea: How do we know that we are angry rather than embarrassed? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.159) | |
A reaction: A very nice question, because the only answer I (or anyone?) can think of is that they are distinguished by their content. Event A is annoying, while event B is embarrassing. Either of those feelings is almost inconceivable without its content. |
3409 | Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim] |
Full Idea: Since Cartesian dualism implies causation from outside of the physical domain, this means there can be no complete physical theory of the physical domain. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.147) | |
A reaction: This, I think, should be taken as a very strong argument against dualism, rather than as bad news for physics. Some exception might make the closure of physics impossible, but the claim that our brain is the exception looks highly suspect. |
3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
Full Idea: If epiphenomenalism were true, it would be a mystery how such things could be known to us. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.130) | |
A reaction: If a brain were asked whether it was conscious, it would presumably say 'yes', but (if epiphenomenalism were true) the cause of that would have to be brain events, and NOT information that it is conscious, which the brain could not have. Big objection. |
3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers doubt the coherence of the very idea of inverted or absent qualia. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.115) | |
A reaction: The possibility of inverted qualia with identical brain structures strikes me as nil, but it would be odd to deny that qualia could be changed by brain surgery, given that insects can see ultra-violet, and some people are colourblind. |
3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Is there anything about the qualitative characters of mental states which, should we come to know it, would convince us that zombies and qualia inversion are not really possible? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.171) | |
A reaction: The issue is what causes the qualitative states, not their 'characters'. This strikes me as falling into the trap of thinking that 'what it is like to be..' is a crucial issue. I think zombies are impossible, but not because I experience redness. |
3359 | Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim] |
Full Idea: Its inability to explain the possibility of "mental causation" doomed Cartesian dualism. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 4) | |
A reaction: This is a modern way of stating the interaction problem. Personally I am inclined to think that dualism was doomed by the spread of the scientific materialist view to every other corner of our knowledge except the mind. Plenty of causes baffle us. |
3369 | Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim] |
Full Idea: Logical behaviourism says any meaningful statement about mental phenomena can be translated without loss of content into a statement solely about behavioural and physical phenomena. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 29) | |
A reaction: Also called analytical behaviourism. If we are supposed to infer the ontology of mental states from language, this makes me cross. Maybe we only discuss mentality in behavioural terms because we are epistemologically, and hence linguistically, limited. |
3428 | Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim] |
Full Idea: Behaviourism can be considered as an attempt to reduce the mental to the physical via definitional bridge principles (every mental expression being given a behavioural definition). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.217) | |
A reaction: Effectively these would (if they had been discoverable) have been the elusive psycho-physical laws (which Davidson says do not exist). The objection to behaviourism is precisely that there is no fixed behaviour attached to a given mental state. |
3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Functionalists take a "realist" approach to dispositions whereas the behaviourist embraces an "instrumentalist" line. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 78) | |
A reaction: A helpful distinction, which immediately shows why functionalism is superior to behaviourism. There must be some explanation of mental dispositions, and the instrumental view is essentially a refusal to think about the real problem. |
3370 | What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Is there even a loosely definable range of bodily behaviour that is characteristically exhibited by people when they believe, say, that there is no largest prime number? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 32) | |
A reaction: This is a highly persuasive argument against behaviourism. Very abstract and theoretical thoughts have no related behaviour, especially among non-mathematicians. I probably believe this idea about numbers, but I can't think what to do about it. |
3371 | Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim] |
Full Idea: Mind-to-behaviour connections are always defeasible - by the occurrence of a further mental state. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 35) | |
A reaction: But then an object's falling under gravity is always defeasible, by someone catching it first. This popular idea is meant to show that there could, as Davidson puts it, 'no psycho-physical laws', but I suspect the laws are just complex, like weather laws. |
3372 | Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim] |
Full Idea: The factors that determine exactly what you are doing when you produce a physical gesture include the customs, habits and conventions that are in force, so it is unlikely that anyone could produce correct behavioural definitions of mental terms. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 36) | |
A reaction: This problem can be added to the problem that it is hard to specify behaviour without reference to mentalistic terms. The point is clearly right, as what I am doing when I wave my hand in the air will depend on all sorts of conventions and expectations. |
3373 | Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim] |
Full Idea: If it is an analytic truth that anyone in pain has a tendency to wince or groan, what about snakes? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 37) | |
