15 ideas
1542 | Diogenes of Apollonia was the last natural scientist [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Simplicius] |
Full Idea: Diogenes of Apollonia was more or less the last of those who made a study of natural science. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], A05) by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 9.25.1 | |
A reaction: He quotes Theophrastus |
21546 | We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell] |
Full Idea: Whoever is afraid of symbols can hardly hope to acquire exact ideas where it is necessary to distinguish 1) the variable in itself as opposed to its value, 2) any value of the variable, 3) all values, 4) some value. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.84) | |
A reaction: Not the best example, perhaps, of the need for precision, but a nice illustration of the new attitude Russell brought into philosophy. |
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13) | |
A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy. |
21531 | Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell] |
Full Idea: Meinong's theory says that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true, while Russell's says that this assertion is false. The average man, if he knows his mythology, would probably agree with Meinong. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.19 | |
A reaction: It seems obvious that some disambiguation is needed here. Assenting to that assertion would be blatantly contextual. No one backs Pegasus at a race track. |
21545 | I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell] |
Full Idea: I should prefer to say that there is no such object as 'the round square'. The difficulties of excluding such objects can, I think, be avoided by the theory of denoting. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.81) | |
A reaction: The 'theory of denoting' is his brand new theory of definite descriptions, which makes implicit claims of existence explicit, so that they can be judged. Why can't we just say that a round square can be an intentional object, but not a real object? |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5) | |
A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy. |
489 | Each thing must be in some way unique [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
Full Idea: No one thing among things subject to change can possibly be exactly like any other thing, without becoming the same thing. | |
From: Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B05), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 153.8 | |
A reaction: This is said to be the first ever formulation of the principle of identity of indiscernible. |
483 | Start a thesis with something undisputable [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
Full Idea: In starting any thesis, it seems to me, one should put forward as one's point of departure something incontrovertible. | |
From: Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B01), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.57 |
1544 | Perception must be an internal matter, because we can fail to perceive when we are preoccupied [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Theophrastus] |
Full Idea: That it is the inner air that perceives, as being a fragment of the god, is shown by the fact that often when our minds are preoccupied with other matters we fail to see or hear. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], A19) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 42 |
24042 | The older Diogenes said the soul is air, made of the smallest particles [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
Full Idea: Diogenes [of Apollonia] took the soul to be air, thnking that of all things air is composed of the smallest particles and is a starting point. | |
From: Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], DK 64), quoted by Aristotle - De Anima 405a21 | |
A reaction: This suggests that Diogenes of Apollonia was an atomist, if the soul is made of particles. See also Met 984a5, which says Anaxagoras had the same view. |
5995 | Diogenes of Apollonia offered the first teleological account of cosmology [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Robinson,TM] |
Full Idea: Credit for the first clear assertion of teleological explanation in cosmology goes to Diogenes of Apollonia, for whom air is the divine and intelligent ground of the real and disposes things in the best possible way. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE]) by T.M. Robinson - Classical Cosmology (frags) | |
A reaction: The first teleological explanation seems to be based on a conscious mind. There also emerges the possibility of some sort of non-conscious teleology, closer to the laws of physics than to God. |
488 | Air is divine, because it is in and around everything, and arranges everything [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
Full Idea: Air in itself seems to me to be God and to reach everywhere and to arrange everything and to be in everything. | |
From: Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B05), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 152.22- | |
A reaction: So water and fire and air have been offered as the ultimate explanans, though no one seems to offer earth, which is too grubby and miserable (and was denied a Form by Plato). 'Air is God' could ground a nice modern religious sect. |
484 | Everything is ultimately a variation of one underlying thing [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that all existing things are created by the alteration of the same thing, and are the same thing. | |
From: Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B02), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 151.31- |
486 | Plants and animals can only come into existence if something fixes their species [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
Full Idea: No plant could grow out of the earth, and no animal or any other thing could come into being, unless it were so compounded as to be the same. | |
From: Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B02), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 151.31- |
485 | Things must retain their essential nature during change, or mixing would be impossible [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
Full Idea: If any existing thing were different in its own essential nature, and were not the same thing which was transformed in many ways and changed, in no way could things mix with one another. | |
From: Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B02), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 151.31- |