A reaction: Snakes do, however, exhibit what looks like 'I really don't like that' behaviour, and their rapid avoidance movements are identical to ours. On the other hand, I'm not quite sure what a snake does what it has a stomach upset. I see Kim's point. |
3379 | Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim] |
Full Idea: Most neurons, it has been said, are pretty much alike and largely interchangeable. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 76) | |
A reaction: This fact, if true, is highly significant, because the correct theory of the mind must therefore be some sort of functionalism. If what a neuron is is insignificant, then what it does must be what matters. |
3388 | Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim] |
Full Idea: Machine functionalism requires a mental state to be a physical realisation of a Turing machine; causal-theoretical functionalism only requires that there be appropriate "internal states". | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.112) | |
A reaction: Searle's objection to the Turing machine version seems good - that such a machine has an implicit notion of a user/interpreter, which is absent from this theory of mind. |
3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is by no means clear that any human could manage to do what Searle imagines himself to be doing in the Chinese Room - that is, short of throwing away the rule book and learning some real Chinese. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.100) | |
A reaction: It is not clear how a rule book could contain answers to an infinity of possible questions. The Chinese Room is just a very poor analogy with what is envisaged in the project of artificial intelligence. |
3393 | How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim] |
Full Idea: On the functionalist account of mental properties, just where does a mental property get its causal powers? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.118) | |
A reaction: That is the key problem. Something can only have a function if it has intrinsic powers (corkscrews are rigid and helix-shaped). It can't be irrelevant that pain hurts. |
3439 | Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim] |
Full Idea: The main obstacle to mind-body reduction is qualia. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.236) | |
A reaction: Personally I am also impressed by Leibniz's Mill (Idea 2109). No microscope could ever reveal the contents of thought. How can it be so vivid for the owner, but totally undetectable to an observer? |
3427 | Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim] |
Full Idea: Most antireductionist arguments focus on the unavailability of bridge laws to effect the reduction of psychological theory to physical theory (as found in reducing the gas laws to theories about molecules). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.216) | |
A reaction: Reduction can, of course, be achieved by identity rather than by bridge laws. I would say that all that prevents us from predicting mental events from physical ones is the sheer complexity involved. Cf. predicting the detailed results of an explosion. |
3424 | Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim] |
Full Idea: The most widely accepted form of physicalism today is the nonreductive variety, ...which combines ontological physicalism with property dualism. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.212) | |
A reaction: I suspect that property dualism is actually in decline, but we will see. I have yet to find a coherent definition of property dualism. If being simultaneously red and square isn't property dualism, then what is it? Sounds like dualism to me. |
3376 | We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim] |
Full Idea: In order to make sense of the empirical character of mind-brain identity, we must acknowledge the existence of phenomenal properties. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 66) | |
A reaction: Mind-brain identity is, of course, an ontological theory, not an epistemological one (like empiricism). I suspect that the basis for my belief in reductive physicalism is an intuition, which I am hoping is a rational intuition. Cf. Idea 3989. |
3413 | Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim] |
Full Idea: The main argument for the physical supervenience of qualia, then, is the apparent conceivability of zombies and qualia inversion in organisms physically indistinguishable from us. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.171) | |
A reaction: Since neither zombies nor qualia inversion for identical brains seem to me to be even remotely conceivable, I won't trouble myself with the very vague concept of 'supervenience'. |
3362 | Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim] |
Full Idea: If one accepts the supervenience of mental on physical, this logically implies that there can only be one Cartesian soul, because such souls are physically indiscernible, and hence mentally indiscernible. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 10) | |
A reaction: Not very persuasive. Brains are certainly discernible, and so are parts of brains. Egos might be mentally discernible. I don't find my notion of personal identity collapsing just because I espouse property dualism. |
3374 | Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim] |
Full Idea: Token physicalism (as opposed to type physicalism) is a weak doctrine which simply says that any event or occurrence with a mental property has some physical property or other. It is not committed to reductionism. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 61) | |
A reaction: Sounds nice, but it seems incoherent to me. How can something have a physical property if it isn't physical? Try 'it isn't coloured, but has colour properties', or 'not a square, but with square properties'. 'Not divine, but divine properties' maybe. |
6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: It is generally conceded by reductive physicalists that a state of the brain cannot be intrinsically about anything, for intentionality is not an intrinsic property of anything, so there can be no internal objects for a physicalist. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], V.4) | |
A reaction: Perhaps it is best to say that 'aboutness' is not a property of physics. We may say that a brain state 'represents' something, because the something caused the brain state, but representations have to be recognised |
3433 | The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim] |
Full Idea: From the emergentist point of view, the reductionists bridge laws are precisely what need to be explained. Why do these mental-physical correlations hold? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.229) | |
A reaction: Everyone is happy with the bridge laws from chemistry to physics, but no one knows (deep down) why those exact laws hold. We need to understand what consciousness is; its cause will then, I think, become apparent. |
3377 | Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim] |
Full Idea: The two best know attempts to analyse away mental states are Armstrong's causal conception of such states (e.g. pain is a neural event caused by tissue damage), and Smart's 'topic-neutral translation'. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 67) | |
A reaction: Armstrong's view certainly seems to be missing something, since his 'pain' could do the job without consciousness. I take Smart's approach to be the germ of the right answer. |
3438 | Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim] |
Full Idea: For the reductionist, no new causal powers emerge at higher levels, which goes against the claims of the emergentist and the non-reductive physicalist. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.232) | |
A reaction: I would say that all higher level causes are simply the sums of lower level causes, as in chemistry and physics. What could possibly produced the power at the higher level, apart from the constituents of the thing? Magic? |
3440 | Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim] |
Full Idea: If reductionism goes, so does the intelligibility of mental causation. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.237) | |
A reaction: Quite so. Substance dualism turns mental causation into a miracle, but property dualism is really no better. If no laws connect brain and mind, you have no account. I don't see how 'reasons are causes' (Davidson) helps at all. |
3375 | If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim] |
Full Idea: If an orange visual image is a brain state then, by the indiscernibility of identicals, some brain state must also be orange. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 64) | |
A reaction: I think this is the Hardest of all Hard Questions: how can I experience orange if my neurons haven't turned orange? What on earth is orangeness? I don't believe it is a 'microproperty' of orange objects; it's in us. |
3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
Full Idea: How do you find out that you believe, rather than, say, doubt or merely hope, that it will rain tomorrow? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.159) | |
A reaction: There should be a special medal created for philosophers who ask reasonable questions which are impossible to answer. They are among the greatest discoveries. |
3394 | Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim] |
Full Idea: There is the "theory" theory of commonsense psychology, and also a "simulation" theory, which says it is not a matter of laws, but of simulating the behaviour of others, using ourselves as models. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.123) | |
A reaction: Using ourselves as models may be the normal and correct way to relate to people within our own culture, but we have to start theorising when we encounter (e.g.) suicide bombers. |
3387 | A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim] |
Full Idea: A culture that lacked our folk psychology would be unintelligible to us, and its language untranslatable into our own. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.110) | |
A reaction: Surely we can manage to discuss the processing life of a robot, without having to resort to anthropomorphic psychology? Its human-style behaviour will fit, but the rest blatantly won't. |
3410 | Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim] |
Full Idea: Freudian depth psychology has now almost achieved the status of folk psychology of the sophisticates. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.158) | |
A reaction: You don't need to be a 'sophisticate' to laugh knowingly when someone makes an embarrassing Freudian slip. Terms like 'neurotic' are commonplace among modern folk. |
3386 | Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim] |
Full Idea: Commonsense psychology seems to have an advantage over scientific psychology: its apparent greater stability. Scientific theories seem to come and go. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.110) | |
A reaction: This seems to make the assumption that the folk are in universal long-term agreement about such things, which seems doubtful. See Ideas 2987 and 3410. |
3382 | A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim] |
Full Idea: The Turing test is too tough, because something doesn't have to be smart enough to outwit a human (or even have language) to have mentality or intelligence. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 97) | |
A reaction: Presumably an alien with an IQ of 580 would also fail the Turing test. Indeed people of normal ability, but from a very different culture, might also fail. However, most of us would pass it. |
3383 | The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim] |
Full Idea: The Turing test is too narrow, because it is designed to fool a human interrogator, but there could be creatures which are intelligent but still fail the test. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 97) | |
A reaction: I think the key test for intelligence would be a capacity for metathought. 'What do you think of the idea that x?' Their thoughts about x might be utterly stupid, of course. How do you measure 'stupid'? |
3408 | Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim] |
Full Idea: States that have the same intrinsic properties - the same neural/physical properties - may have different contents if they are embedded in different environments. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.146) | |
A reaction: This is a way of expressing externalism. It depends what you mean by 'contents'. I struggle to see how "H2O" could be the content of the word 'water' among ancient Greeks. |
3420 | Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim] |
Full Idea: The difference in the two types of 'water' in the Twin Earth experiment seem psychologically irrelevant, for behaviour causation or explanation. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.203) | |
A reaction: A rather important point. No matter how externalist you are about what content really is, people can only act on the internal aspects of it. |
3421 | Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is standard to take contents as truth conditions. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.203) | |
A reaction: This tradition runs from Frege to Davidson, and has been extended to truth conditions in possible worlds. Rivals will involve intentions, or eliminativism about meaning. |
3416 | Content may match several things in the environment [Kim] |
Full Idea: If content is said to be 'covariance' with something in the environment, then the belief that there are horses in the field covaries reliably with the presence of horses in the field, but also the presence of horse genes in the field. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.192) | |
A reaction: That's the end of that interesting proposal, then. Or is it? Looking at the field from a distance this is right, but down the microscope, the covariance varies. The theory lives on. |
3418 | 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim] |
Full Idea: The example of someone claiming "arthritis in my thigh" shows that the content of belief depends, at least in part but crucially, on the speech practices of the linguistic community in which we situate the subject. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.197) | |
A reaction: Personally I find this social aspect to meaning to be more convincing that Putnam's idea that the physical world is part of meaning. It connects nicely with the social aspects of justification. |
3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
Full Idea: An objection to the 'covariance' theory of content is that what you believe is influenced, often crucially, by what else you believe. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.193) | |
A reaction: I can't think of a reply to this, if the covariance theory is suggesting that content just IS covariance of mental states with the environment. Externalism says that mind extends into the world. |
3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
Full Idea: No external factors seem to be required for Fred's belief that he is in pain, or that he exists, or that there are no unicorns. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.198) | |
A reaction: This is an extremely important observation for anyone who was getting over-excited about external accounts of content. Unicorns might connect externally to horns and horses. |
3402 | If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim] |
Full Idea: If someone says "I do and I don't like x", we do not take her to be expressing a literally contradictory belief. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.135) | |
A reaction: It might mean 'one minute I like it, and the next minute I don't', where there seems to be a real contradiction, with a time factor. You can't sustain both preferences with conviction. |
3403 | We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim] |
Full Idea: We attribute to a subject beliefs that are obvious logical consequences of beliefs already attributed to him. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.135) | |
A reaction: Depends what you mean by 'obvious'. Presumably they must be judged obvious to the believer, but only if they have thought of them. We can't believe all the simple but quirky implications of our beliefs. |
15963 | Science has been partly motivated by the belief that the universe is run by God's laws [Alexander,P] |
Full Idea: The idea of a designed universe has not been utterly irrelevant to the scientific project; it is one of the beliefs that can give a scientist the faith that there are laws, waiting to be discovered, that govern all phenomena. | |
From: Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Of course if you start out looking for the 'laws of God' that is probably what you will discover. Natural selection strikes me as significant, because it shows no sign of being a procedure appropriate to a benevolent god. |
6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Notoriously, Locke's filler for Descartes's geometrical matter, solidity, will not do, for that quality collapses on examination into a composite of the dispositional-cum-relational propery of impenetrability, and the secondary quality of hardness. | |
From: Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.3) | |
A reaction: I would have thought the problem was that 'matter is solidity' turns out on analysis to be a tautology. We have a handful of nearly synonymous words for matter and our experiences of it, but they boil down to some 'given' thing for which we lack words. |
3401 | A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim] |
Full Idea: A widely but not universally accepted principle is that causally connected events must instantiate a law. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.133) |
3407 | Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim] |
Full Idea: Some laws are held to be 'strict', and others involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.143) |
15951 | Alchemists tried to separate out essences, which influenced later chemistry [Alexander,P] |
Full Idea: The alchemists sought the separation of the 'pure essences' of substances from unwanted impurities. This last goal was of great importance for the development of modern chemistry at the hands of Boyle and his successors. | |
From: Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 01.1) | |
A reaction: In a nutshell this gives us the reason why essences are so important, and also why they became discredited. Time for a clear modern rethink. |
15981 | Absolute space either provides locations, or exists but lacks 'marks' for locations [Alexander,P] |
Full Idea: There are two conceptions of absolute space. In the first, empty space is independent of objects but provides a frame of reference so an object has a location. ..In the second space exists independently, but has no 'marks' into which objects can be put. | |
From: Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 6) | |
A reaction: He says that Locke seems to reject the first one, but accept the second one. |